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# CONSERVATOR OF AMERICANISM

# A Biography by ERIC FISHER WOOD



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### LEONARD WOOD CONSERVATOR OF AMERICANISM

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# LEONARD WOOD CONSERVATOR OF AMERICANISM

**A BIOGRAPHY** 

BY

### ERIC FISHER WOOD

AUTHOR OF "THE WRITING ON THE WALL," "THE NOTE-BOOK OF AN ATTACHE," ETC., ETC.

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TO MY WIFE

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#### NOTE BY THE PUBLISHERS

MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, the subject of this biography, and Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Fisher Wood, the author, are not connected by blood ties.

The author is a "Plattsburger" and his military career is typical of that of hundreds of young Americans, who enthusiastically translated into action the teaching of Leonard Wood, the prophet of Americanism.

During the World War, the author was twice wounded and twice decorated; and although at the beginning of the conflict he was only twentyfive years old, and had had no previous military experience, the end of hostilities found him a Lieutenant-Colonel on the General Staff—a result of the impetus gained at Plattsburg under the inspiration of General Wood's teaching.

As one of the Executive Board of nine members which conducted the Plattsburg Military Training Camps Association, and as a writer and speaker on preparedness, the author frequently came into contact with the subject of this biography, both in an official and in a social way.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wood is a graduate of [vii]

Yale University and was a student of architecture at the École des Beaux Arts in Paris before the War. In 1914 he was Civil Attaché at the American Embassy in that city, and later a founder and commissioned officer of the American Ambulance in France.

When he returned to the United States in 1915 he became an active participant in the Plattsburg movement, and Vice-President of the National Security League.

He served in the British Army during the first six months of 1917, and in July of that year was released from the British forces and commissioned Major of Infantry in the new National Army of the United States.

He is the author of "The Note Book of an Attaché," "The Writing on the Wall," "The Note Book of an Intelligence Officer" and of numerous magazine articles.

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THE idea of writing a biography of Leonard Wood first took shape in my mind as early as 1914.

At that time I was in the American diplomatic service in Europe, where the war, and military matters in general, became the one and only subject of interest. 'One of the all-absorbing topics was the question of America's probable attitude towards the war.

This led to much discussion of American affairs and American men among the civilians and officials with whom I came into contact in France and England, in Germany and Austria.

I then gained a new conception of Leonard Wood, and discovered that his reputation was far higher in Europe than at home. In America we thought of him merely as a competent soldier, but I found that the official classes of the Allies and of the Central Powers rated him not only a great soldier, but as one of the world's greatest administrators; and that they considered Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood the two most notable living Americans.

Since 1914 his own countrymen have seen [ix]

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Leonard Wood in a new light, for his work at Plattsburg, his pleas for preparedness, and his dignified reticence under injustice have elevated him in public opinion at home nearer to the European estimate.

Before commencing the compilation of this biography, I had expected to find, already in print, a great mass of material upon which to base my work, and confidently anticipated being able to study numerous books, either written by Leonard Wood or about him. My search for such readymade material was, however, fruitless. Little or nothing was to be discovered.

I found that he had, for popular consumption, published only one small volume on preparedness, and that that contained no information about himself. It was, in fact, so impersonal that, even inferentially, one could gain little impression of the writer beyond his burning spirit of patriotism.

It was also surprising to find how little he had ever talked about himself, and how seldom he had given others a chance to talk about him or his work.

He has preëminently been "not the speaker but the doer of the word." No living man of equally great achievements has so effectively escaped publicity.

During my past acquaintance with him, as well as in numerous recent interviews, it seemed impossible to obtain from him any material of a

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strictly personal character. He has been most generous in furnishing subject-matter, relating to historical events in which he had participated, but *his* part in these events was passed over lightly or was allowed to drop out of sight altogether.

It therefore became necessary to fall back upon a painstaking research into his official reports—of which there are nearly a hundred volumes, upon my own knowledge of his personality, and upon information gained by me during several years from his associates, past and present.

Among those to whom I am especially indebted for valuable information and strong impressions are the late Theodore Roosevelt, the late Robert Bacon, Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, and Colonel Henry L. Stimson, who was Secretary of War when General Wood was Chief of Staff; also to Mr. Edward Barlow, one of Wood's boyhood playmates; to Captain Patch, who served with him in the Indian campaigns of the Southwest; to General Edwin F. Glenn and General Charles Kilbourne, each of whom has served as his Chief of Staff: to Halstead Dorey, Gordon Johnston, S. M. Williams, Wilbur Smith, Thomas Gowenlock and Landon Thomas, who have at various times served him as aides-decamp or staff officers; and to his sons, Leonard, Jr., and Osborne.

I am also indebted to my mother, Frances [xi]

Fisher Wood, not only for valuable aid in preparing this book for publication, but also for careful genealogical research in Leonard Wood's ancestral lines, resulting in the discovery of the names and records of some four hundred of his American ancestors.

E. F. W.

December, 1919.





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# LEONARD WOOD CONSERVATOR OF AMERICANISM





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# LEONARD WOOD

## CONSERVATOR OF AMERICANISM

#### CHAPTER I

#### ANCESTRY AND BOYHOOD

LEONARD WOOD'S parents were Charles Jewett Wood, born at Leicester, Massachusetts, and Caroline Hager, born at Weston, Massachusetts; they were married in 1859, when the former was thirty years old and the latter twenty-three. The father, Charles Wood, was a physician. Leonard, their first child, was born on October 9th, 1860, at Winchester, New Hampshire.

The next spring the Civil War, long smoldering, burst into flames. Ever since December, 1620, when two of Charles Wood's forbears, Stephen Hopkins and Richard Warren, had landed from the *Mayflower* under command of Captain Myles Standish as members of a reconnoitering party and had fought the famous "First Encounter" with the Indians two weeks

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before the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock, there had never been any warfare in America in which the ancestors of Charles Wood had not bravely taken their full part.

Therefore, it was consistent with the family tradition that in 1861 he should promptly answer the call to arms. Moreover, his brave wife, who was descended from equally stalwart lines, and was a great-granddaughter of General John Nixon of the Revolution, insisted that she should not stand as an obstacle in the way of his patriotic duty. The dominant characteristic of their ancestors who are on record was, generation after generation, without exception, devotion to the high ideals of what we now call Americanism,—and the records of an astonishingly large number of them are known to us.

The forbears of both Charles and Caroline Wood were all born in this country or migrated to it before 1700, nearly all arriving before 1650, and the personal histories of more than four hundred of them have been traced and are set down in public records. Seven of them were passengers on the *Mayflower*; and more than fifty during the period of the Colonial Wars rendered patriotic service, either by active duty in the field against the French and Indians, or by equally valuable service in the legislative bodies of the Massachusetts Colony. In the later generations, at least seven were soldiers in the Revolution.\*

\*See Appendix No. 2.

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It must be granted that a long line of colonial ancestors is not in itself a conclusive guarantee that a man will be imbued with a spirit of profound patriotism, for some of our American-born Tories, Copperheads and Bolsheviks have conspicuously lacked that virtue, while it is found in a superlative degree in many recently naturalized citizens of foreign birth. But in Wood's pedigree we discover an unprecedented record, for among his hundreds of known ancestors not one is found who cannot pass the severest test of Americanism. From earliest times, his forbears have striven for that ideal condition where love of personal liberty is happily balanced by respect for constitutional law.

It has been said that the *Mayflower* would need to have been as large as the *Leviathan* to have brought over as many souls as present-day Americans claim came across in that tiny bark. In point of fact, there were, according to the records of Governor Bradford of Plymouth, exactly 104 passengers on the ship and among them were only twenty-two heads of families to whom those claiming *Mayflower* ancestry have ever been able to prove descent.

Leonard Wood, by verified records, traces to four of these twenty-two men:—William White, Francis Cooke, Stephen Hopkins and Richard Warren, and to three of the members of their families who accompanied them.

Many of the passengers of the Mayflower were

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appalled at the inconceivable hardships of the first winter in Cape Cod, and, finding the struggle to realize their ideals of liberty too arduous for their endurance, returned next spring to England; but no one of Wood's ancestors was among these of faint-heart.

Also, many of the less hardy among the little band died in Plymouth during that terrible winter. The twenty-two leaders, who with their families survived the ordeal and braved it out, left long lines of descendants who in physical vigor, indomitable courage and strength of principle have for three centuries been the superlative type of American citizen.

To the early immigrants, Puritans or Pilgrims, and their descendants their new country was first, last, and always of supreme importance. In it they had finally found a refuge, where they could develop for their children and their children's children an atmosphere of religious liberty and constitutional political freedom.

It is, therefore, not surprising that Leonard Wood's character and the ideals by which he has directed his life should correspond closely to the ideals of the men, his ancestors, who signed the immortal *Compact* in the little cabin of the *Mayflower* on that bleak twentieth of December, 1620—a compact that is justly considered to embody the vital germ of our own great Constitution.

In addition to the dominant instinct for patri-

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otic public service, with its natural corollaries of military and legislative activity, we find in Leonard Wood's heredity, recurring in several generations, a leaning toward the medical profession, which claims for its own men who possess the scientific turn of mind, supplemented with intense devotion to public welfare and an unlimited capacity for self-sacrifice.

These hereditary traits—medical, patriotic and executive—are the foundation upon which Leonard Wood, by virtue of his strong will and his ability to conquer his environment, has built up his earnest and efficient character. They rendered possible the great feats of administrative reconstruction which early earned for him his welldeserved international fame,—feats that would have been impossible of accomplishment to any one with military ability alone.

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In upholding and defending the Constitution of the United States, which his ancestors had helped to make, and in upholding the ancient standards of the Pilgrim Fathers, the man with a long American pedigree has to-day a special mission among us. When the foundations of civilization are shaken, we look to these men of traditional patriotism to steady them; and to effect reforms and correct abuses as our forefathers did, by constructive constitutional means and not by the destructive measures of direct action.

The men who settled New England were of marked type, fanatical perhaps, but fanatical for

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great principles. Personal comfort they abandoned, class distinctions they abolished, surplus wealth was unknown among them. Even as late as 1720 the estate of the richest man in Massachusetts was inventoried at only \$20,000.

In much of New England, these primitive conditions had been modified before Leonard Wood was born. In the larger towns social distinctions had become fixed, considerable fortunes had accumulated, and the rigid principles of the Pilgrim Fathers had been relaxed. But at Cape Cod, where he passed the first nineteen years of his life, conditions were almost as simple as at Plymouth in the early Colonial days.

Pending her husband's return from the Civil War, Caroline Wood lived with her people at Weston, Massachusetts, and there Leonard grew from babyhood to boyhood. The family was not re-united until 1865, when Charles came back from the army to rejoin his wife. Shortly afterwards they moved to Chiltonville near Plymouth. Doctor Wood's health had been wrecked by pernicious malaria, contracted during the war, and he was advised to live among the pines and sands of the Cape. It was at Chiltonville that his second son, Jacob, was born.

A few months later the Woods moved across the Cape from the Plymouth side, to Monument Beach on the Buzzards Bay side, where their third and last child, Barbara, was born.

In 1867 the family again transferred itself,

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this time moving a short three miles along the shore in the direction of Martha's Vineyard, to Pocasset, where a more central location for the Doctor's practice could be obtained. There they established their permanent residence; there Leonard's boyhood and youth were passed, and there he lived until he went as a young man to Harvard in 1880.

At that time most of the people of Pocasset were sailors, either owning their own vessels in the coastwise trade, or serving as masters of whalers or other deep-sea ships.

In the desire to visualize the environment and sense the atmosphere of Leonard Wood's boyhood, I paid a visit to Pocasset, which is to-day a local stop between Buzzards Bay Station and Wood's Hole on the Old Colony Line. Its little depot stands quite by itself; in the middle distance are to be seen two or three houses, a church, and a schoolhouse. The people of Pocasset live in farmhouses widely scattered along two miles of the main street, which crosses the railway at right angles.

The train stopped a few reluctant seconds to allow four passengers to alight and then was off again chugging diminuendo towards Cataumet, its next stop two miles down the line. Two of the passengers started cross-lots over the fields while a third approached a waiting farmer's wagon, whose driver was the only sign of life visible about the depot and therefore the only ap-

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parent source of information. He showed pained surprise when I asked him if there was any hotel where I might spend the night.

"Reckon you better go up to the post-mistress' place and see if she can let you have a room. Fourth house on the left, up the road and over the hill."

Five minutes' walk brought me to the postmistress' house. She was not at home I was informed by her younger sister, a maiden lady of fifty-odd, a perfectly delightful person whose continued spinsterhood inspired me with astonishment,—until I remembered that the Old Colony constitutes one of the birthplaces of America's pioneers and the cradle of her Empirebuilders. For centuries her enterprising young manhood has generation after generation fared forth to conquer and push back the geographic and industrial frontiers of America, in the process leaving behind their sisters and those of their comrades.

The postmistress' sister said that they "were not fixed to take boarders," but added with the most generous and unaffected hospitality that they would, nevertheless, find some way to lodge me if other means failed. Other means proved to be Mrs. Jones' boarding house "up the road a piece."

It developed during our conversation that my informant had been a schoolmate of General Wood in the little village school, and I induced her to talk about his parents and his school life for an hour, before I sought Mrs. Jones' establishment.

"I was only ten," she said, "and was in my first year at school when Leonard left to go to Pierce Academy at Middleboro. I saw him in Washington six or eight years ago and he remembered me perfectly. He said, 'Why you don't look a bit different from what you did when you were the littlest girl in the village school, and I was the biggest boy.'

"I can't tell you a great deal about his boyhood, because of his being six years older than I, and because he was a regular boy and didn't care much for girls. But his sister, Barbara, was my best friend until she died in 1880 when she was fourteen, and I used to be over to their house often, and knew her father and mother, and I can tell you about them.

"They were most awfully fond of each other. I don't think they minded the hard work of being a country doctor's family, or anything else for that matter, as long as they could be together. They were everything to each other.

"Doctor Charles Wood was the leading citizen of Pocasset in his day, being head of the schoolboard and having a great deal of influence in the community. He was universally well liked, had a great sense of humor, excellent judgment, and was most kind-hearted. Every one respected him for his unselfishness, of which the most striking

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evidence was the vast number of uncollected bills which he left at his death.

"Leonard's mother was a mighty fine woman with lots of character. She was most ambitious for her boys and deserves a lot more credit for their success than most people remember to give her. Doctor Wood died in 1880, when Leonard was nineteen, but Mrs. Wood outlived him more than thirty years and always exerted a great deal of influence over her two sons, so that in addition to Leonard's success, his younger brother, Jacob, has become a very progressive and prosperous business man.

"All of us children used to go to the district school, for it was the only one in or near Pocasset. It was a mixed school of about thirty girls and boys. There were the three Gibbs boys; and Carrie and Lizzie Adams; and the two Dimock boys, and Georgiana Dimock; and Fred and Ed Barlow; and Sadie Beckerman who is to-day Mrs. Fred Barlow, and Lizzie Wright, who is now Mrs. Ed Barlow; and Andrew and Preston Wright; and Leonard Wood and Louis Raymond; and Herbert, Everett, Jeanette, Walter, Eleanor and Abner Avery; and Lucy, Mary and Annie Wing who are all dead now, and Chester and Byron Wing, and Henry Hammond, and several more whose names I have forgotten.

"The school was equivalent to the grammar school of to-day, but was not divided into grades. In the autumn each scholar told the

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teacher where he left off the spring before and began his work at that point; and each one took his own gait independently of the rest.

"The boys and girls in the school did not use standard books, but each studied from a different set, left over from the school days of their older brothers and sisters, and some were even inherited from parents.

"No books were provided by the Town, as the Cape Codders were doubtful whether expensive new editions would be any better than the ones on hand, although most of those in use were actually very much out of date."

It developed that the most exciting incident of their schooldays was a successful house-to-house campaign undertaken by a new school-mistress named Miss Haskell in the hope of persuading the parents of Pocasset to buy a few up-to-date text-books with which advantageously to begin a new school year.

The attendance was inclined to be irregular. Most of the boys went to work when they were "knee-high to a grasshopper," and only came to school during their spare time in the winter.

"Even that didn't last many years," said my informant, "for if they were Shore-Peeps they went to sea for good before they were sixteen, or into the foundry if they were Up-Roaders."

I requested an explanation of the terms "Shore-Peeps" and "Up-Roaders," and learned that the town had once been divided into two

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social sets. The main road of Pocasset runs inland two miles from the shore until it joins the turnpike from Buzzards Bay Station to Wood's Hole. Midway between the water and the turnpike, it crosses the Old Colony railroad at right angles. Beyond the railroad and near the turnpike there used to be a foundry where pots and kettles for cooking on iron cranes in open fireplaces were made, and also giant cauldrons for the sugar plantation of Jamaica and Louisiana. This foundry, however, went out of existence twenty-five years ago.

When Leonard Wood was a boy, those who lived between the railroad and the coast were followers of the sea; they were called the Shore-Peeps. Those who lived between the railroad and turn-pike were molders and casters working in the foundry, and were nicknamed the Up-Roaders. The Shore-Peeps and Up-Roaders did not harmonize very well.

The distinction ran everywhere through all the lives of the inhabitants, not merely with the children at school or at play, but with their elders in church or at work. Thus was Pocasset society riven in twain.

The schoolhouse, the church, the depot and the post-office were all situated near the railway half way between shore and foundry and served both factions alike. The families of the schoolteacher, the preacher and the postmistress were neutral and were known as the "In-Betweeners."

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Leonard Wood was a Shore-Peep, not only because his father lived between the railroad and the tides, but because his own inclination led him constantly towards the sea. He and his younger brother, Jacob, were always on the water, cruising or fishing off Patuisset and Exmouth and Magansett and Onset and Monument Beach, or even venturing as far South as Martha's Vineyard, No-Man's Land and Gay Head. As a boy it was Leonard's ambition and intention to "go to sea" when he arrived at the mature age of sixteen, following the example of all good Shore-Peeps.

"You ought to go visit old Captain Will Barlow," advised the postmistress' sister. "He ran a sloop in the coast trade, carrying cargoes between ports when Leonard was a boy, and took him on several voyages; and you ought to talk to his younger brother Ed, who is about Leonard's age. He won't be home daytimes because his wife is sick in the hospital at New Bedford, and Captain Ed goes to see her every blessed day and hasn't missed a day for two months, though it's a forty-mile trip. But he is at home every evening, and if he isn't, you'll find him next door at Mr. Roland Finney's, the grocer who married his daughter.

"You ought also to see Captain Irving Gibbs of Cataument, who lives a couple of miles south of here; he and Leonard have always been great [31] friends ever since they were six or seven years old."

Accordingly, that evening I sought out Captain Edward Barlow, and found a business-like old sailor, who had been master of ships for thirty years. He had commanded an American trans-Atlantic steamer throughout the recent hostilities, and even before America came into the war was fired at eight times by a submarine. As had been predicted, he willingly added to my information about Doctor Charles Wood and his family.

"I can't tell you so much about Leonard as I can about his father, because there aren't so many things to remember about a boy as about his father, who worked with us so many years, and saved so many of our lives.

"Doctor Charles Wood was a wonderful doctor. We think he was the best there ever was on Cape Cod. He was very original and a great reader of human nature. I reckon that was an important part of his success in his profession."

Captain Barlow told me how his own father, Captain Jesse Barlow, "had had nervous dyspepsia and finally was unable to work daytimes, or to sleep at night. For many years he was master of a small vessel in the coasting trade and worked grinding hard. He ate when and where he could, and usually in a hurry; often he bolted his food. Finally he broke down his digestion and developed his nervous dyspepsia.

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THE HOUSE WHICH LEONARD'S FATHER BUILT ABOUT 1875



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WHERE THE "SHOREPEEPS" LIVED

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FOCASSET BOYS OF TODAY Grandsons of Leonard Wood's boyhood playmates.



THE SCHOOLHOUSE IN POCASSET Where, as a boy, he studied for six years.

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"Then he went to see Doctor Wood and asked him for some pills. Doctor Wood knew father well, and what ailed him, and why. He looked at him for a time, and then said: 'You better go see an osteopath.'

"'What will he do to me?'

"'I don't know, but he is sure to do something.'

"So father went away, meaning to visit an osteopath, but the next day he came back again, and said he had decided against it, and wanted Doctor Wood to take charge of his case.

"'I don't believe I can do any good,' said the Doctor.

"'If you can't, nobody can,' replied father, and he stuck to it.

"Finally the Doctor said, 'Since you are so obstinate about it, I will take care of you on one condition, and that is that you will do exactly what I tell you, no matter how hard the treatment seems.' As soon as father promised, he continued:—

"'All right then, my first orders are that until I come and tell you to stop, you will eat only one meal a day, and that to consist exclusively of rye meal pudding, without sugar, or milk, or salt, or any other fixings.'

"For several weeks father did exactly as he was ordered. He said he felt as though he was starving to death, but he stuck it out. Pretty soon he began to sleep at night,—although he dreamed

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constantly of being hungry, and of sitting down to sumptuous dinners, and of having them snatched away just as he was beginning to eat.

"At the end of two weeks Doctor Wood came to see him again and told him he could now begin to eat three meals a day, but that as long as he lived he must never again eat pies, flapjacks, or heavy pastry, nor drink water with his meals. 'And take time to eat,' said the Doctor. 'If you obey these rules, you will never be sick again until you die of old age.' Father did keep them and he lived to be eighty-seven, and worked almost to the last.

"The Woods were a family possessed of perseverance and constitution," continued Captain Ed. "I guess those two words describe them better than anything else. They were always more all-fired persistent than anybody else, and once they started, they always had the endurance to see it through.

"When Leonard and Jacob went gunning they left home early, kept going all day, and didn't get back until after dark. The other boys didn't much like to go with them; it was too much like work.

"And if old Doctor Wood hadn't had that sort of a constitution, he would have taken sick within a year or two, like a young doctor we had here recently. For you want to remember that along from 1865 to 1880 there weren't any automobiles for a country doctor to get around in.

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"Doctor Wood had all the practice in and around Pocasset and he used to drive a great many miles each day; six miles up to North Falmouth, eight miles down to Sagamore, and all in between. His old white mare 'Freetchy' (Barbara Fritchie) was a regular part of the establishment and was known all over this side of the Cape. The Doctor bought her as a colt when he first came to Pocasset, trained her himself, and drove her all the rest of his life. She survived him by twelve or fifteen years and lived to be a very old horse, for she did not die until she was thirty-three. The two Wood boys continued to drive her long after the Doctor was gone.

"Frank Dimock, who was father of the two Dimock boys and a close friend of the Woods, was quite a poet; he wrote a poem about the old mare, and she is so much of a tradition that the Cape Codders still know that song, although it's forty years since the Doctor last drove her. The chorus goes:—

> Improved with age From fair to good The neighbors called her Freetchy Wood.

"The Doctor always took care of Freetchy himself, and she was very faithful and industrious. When he had to go on long drives he put in the feed-bag, so that Freetchy could have her dinner while he was seeing the patient. He would often go without food himself but he always saw to it that Freetchy had her 'snack.'

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"Those two went through a great deal of trouble together, particularly driving round during the long cold winters. The Doctor was always short of sleep, and used to catch up by taking naps while driving home. When he had finished with his last patient, he would climb into his buggy, start Freetchy and go sound asleep. She always went straight back to the Wood house here in Pocasset; she had learned the way from every direction.

"Sometimes on lonely winter days when we were wood-cutting, we would see faithful old Freetchy plodding along the frozen roads towards home; the Doctor sitting behind her in his single seater, all wrapped up in his buffalo robes and fast asleep. When the buggy stopped in his own front yard he would wake up.

"Those rides were mighty lonely, and when outward bound the Doctor used to tie a bif of rag on a wheel-spoke and count the revolutions and calculate distances and rates from place to place in order to keep himself awake. His little red rag was the first speedometer ever used in this part of the country.

"Doctor Wood was a great hand to joke," said Captain Ed. "He always looked on the funny side of everything. I don't mean he was a practical joker, because he wasn't, but he just always seemed to be able to see the humor even in the most unpleasant situations.

"One day he was at the depot waiting for the

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train, which was very late. Some one said to him: 'Well, Doctor, how are your patients today?' 'Nearly exhausted,' he replied, 'waiting for this train.'

"Back in 1875, when he had just finished his fine new house, one of the neighbors was joking him about it and said, 'Doctor, what for is that flat place on top with a rail round it?"

"'Why,' said the Doctor, 'that is where I am going to stick on a mortgage if I ever need one, and the railing is to keep any one from getting at it to foreclose it.'

"One day he was sailing across the bay to Onset Beach with Leonard. Leonard was then about eight years old, and was handling the tiller. Another boat came along cutting in on their course. 'Give 'em more room,' said the Doctor. 'But we have the right of way,' said Leonard. 'I know it, but I'd rather forego my rights than spend the night out here with my mouth full of sea-weed,' returned his father.

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"Perhaps I have told you enough about the Doctor, and you want to hear what I think about Leonard.

"There's one thing I particularly like about him, and that is that no matter how elevated he gets, he never changes any towards his old friends. I hadn't seen him for a good many years after he left here to go to Medical School; I was mostly away at sea, and he wasn't often in Pocasset, being always so busy. Finally after

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about twenty years I moved to Brooklyn on account of being master of **a** ship sailing out of New York.

"He was stationed at Governor's Island and one day I decided to telephone him. Some soldier I didn't know answered the phone. I asked for Leonard Wood, and pretty soon I heard another voice I didn't recognize, and I said again,— 'I want to speak to Leonard Wood,' and the voice answered:—'This is Leonard Wood.'

"'This is Ed Barlow.'

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"'Ed Barlow, Ed Barlow?' he said twice, thoughtful like, and then after a second, 'It's just twenty-three years since I last heard your voice.' I was kind of dumbfounded, because I couldn't recollect to save my soul when I had seen him last. 'I only have one day to myself and that's Sunday,' he said, 'come over and see me next Sunday.' And I went and we spent four or five hours together."

Captain Barlow and I drove to Cataumet to see Captain Gibbs, who had also gone to school with Leonard and who proved to be one of the most interesting sea captains I have ever met. He seemed to think that Leonard Wood had not as a boy been "much to look at." He said, "He had a strong and stocky build, light blue eyes, and a shock of whitish hair, lighter than yellow, about the color of raw hemp. He looked like any other boy except for his hair.

"Leonard was more fond of shooting and fish-

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ing than the rest of us. He was a quiet sort of a boy who didn't have much to say for himself. He didn't hang around much with the other boys, and you would hardly know how to get him into a quarrel. But when he did get into a fight, his face sort of lit up; and he wasn't ever a fraid of anything.

"I remember when he first came here, Frank Dimock and I laid for him, but he whipped the two of us. He blacked my eye and cut Frank's lip. Up to that time we boys always wrestled when we got into a fight, but Leonard introduced the new method."

Captain Irving meditated a moment, and then added, "I will say this for myself, that at the time Leonard whipped me I was most a year younger than him, but Frank was his age and size.

"Leonard always had lots of character, even as a boy. He got that from his father and mother. It was in the family and was born in him. They were all mighty persevering.

"He was a great hand to read. That was different from all the rest of us, and from his own brother, too, for we never read if we could help it. He used even to take books with him when he went fishing. He would sit in a center-board skiff and fish with one hand and turn pages with the other, using rocks for paper-weights. He used to read history and books about travel and exploration. I remember him reading Cooper's novels and a book called "Plutarch's Lives." I

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wouldn't be surprised if that was the foundation of his knowledge and education.

"In school he didn't work any more than the other boys, but he grasped things quicker. Although he seemed to drift along just the way the others did, he outgrew the little school in no time, and when he was sixteen he started going to Pierce Academy, in Middleboro, fifteen miles from here. He went up every morning on the train, and came back the same way at night.

"Yes, in school he drifted along like the other boys, but when the time came for him to do something, he woke up. And that time came in the spring of 1880, when his father died."

Leonard Wood had decided to study medicine, but wanted to go through Harvard College first, his father having convinced him that it would be a help not only in medical school but ever afterwards. But when he lost his father in 1880, a shortage of funds compelled him to skip college and go direct to the Harvard Medical School that same autumn.

He began preparing for the examination under the instruction of Miss Haskell, who was an exceptional woman of unusually fine character. She was thoroughly grounded in classics, modern languages and mathematics, and had been the head of a large finishing school, but found herself unable to endure the strain and had first come to Cape Cod to recuperate, afterwards remaining

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there for a number of years. She boarded that summer with Mrs. Charles Wood so that she could more conveniently tutor Leonard. Much to everybody's surprise he passed the entrance examinations and stood high, although most of those with whom he competed had already been through college.

He left Pocasset when he was nineteen, without money, without friends in the outside world, with no influence, and with only the limited education he had been able to secure in the little Pocasset school and at the Middleboro Academy, which was about equal to the high schools of to-day.

He started with no capital except a good constitution built up by living outdoors around Cape Cod, a strong character which he inherited from his parents, and the memory of the beautiful home life with his father and mother.

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## CHAPTER II

#### **PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS**

LEONARD WOOD was fifty-nine years old on the ninth day of October, 1919. He is five feet, eleven inches tall, weighs 195 pounds and has a 44-inch chest. His health is in every way perfect. Throughout his life he has never met a man of his own age, and few of any age, whom he could not outride or outwork, and this is as true of him to-day as ever.

The Board of Army Surgeons which gave him his physical examination when he returned from France in 1918, stated that he was in every way fit for active service anywhere.

Every one who meets Leonard Wood is immediately impressed by his extraordinary physical vigor. He seems so charged with surplus energy that one easily comprehends how he was able to achieve the remarkable feats of endurance recorded of him. All his life he has been devoted to sports and athletics and even now enjoys nothing so much as a twenty-five-mile ride or a day's shooting or fishing. When he was stationed at Monterey in 1890 he used for ex-

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ercise to run around the soft and sandy seventeenmile drive and held the record, having made the distance in 2 hours and 12 minutes.

While in command of the Department of Mindanao he decided that all his men must learn to swim 75 yards with their clothes on, and 50 yards with full equipment. But before any order was issued Wood himself accomplished double the distances prescribed, and moreover before making the trial thoroughly soaked the equipment.

When he was stationed at Fort McPherson, Georgia, in 1896, in addition to his regular work as an army surgeon he took a course of study at the Georgia Institute of Technology, and while there organized and coached the first football team the Institute ever had. His team in its first season defeated the champions of the South, and lost only one game during the two years he was its captain. Starting with that impetus and proud of its initial reputation the Georgia Tech has always since then maintained a fine football record.

When in 1917 Wood was transferred to the command of the Southeastern Department, his exploits as an athlete were still remembered throughout that section, and the great enthusiasm with which he was received was only in part intended for Wood the soldier, as a portion at least was a tribute to Wood the athlete who had years before brought honor to Georgia Tech.

Soon after his arrival, he was entertained in

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Macon at a banquet given in his honor. The toastmaster closed his remarks by saying, "You have now heard me throw a lot of bouquets at General Wood, but the last time I saw him was after a hotly contested football game, in which he defeated my team, and I was then throwing bricks at him."

Shortly after this banquet, he visited the town of Athens in order to address a mass meeting, traveling there and back in the private car of the president of the railroad. He was reminded that the last time he left Athens, in 1897, he rode in a freight car to escape a mob of local football enthusiasts who were hunting his scalp.

At the end of another game which he had refereed in the early nineties, the captain of the losing team said to him, "The next time I see you I am going to knock your damned white head off."

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### PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

had been that the General might fail to recognize him.

Leonard Wood is an Episcopalian.

Leonard Wood's directness and democratic lack of formality, his complete modesty and simplicity are among the most striking and attractive traits of his temperament.

He is always approachable and has a happy knack of getting on harmoniously with diverse kinds of humans. He possesses the rare gift of looking a man in the eye, telling him a disagreeable truth, and afterward being better friends with him than ever.

He has never tolerated for himself any retinues or guards of honor, even in tropical countries where they have for centuries been the universal setting for every man in authority. Whenever he has governed provinces he has not affected pomp, ceremony or circumstance, but has gone quite to the other extreme.

In Santiago General Wood lived in the utmost simplicity, in striking contrast to the splendid luxury of his Spanish predecessors. He occupied a thatch-roofed country house, a mile out of town, which had previously belonged to the British Consul. Accompanied only by a single mounted orderly he rode each morning to his office, which was a single bare room at the back of the Spanish Governor's old palace. His personal dignity and

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power are too great to need reënforcement by artificial means.

He has no pride of opinion nor any trace of that extreme rigidity of conviction which makes a man intolerant of advice. He is always willing to give his open-minded attention to the views of others, even those of his least important subordinates.

Colonel Halstead Dorey, who when a Captain in 1903 served as an aide to General Wood, tells of his first impressions of his commander.

"I joined General Wood in Mindanao, at a time when there was trouble brewing with the Sultan of Sulu. Captain McCoy, who was also an aide, had already been with him for four years. The first day I was on duty the question of the status of the Sultan came up for discussion, and McCoy expressed to the general very positive opinions as to how the Sultan should be handled —opinions which varied greatly from those held by the General, who nevertheless gave them his full consideration.

"Such a hot argument ensued that I fully expected McCoy to be placed under arrest and tried for insubordination.

"To my surprise, however, the general not only listened patiently to all that McCoy had to say, but even adopted several of his suggestions.

"I quickly learned that the General always expected his staff officers to express their opinions freely. He will patiently listen, and if convinced

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that their ideas are correct, is always willing to alter his own tentative plans.

"In discussing an old officer who had just been retired for age, and who made it his boast that he had never changed an order after he had once issued it, the General remarked that, while needless vacillation should be avoided, any man who was such an egotist as to count himself infallible, and therefore never considered it necessary to change an order, even if unforeseen conditions arose, should never have been commissioned, much less permitted to remain in the service until he was retired for age."

The author once asked General Wood his rules of life. He replied:—"Always volunteer, no matter how dangerous or unpromising the task.

"Once you have volunteered, never stop fighting. Do things, and don't talk about them. During the process you are likely to discover opportunity; eventually you can win through to success." His face widened out into its characteristic aggressive smile, "and then you will have the pleasure of hearing un-enterprising men who would never take a chance allude to your achievements as due solely to luck and influence."

The opportunities which he has most eagerly sought have been those which involved patriotic service to his country, for Leonard Wood's most dominant moral characteristic is his courageous, whole-souled devotion to the ideals of Americanism.

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## CHAPTER III

#### AS A SURGEON

LEONARD WOOD supported himself through the four years of his course at the Harvard Medical School in the spring of 1884, and upon graduation won an appointment as interne at the Boston City Hospital in a competitive examination, in which he stood third among more than a score of contestants.

He did not complete his course, however, because of an unfortunate incident which occurred early in his hospital experience. According to rule an interne was not allowed to perform an operation, but was required to summon the visiting surgeon whenever it was necessary. One day the ambulance brought in an injured child, whose life depended upon immediate operation; but the visiting surgeon was not available. Wood deliberated for a few moments and then decided that the right thing was to operate at once; this he had the courage to do, regardless of the consequences to himself, and thereby saved the child's life.

Later the visiting surgeon walked into the ward, and when he learned what had happened

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in his absence, he flew into a rage and demanded an explanation of Wood, who answered, "If the child's life was to be saved there was no time to lose and it was necessary to operate at once. No one else was at hand and therefore I assumed the responsibility." The visiting surgeon on that ground preferred charges against Wood and he was suspended and ultimately dismissed from the hospital.

When he left the City Hospital, he established himself in a tiny office in Stamford Street, in what was then one of the poorest quarters of the city. He supplemented the meager pay which he received from his povertystricken patients by tutoring and by working in the nearest public dispensary.

He often recalls with great interest his experiences of that time, and the gratitude which the individual tenement dwellers showed for his services,—a gratitude in strong contrast to their distaste and dislike for ordinary charity workers.

One dark night he was stopped on a street corner by a gang of thugs. "Wait a minute, Bo," they said; "who are you?" "I am the dispensary doctor," replied Wood. "Oh, that's different," they answered affably. "We're sorry to have bothered you."

His experience in the slums of Boston was among the most valuable and developmental of his entire life, since it early brought him into personal contact with the hopelessly poor, and

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with their sufferings and needs. He came into touch with those whose entire effort is directed not toward winning to-morrow's bread, but is concentrated upon seeking bread for to-day.

The sympathy, compassion and understanding which in later life he invariably showed towards the millions of submerged people, over whom he at one time or another ruled, and his infinite patience with them in their struggles and mistakes, are founded upon the first-hand knowledge which he gained during his service in the slums of Boston.

In the spring of 1885 he took the competitive examination for the position of Assistant-Surgeon in the army, ranked second in a class of fifty-nine, and was promptly accepted.

He volunteered for immediate service in the far west, and was ordered to proceed to Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

In speaking of his entrance into the Army, General Wood says: "While deeply interested in medicine and surgery, it was always my desire to gain active service in the line, and from the moment I arrived in Arizona and reported for duty, I took up systematically work looking towards such service. I never lost an opportunity for combat assignment, no matter what the temporary disadvantages. It was this course of action which led ultimately to recommendations by Generals Lawton, Graham, Miles, Forsythe and [50] others that I be given the Colonelcy of a volunteer regiment at the time of the Spanish War."

In Arizona and New Mexico, in addition to his service as a surgeon, he also performed the functions of a combat officer. A detailed account of this service is given in the next chapter.

After two years' arduous service he was assigned to duty in Southern California.

It was at Los Angeles that Major-General Miles, the Department Commander, was thrown from his horse and badly injured, his leg being broken and crushed. The first surgeons to be called in recommended that the leg be amputated, which would have terminated the military career of the officer who was, at that time, America's leading soldier in active service.

General Miles refused to consider this diagnosis as final until he had sent for Captain Wood, whose reputation as a surgeon was already favorably known to him. In spite of the adverse judgment of his seniors, Wood, after a careful examination, stated that he could save the leg. Thereupon Miles placed himself under the exclusive care of the young surgeon, who was as good as his word, for he set the shattered bones and readjusted the torn ligaments and tendons so skillfully that the General completely recovered the use of his leg, was able to walk without even the slightest limp, and continued to serve his country for nearly fifteen years.

At Monterey Leonard Wood met Louise A.

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Condit-Smith, to whom he became engaged and to whom he was married in 1890.

The avoidance of unnecessary publicity, which has characterized General Wood throughout his whole career, has been dictated not only by the unwritten laws of our military service, but was reënforced by his distaste for injecting his personal affairs into the record of his public services.

This reticence with regard to himself has been intensified whenever it touched his family.

In this reserve he shows the same fine instinct which always actuated Theodore Roosevelt. No man in the history of America ever appeared more often in the daily press and current literature than he, but no wife of any popular hero figured so seldom in public print as Mrs. Roosevelt. The powerful personal influence she radiated from their strenuous home center was immediately apparent to any one who crossed its threshold—but into its sacred precinct the newspaper reporter in his official capacity was never allowed to intrude.

Leonard Wood has been similarly scrupulous in maintaining the distinction between his public and his private affairs. Only personal friends realize how the dignity, simplicity and harmony of his family life, which presupposes an able, discreet and sympathetic helpmate, have augmented his usefulness to his country.

Mrs. Wood is the daughter of Colonel John Condit-Smith, who served in the Civil War on

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General Sherman's staff, but who died several years before her marriage to General Wood.

General Wood's three children already give promise that they will carry on the honorable and patriotic records of their ancestral lines.

Subsequent to his marriage he served for several years as surgeon at Fort McPherson in Georgia, and in the autumn of 1895 he was ordered to duty in Washington, D. C.

\*"To an army surgeon Washington is a place full of possibilities of honor, but also a place of much hard work. He must attend as medical advisor all active and retired officers of the army and their families; he is official physician to the Secretary of War, and he shares with a navy surgeon the responsibility of attending the President. \* \* \* It was not long before he became a frequent visitor to President Cleveland and his family. And here in the *V* inte House, as on the plains, he won friends.

"When the administration changed and President McKinley came into power, Dr. Bates of the navy was for six months, until his death, attending surgeon at the White House. One night, in the fall of 1897, Wood received a summons from the President, and from that time forward he was the regular medical adviser to Mr. and Mrs. McKinley, as he was already attendant on General Alger, the Secretary of War.

"It was about this time that he met Theodore • By Ray Stannard Baker-McClure's-February, 1900.

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Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy. They were guests at dinner with the Lowndes family, and they walked home together in the evening. Their friendship was instant. Both were men of extraordinary vitality and activity. Both loved hunting, fishing, sailing, and all the vigorous outdoor sports which do so much toward making good men. Both knew the wild West; both were born with the blood of fighters hot within them. In each of them was bred the best of American traditions—for Roosevelt had come from the ancient Dutch stock of Manhattan and Wood was from the oldest blood of New England. And, more than anything else, both were men of high ideals and splendid ambitions.

"Straightway the two young Americans, not so famous then as they were soon to be, were tramping together in the country, each walking at a gait to outdo the other and each pretending that he was doing nothing at all unusual."

The eighteen years of his life, from 1880-1898, which Wood devoted to the study and practice of the profession of surgery were not only of great value to him from an educational and developmental standpoint, but gave him a knowledge of medicine which was of constant use to him in later years and of much value to the people he governed.

It made possible his sanitary reforms in Cuba and in the Philippines, his work in conquering yellow fever, his intelligent support of the fight

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## AS A SURGEON

against leprosy and beri-beri in the Philippines, his improvement of the health of the troops of his commands and of the civilian populations among which they lived.

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## CHAPTER IV

#### THE GERONIMO CAMPAIGN

ON the evening of July 4th, 1885, at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, a few miles north of the Mexican border, Assistant-Surgeon Leonard Wood reported for duty to General Crook, the noted Indian fighter.

The infamous Apaché chief, Geronimo, and his band of renegade Indians, had already been constantly on the war-path for two years, spreading terror and devastation all along our southwestern border.

On the evening of his arrival, Wood learned that Captain H. W. Lawton (later to become famous as Major-General Lawton) was at the Fort and was to leave early the next morning, July 5th, in command of a carefully prepared expedition against Geronimo.

Although no one fully foresaw the hardships, sufferings and dangers which this expedition would have to endure for nearly two years, it was nevertheless evident that the affair would be far from a picnic, and few cared to join Lawton if honorably they could avoid it.

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It was necessary that the personnel of the expedition should include a surgeon, and Wood, true to his lifelong motto always to volunteer, no matter how dangerous or unpromising the task, sought Lawton and persuaded that leader to accept him as surgeon in spite of his youth and comparative lack of experience. He spent the night making the necessary preparations and left with Lawton the next morning, riding the only available horse, a vicious unbroken bronco which every one else had "passed up," but which Wood, being the last comer, was obliged to accept.

This was his first experience in horsemanship, for the boyhood occupations of Cape Cod had not included equitation, and in the Harvard Medical School he had been unable to afford riding as a recreation. He mastered the bronco, however, in spite of several unpleasant incidents. The first day's march covered thirty miles through the overwhelming summer heat of the Arizona desert, and for six consecutive days he was in the saddle. It was not until the seventh day that the troops halted for their first rest.

Lawton's expedition had been in process of preparation for six months. As events turned out it was to conduct not only the most notable Indian Campaign since the Custer massacre, but was to write the concluding chapter in that long history of warfare with the Redman, which had begun with the Pilgrims at Plymouth and had

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continued almost without interruption for two hundred and fifty years.

During those centuries, America's frontier of civilization, at first defined by the forest-edge surrounding the little town of Plymouth, had gradually been pushed back step by step. During the seventeenth century, it extended itself laterally north and south along the coast from Salem to Charleston, but remained within sight of the sea. In the eighteenth century, through the period of the French and Indian Wars, it was pushed back to the St. Lawrence, the Mohawk and the Susquehanna. In the early nineteenth century the bitter fighting on the "Bloody Ground" of Kentucky and Tennessee forced it definitely beyond the Alleghenies, and by the middle of the last century it had in the Northwest been thrust westward to the Pacific, and in the Southwest to the Rocky Mountains, until in 1885 the last remaining corner of savage country was the section north of Mexico in the territories of New Mexico and Arizona.

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Since 1620 civilization had marched steadily forward, conquering in turn the Narragansetts of Cape Cod, the Pequots and Wampanoags of New England, the Iroquois Five Nations who once possessed all the country east of the Alleghenies, the Algonquins of the Ohio Valley, the Seminoles of the South, and the Sioux, Arapahoes and Dakotas of the plains.

Indian chieftains had succeeded each other in

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the losing fight of savagery and had left their names upon the pages of American history; Peksuot, whom Captain Myles Standish killed with his own hand; King Philip, who brought death and destruction to the New England Colonies; Pontiac, whose conspiracy in 1763 just failed to destroy the settlers of New York; Queen Aliquippa, to whom Major George Washington was once sent as an emissary; Black Hawk, against whom Abraham Lincoln served as an officer of Militia in 1832; and Sitting Bull, who commanded the Indians at the massacre of the Seventh Cavalry on the Little Bighorn.

The long record was at last drawing to a close; the final chapter had been reached. Amid the scorching deserts and barren mountains which constituted the last vestige of their lost empire, the one still unconquered Indian tribe, the Apachés, stood at bay preferring death to submission, and fighting with the aggressive, bitter courage of despair. Geronimo, the last Indian to make a name as a leader of his people, fought like a cornered wolf and waged war after his own lights, by torture, by stealthy ambush and sudden massacre.

He was the descendent of a long line of Indian leaders who, generation after generation, had opposed the onward march of civilization. He was to find among his enemies at least one white officer whose Anglo-Saxon ancestors had fought even more steadfastly for its advancement.

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Ever since 1620 when Wood's forbears landed from the *Mayflower* to select a suitable site for the new colony, and fought in the famous First Encounter with the Indians, and since 1675, when Samuel Wood served in the war against King Philip and had his house at Groton burned to the ground by the enemy, ancestors of Wood, from decade to decade, participated as combatants in all our Indian wars. In the Apaché War which we are now considering Leonard Wood was to become second in command of the white forces.

As he rode out from Fort Huachuca, Wood questioned his companions as to the record of the savages they were pursuing. He learned that Geronimo's Apachés had already killed eight hundred white men, women and children and had spread terror over the entire Southwest. Geronimo himself had killed ninety-nine white people with his own hand.

His savages were so stealthy that their victims never had the slightest chance to defend themselves, but were either massacred from ambush or captured by cunning ruses. To be captured by Geronimo was the most terrible of fates, for the prisoner was invariably tortured to death with unspeakable agonies which were frequently prolonged for days. The first step was to skin the victim alive and the last was not infrequently to cook him alive over red hot stones.

The Apachés possessed most extraordinary

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endurance, and were familiar with every inch of the country in which they operated. When pursued, they stole horses, rode them to death, ate their flesh and then continued on foot over almost impassable mountain ranges at a rate which well-nigh defied pursuit.

Lawton nevertheless pressed forward relentlessly. He began by garrisoning all the best water-holes along the southern border of New' Mexico and Arizona, thus somewhat restricting the Indians' zone of activity. At the same time, mobile forces pursued them relentlessly, basing their operations upon the garrisons at the waterholes.

Weeks grew into months. During the first month Lawton's men rode more than five hundred miles through the mid-summer heat of the desert, which often reached 125 degrees in the shade. Their horses died of exhaustion and were replaced by others. Men grew sick or were injured and new soldiers took their places.

On one occasion, when a body of two hundred Indians were on the run and there seemed a chance of overtaking them, an advance guard of fifty picked men marched almost constantly on foot for seven days, through a country so rough and precipitous as to be impassable for cavalry or even for pack trains. They subsisted on a dead mule and two deer which were killed by their scouts, the meat being eaten without salt. Their efforts were crippled by the worthless shoes

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which had been manufactured by the military prisoners at Leavenworth. After three or four days' marching these shoes fell apart and left their feet to be cut to pieces by the jagged rocks over which they advanced.

Month after month the dreary grinding chase continued. Officers broke down, were taken sick, or died of exhaustion. After six months, Lawton and Wood were the only officers whose determination and physique had been sufficient to keep them constantly at work, and who had not had to be replaced by fresher men.

This pursuit is probably the most epic of its kind in all history. It far surpasses even the most classic performances of the Royal Northwestern Mounted Police of Canada, whose code is never to relinquish a trail, even though it lasts for years and leads them around the world.

Theodore Roosevelt, in speaking of the Geronimo Campaign, said:—"No one who has not lived in the West can appreciate the incredible, the extraordinary fatigue and hardship attendant upon this campaign. There was not much fighting, but what there was, was of an exceedingly dangerous type; and the severity of the marches through the waterless mountains of Arizona, New Mexico and the northern regions of old Mexico, whither the Apaché bands finally retreated, was such that only men of iron could stand them."

Sometimes the pursuit passed over mountain

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ranges ten thousand feet high; at other periods it led across the Mohave desert, the hottest and most desolate piece of land in all the world, whose floor in one place, Death's Valley, is three hundred feet below sea-level.

It seemed to the pursuers as if Geronimo and his band were gifted with supernatural powers. As month after month dragged by and thousands of miles passed beneath the weary feet of the soldiers, they felt as if they were struggling forward through a Dante's inferno, bent upon a hopeless task. Men burned themselves out with fatigue and many actually died from exhaustion. Discouragement overtook all except Lawton and Wood, whose valiant and determined spirits burned ever clearly.

In March, 1886, when the chase had already lasted a little over eight months, Wood was placed in command of all the infantry and a part of the friendly Indian Scouts; a position which he maintained to the end. He was preëminently fitted for this responsibility, and there could be no valid reason why a surgeon, who was interested in military tactics, and who was a born leader of men, should not serve as a combat officer in a campaign against savages who observed none of the rules of war and who in fact had never even heard of them.

In such an emergency, it was of vital importance to place in authority the man by nature best fitted to command, irrespective of his acci-

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dental position; and it had become evident to Lawton that Wood was the very one for the task. In later years the generous Lawton said: "It was mainly due to Captain Wood's loyalty and resolution that the expedition was successful."

When the chase had lasted uninterruptedly for a year, the Americans had developed a system of relays; units on Geronimo's trail were, on the march, regularly relieved by fresher forces.

Lawton and Wood were the coördinating elements. They worked incessantly, never leaving the field.

Wood was dauntless in conquering his fatigue. Once while sleeping on the bare ground, a tarantula climbed into his clothing and when he awoke and disturbed it, it stung him. In many men this would have resulted in death, but Wood continued the march on foot for two days, suffering dreadful agony, until he fell delirious and had to be restrained by his men from running into the mountains where lurking Indians might have captured and tortured him to death.

The Apachés retreated craftily, watching every chance to cut off outposts, messengers or stragglers who might become detached from the main body. Lawton's forces constantly followed them up, seeking for a decisive engagement, pushing forward carefully, ever on the alert for ambush, never for a moment able to relax their vigilance.

Sometimes for a month or six weeks the Indians would feign inactivity and would avoid



GERONIMO, WAR CHIEF OF THE APACHÉS He killed 99 white people with his own hand.





SOME OF THE MEN WHO RAN DOWN THE APACHÉS



THE APACHÉ CHIEFTAINS SHORTLY AFTER THEIR CAPTURE



### LEONARD WOOD, AT THE TIME OF THE GERONIMO CAMPAIGN

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every contact; then suddenly attack some isolated ranch-house or outpost at the most unexpected moment and under conditions most disadvantageous for the whites. At other times they would maintain a constant guerilla warfare, while cleverly avoiding a battle in which any considerable number of Indians could be engaged.

It was at times like these that Wood repeatedly left the expedition, alone, to carry messages for reënforcements or to communicate with bases of supply. One day when the expedition was in the burning desert and had already made a march of twenty-five miles, it became necessary for Lawton to send a message to another force nearly thirty-five miles away. On several previous occasions his messengers had been cut off and captured by the watching Apachés. Wood volunteered to undertake the trip and left the camp as soon as darkness had set in. He made his way thirty-five miles through a country infested with Indians and almost devoid of cover, delivered his message at two in the morning, departed almost immediately with the answer, and completed the return journey before eight o'clock the same morning, making a distance of nearly seventy miles during the hours of darkness. He then resumed his command and, without any chance for rest, completed the next day's advance on foot, a forced march of more than thirty miles, thus covering nearly one hundred and twenty-five miles

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in thirty-six hours, without sleep and through a rough and dangerous country.

The campaign had lasted nearly eighteen months before the troops were finally able to close with the Indians in any decisive engagement. Lawton's scouts at last succeeded in locating the camp of the Apachés, at a time when all the various elements of the warring tribes had united in one place. A carefully conducted forced march, of a type which had already failed a hundred times. was tried for the one hundred and first time and succeeded. This happened on the Yaqui River in the district of Montezuma. The Indians for once had no warning of the impending attack until the very last moment, and the braves escaped into the rocks with only what they at the moment happened to have on their backs, many of them being forced to abandon even their firearms. Their equipment and tepees, their ammunition and horses were all captured.

This was the beginning of the end, for this defeat of the Apachés occurred in the most barren and uninhabited part of Arizona, where it was next to impossible for Geronimo to obtain new arms and ammunition, or to secure fresh mounts, and where even game was exceedingly scarce.

The Indians nevertheless fought on for months. They divided into small bands which had separately to be pursued but which could be united by Geronimo whenever he planned a counter-attack. Even in this most desolate desert,

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short of arms and without horses, they yet seemed able to eke out an existence, subsisting on cactus leaves, roots, rats, lizards, and snakes; in the emergency nothing came amiss to their ostrich-like digestions.

The inevitable end, however, was now in sight, for even the iron constitutions and fanatical determination of the Apachés could not forever hold out against troops working in relays with an endless supply of men to replace casualties, coordinated and directed by such indomitable leaders.

After the loss of their horses and equipment, band after band of Indians were captured until finally in April, 1887, twenty-one months from the beginning of the campaign, Geronimo himself gave up the fight and surrendered with all his surviving warriors.

The people of New Mexico, who had suffered for years from the murders and depredations of Geronimo, celebrated his capture with three weeks of festivities at Albuquerque, given in honor of the men who had run him down.

Thus ended the last American Indian campaign.

Wood had won for himself a reputation as a soldier, not only in the regular army, but with the population of the far West and Southwest. His name, second only to that of Lawton's, was on every lip.

Roosevelt first heard of him at this time, nearly

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ten years before they ever met. Later, in commenting upon Wood's part in the campaign, he said:

"The young doctor, tall, broad-chested, with his light-yellow hair and blue eyes, soon showed the stuff of which he was made. Hardly any of the whites, whether soldiers or frontiersmen, could last with him; and the friendly Indian trailers themselves could not wear him down....

"On expeditions of this kind, where the work is so exhausting as to call for the last ounce of reserve strength and courage in the man, only a very high type of officer can succeed. Wood, however, never called upon his men to do anything that he himself did not do. They ran no risk that he did not run; they endured no hardship which he did not endure; intolerable fatigue, intolerable thirst, never-satisfied hunger, and the strain of unending watchfulness against the most cruel and dangerous of foes; through all this Wood led his men until the final hour of signal success. When he ended the campaign, he had won the high regard of his superior officers not merely for courage and endurance, but for judgment and entire trustworthiness. A young man who is high of heart, clean of life, incapable of a mean or ungenerous action, and burning with the desire to honorably distinguish himself, needs only the opportunity in order to do good work for his country. . . .'

Although Wood crowded into this period of

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two years his entire experience as a junior line officer, he nevertheless won every honor in the gift of his subordinates and superiors. He received not only the enthusiastic devotion of his men, the admiration of the Western public, and the Congressional Medal of Honor, but was mentioned in orders by all his superiors.

In his report of the campaign, Captain Lawton said:

"I desire to invite the attention of the department commander to Assistant Surgeon Leonard Wood, the only officer who has been with me through the whole campaign. His courage, energy, and loyal support during the whole time, his encouraging example to the command when work was the hardest and prospects darkest, his thorough confidence and belief in the final success of the expedition, and his untiring efforts to make it so, have placed me under obligations so great that I can not express them."

In 1894 Lawton repeated his commendation to his commanding officer, Major-General Miles, in the following terms:

"Concerning Captain Leonard Wood, I can only repeat what I have before reported officially, and what I have said to you; that his services during that trying campaign were of the highest order. I speak particularly of services other than those devolving upon him as a medical officer; services as a combatant or line officer, voluntarily assumed. He sought the most difficult and dan-

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gerous work, and by his determination and courage rendered a successful issue of the campaign possible."

And still later, in a letter to the Governor of Massachusetts, Lawton said:

"I have served through the war of the rebellion, and in many battles, but in no instance do I remember such devotion to duty or such courage and perseverance. It was mainly due to Captain Wood's loyalty and resolution that the expedition was successful."

Major-General Miles, endorsing Lawton's commendation, wrote as follows:

"Assistant Surgeon Wood accompanied Lawton's command from the beginning to the end. He not only fulfilled the duties of his profession in his skillful attention to disabled officers and soldiers, but performed satisfactorily the duties of a line officer, and during the whole extraordinary march, by his example of physical endurance, greatly encouraged others, having voluntarily made many of the longest and most difficult marches on foot."

Subsequently General Miles sent the following commendation to the Secretary of War:

"I now most earnestly renew the recommendation, calling especial attention to the letter of Colonel Lawton, which describes one of the most laborious, persistent, and heroic campaigns in which men were ever engaged, and the fact that Captain Leonard Wood, Assistant Surgeon, vol-

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unteered to perform the extraordinarily hazardous and dangerous service is creditable to him in the highest degree. For his gallantry on the 13th of July in the surprise and capture of Geronimo's camp, I recommend that he be brevetted for his services on that date."

His work in the Geronimo campaign was the first big step upward in Wood's career, and ten years later when there was a shortage of experienced officers to command the volunteer units in the Spanish War, it led to his selection as Colonel of the First Volunteer Cavalry, better known to fame as the "Rough Riders."

It has sometimes been said that Wood was made Colonel of the First Volunteer Cavalry by "pull." Nothing is farther from the truth, for the Rough Riders were recruited from New Mexico, Arizona and the Indian Territory, the very country in which Wood had campaigned against Geronimo, and where his military reputation was favorably known to every settler and cowpuncher. He was the one man best suited to command a regiment recruited from this territory.

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## CHAPTER V

#### THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

To Leonard Wood's willingness always to volunteer, no matter how dangerous or unpromising the task, and to his dictum to do things and not talk about them, must be added a third and capping characteristic in the structure of his success,—his extraordinary faculty of foreseeing the general nature of his future opportunities to serve his country and of preparing himself to meet them.

In several instances the greatest successes of his life have been directly due to this faculty. Long before the Spanish War began, he foresaw the possibility that he might be appointed to command a volunteer organization, and also foresaw the impending lack of military equipment; he therefore took steps to get supplies for his organization before the rush began. As a result of this foresightedness the Rough Riders were the only volunteer cavalry regiment which was ready for action in time to fight at San Juan, the only major battle of the whole war. It is interesting in this connection to recall Lincoln's dictum:-""He who does something at the head of one regiment will eclipse him who does nothing at the head of a hundred."

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While the great majority of his fellow-countrymen were still maintaining that hostilities would be unnecessary, Wood clearly realized that war was inevitable. He was convinced that his country would not much longer tolerate the abuses perpetrated by Spain in Cuba. Accordingly he set out not only to create an opportunity to serve in the coming crash, but also prepared himself to meet that opportunity successfully.

President McKinley had faith in Wood's sterling character and in his ability, for he was familiar with his past record not only as a successful surgeon, but also as a competent soldier in the campaign against Geronimo.

Roosevelt, in describing his conversations with Wood at this epoch, said: "We both felt very strongly that such a war would be a righteous one, and would be advantageous to the honor and the interests of the nation; and after the blowing up of the *Maine*, we felt that it was inevitable.

"We then at once began to try to see that we had our share of it. . . .

"At first we had great difficulty in knowing exactly what to try for. We could go on the staff of any one of several Generals, but we much preferred the line. Wood hoped he might get a commission from his native State of Massachusetts. . . .

"Our doubts were resolved when Congress, upon the suggestion of Senator Warren, authorized the raising of three cavalry regiments from

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among the wild riders and riflemen of the Rockies and of the Great Plains."

Roosevelt and Wood were offered the Colonelcies of two of these regiments, but Roosevelt doubted his own ability to fulfil such a command until he had had more extensive military experience. His attitude was that of a generous and patriotic soul, unwilling to jeopardize the lives of American soldiers or the interests of his country for his own personal advancement. He preferred to serve as second-in-command under Wood, in whose experience and ability he had implicit confidence.

"Secretary Alger," writes Roosevelt, "offered me the command of one of these regiments. . . . Fortunately, I was wise enough to tell the Secretary that . . . I would be quite content to go as Lieutenant-Colonel, if he would make Wood Colonel.

"This was entirely satisfactory to both the President and Secretary, and accordingly Wood and I were speedily commissioned as Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel of the First United States Volunteer Cavalry."

Hundreds of new regiments were being called into existence by the United States Government, but there was not equipment for a tenth that number. For every ten regiments which could be immediately fitted out there were ninety which would have to wait many months while new supplies were contracted for, manufactured and delivered.

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But for a regiment to wait that long meant that it would miss the first campaigns and in all probability the whole war.

Gradually it began to dawn on the various regimental commanders that they were in for a race to see who would first obtain what little equipment there was on hand.

From the very beginning Wood had clearly understood the situation and with characteristic foresight had obtained a correspondingly early start.

He had not only sensed the inevitable complications before any one else realized them, but had carefully prepared all the requisitions for the equipment of a regiment, and had made a study of the location of the various depots throughout the United States where the supplies could be obtained.

When he was commissioned Colonel he needed only three days to amend his papers exactly to fit the requirements of the Rough Riders, bringing everything up to date and even writing out the telegrams which would need to be sent out by the President directing the Governors of Arizona, New Mexico and Indian Territory to issue the call for recruits. Each paper required only the signature of the Secretary of War to become an official order issued in the name of the President.

When all these papers were ready Wood took them in one lot to Secretary Alger, who said in surprise: "If more men would only do things

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instead of talking about them, the army would soon be organized."

He promptly signed all the papers, and Wood was off to get the full equipment for his regiment from the various supply depots and arsenals, before other Colonels had even figured out the rules of the game.

He obtained the new Krag rifles for the Rough Riders, the only volunteer regiment armed with this up-to-date weapon.

Wood had been commissioned Colonel of his, then non-existent, regiment on May 8th. On May 21st the regiment, organized, trained and fully equipped, had been completely mustered into the Federal Service. It left its mobilization center in San Antonio, Texas, and was on its way to Cuba on May 30th.

In three weeks he had recruited, enlisted and assembled a thousand men and had obtained for them their horses, rifles, pistols, ammunition, clothing, shelter tents, haversacks, saddle equipment, food, medical supplies and a thousand other items of equipment, and had welded all into a cavalry regiment with splendid morale.

His resourcefulness, inventiveness and persistency overcame every obstacle and broke through even the red-tape of the Ordnance Department.

A little more than three weeks later, on June 24th, the regiment, the product of Wood's organizing ability, was put to the supreme test of battle, and in a difficult, tactical operation was

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able to take the offensive and decisively defeat twice its number of Spanish regulars, acting on the defensive in prepared trenches in their own country.

The regiment arrived at Tampa on June 4th, after a weary four days trip by rail. The horses and mules had been unloaded and exercised every day of the journey, and as a result not one died or was taken sick. At Tampa the regiment "disembarked into a perfect welter of confusion. Tampa lay in pine-covered flats at the end of a one-track railroad, and everything connected with both military and railroad matters was in an almost inextricable tangle." \*

There seemed to be no one in authority and there were no orders as to where the regiment was to camp. There was little food, and in order to feed their men, the officers were obliged to buy food and pay for it out of their own pockets.

After a week at Tampa, during which Wood found time not only to rest his men and horses, but to have numerous mounted drills, telegraphic orders were received that the expeditionary force was to sail from Port Tampa the next morning for some unknown destination. The Rough Riders were to go with it, but were to leave their horses behind, together with four of their twelve troops which were to take care of the animals. The other eight troops were to entrain at a certain track at midnight.

\* By Theodore Roosevelt.

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The regiment was at the appointed place on time, but the expected train never appeared.

At three in the morning, new orders were received, requiring the regiment to go to a different track. Here also the train failed to appear, but at six o'clock some empty coal cars came along, going in the opposite direction. Wood held up this train and in a good-natured way induced the engineer to take the regiment on board, and then back his train the nine miles to Port Tampa. By this expedient they finally arrived at their port of departure.

But there the same comedy of inefficiency continued. For hours, Wood and Roosevelt endeavored to ascertain what transport they were to take, and where and when they were to embark. Eventually, by persistence, they succeeded in getting themselves assigned to the S. S. Yucatan. It was soon discovered, however, that this ship, with a capacity to accommodate one regiment only, had already been assigned to the Second Regular Infantry and the Seventy-First New York Volunteers in addition to the Rough Riders.

Colonel Wood hunted up a launch, and persuaded the officer in charge to take him out to the *Yucatan*, which was still in mid-stream, but was preparing to dock. He boarded the ship and held possession; meanwhile Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt went back to get the regiment and doublequicked it to the wharf.

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#### THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

When the other two regiments eventually arrived they found the Rough Riders in full possession of the transport with almost no room left for more passengers. Space was eventually made for Colonel Wherry and two companies of the Second Infantry.

The first American expeditionary force sent to Cuba consisted of one Army Corps under General Shafter, consisting of eighteen regular infantry regiments, three volunteer infantry regiments, five regular cavalry regiments (dismounted), one volunteer cavalry regiment (the Rough Riders, dismounted), six batteries of regular artillery, and a battalion of regular engineers.

Hundreds of volunteer regiments were authorized during the war, but only four eventually reached Cuba before hostilities had practically ceased. The First Volunteer Cavalry or Rough Riders was the only unit of its class to take part in the battles of Las Guasimas and San Juan. Of its five hundred members who landed in Cuba, one hundred and forty-two were killed or wounded, a ratio of casualties not exceeded by any other regiment.

Shafter's Army Corps consisted of three divisions. The First commanded by General Kent, and the Second by the same General Lawton who had been Wood's chief in the Geronimo Cam-

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paign. Each infantry division was composed of three brigades of three regiments each.

The Cavalry Division (dismounted) was commanded by Major-General Joe Wheeler, the famous Confederate Cavalry leader, who was second in rank to Shafter. His division, which consisted of two brigades of three cavalry regiments each, was made up as follows:

## Cavalry Division

Major General Wheeler, Commanding.

While Gen. Wheeler was sick with fever he was succeeded by Brig.-Gen. Sumner.

1st Cavalry Brigade Brigadier-General Sumner, Command'g. 2nd Cavalry Brigade

- ner, Command'g. When Gen. Sumner took command of the Division he was succeeded by Co
- Colonel Henry Carroll. When Col. Carroll was wounded he was succeeded by

Lt.-Colonel Hamilton, who was killed.

- This brigade was composed of
  - 3rd Regular Cavalry
  - 6th Regular Cavalry
  - 9th Regular Cavalry (colored)

- Brig.-Gen. S. B. M. Young, Command'g. When Gen. Young succumbed to fever he was succeeded by
- Colonel Leonard Wood (promoted Brig.-Gen.)
  - When Gen. Wood became Gov. of Santiago he was succeeded by
- Lt.-Colonel Roosevelt (promoted Colonel)
- This brigade was composed of
  - 1st Volunteer Cavalry
  - 1st Regular Cavalry
  - 10th Regular Cavalry (colored)

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CHAPLAIN BROWN of the "Rough Riders" MAJ.-GEN. WHEELER Commanding Cavalry Division 2nd Cavalry Brigade

BRIG-GEN. WOOD Commanding 2nd Cavalry Brigade COL. ROOSEVELT Commanding 1st Volunteer Cavalry



Leonard Wood and his eldest son at the epoch of the Spanish War

OFFICERS OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION



CHAPLAIN BROWN COL. COL. ROOSEVELT WOOD

CHAPLAIN BROWN PREACHING TO THE "ROUGH RIDERS"

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Shafter's Corps disembarked on June 22d at the beach of Daiquiri, about thirty miles east of the mouth of Santiago harbor; a force of about 500 Spaniards was driven inland by a bombardment from the fleet, so that the landing proceeded without opposition. It was the intention to advance westward along the coast to Santiago, the left of the army resting on the sea and the right on the high, impassable country inland.

The next day, June 23d, the Corps moved forward along the coast about ten miles to Siboney, where in the evening it first gained contact with the main body of the Spanish forces defending Santiago.

During the night plans for throwing back the enemy were made by Major-General Wheeler, commanding in the absence of General Shafter who was still on shipboard. Reconnaissance by Cuban scouts had demonstrated that the Spaniards were holding a strong position about four miles beyond Siboney, and were there confidently awaiting the American attack.

Brigadier-General Young's 2nd Cavalry Brigade, to which the Rough Riders belonged, was ordered to lead the attack at dawn. The rest of the Corps was to follow them into battle.

The country was mountainous and covered with forests, which in certain spots were very dense. From Siboney a main road led up the valley towards Santiago. This was the shortest

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route to the enemy's position. Another road, really little more than a trail, branched off to the left just outside Siboney, climbed the hills along the left side of the valley, followed their summits for several miles, and then descended into the valley again to join the main road at a distance of a little more than four miles.

The enemy's position was in front of the final junction of these two roads, at a place called Las Guasimas. A force which could make its way along this mountain trail would be able to strike the enemy's right flank and, if successful in its attack, would outflank the main Spanish position and bring about a general retreat.

General Young decided to lead two of his regiments forward along the main road to make a frontal attack, while his third regiment took the longer, steeper and rougher hill road towards the enemy's flank.

Colonel Wood sought this more difficult mission, and at a midnight council of war was selected by General Young to take the hill trail with his regiment.

At a quarter before six, on the morning of June 24th, Young's brigade marched out of Siboney, Young himself with eight troops of regulars and two Hotchkiss guns moving up the main road, followed by the rest of the regular troops as reserves.

Wood, with the eight troops of the Rough Riders and two Colt guns, took the hill trail to

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the left, the two forces marching towards the Spaniards on parallel routes about a mile and a half apart.

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Eight o'clock had been tentatively set by General Young as the hour for their joint attack. The head of his main column, having the shorter and easier route, sighted the Spaniards in their trenches at about half-past seven. Young, who was with his advance guard, restrained his men from firing and halted his main body for half an hour without disturbing the Spaniards, so that Wood might have time to reach his objective, the enemy's right flank.

Meanwhile Colonel Wood had been pushing forward at a rapid rate. He handled his regiment with faultless perfection. Assuming the correct military formation, he threw out an advance guard of one troop, so that in case of an unexpected ambush, or a head-on collision with an aggressive advancing enemy, not more than one-eighth of his force would be involved in a surprise. He led this troop himself, while the other seven troops followed in security at a little distance.

For additional precaution a picked non-commissioned officer, Sergeant Hamilton Fish, and four men, were pushed far ahead of the advance guard troop, as a "point" to give ample warning of the presence of the enemy.

Shortly before eight the "point" discovered the

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## LEONARD WOOD

Spaniards, and quietly sent back word to Colonel Wood and to the advance guard troop.

Wood immediately deployed this troop across the road, being able to do so before any firing commenced. He then ran back to the main body of his regiment and deployed three troops to the right of the road and three to the left, in one long battle line, holding the eighth troop in reserve under cover. Then he gave the order to advance and the battle line of six troops, supported by the two Colt guns, went forward at eight o'clock and the battle began.

Thus General Young's plan was executed to perfection. His two forces were able to deploy into proper combat formation and to open the battle without interruption from the enemy; in the center and on the left wing the attack began simultaneously.

Wood smashed in the Spanish right after a bitter fight in which he lost forty-two men, and in which the advance guard troop suffered most heavily, both the Captain of the troop and the Sergeant in command of the "point" being killed. The regiment then turned its fire to its right, enfilading the enemy's main position, so that he retreated in disorder, closely pursued by the regulars under Young.

The Rough Riders followed up the Spaniards for a mile beyond their abandoned trenches, and then took up a defensive position to repel counterattacks.

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Colonel Wood then re-ammunitioned and rewatered his men. Shortly afterwards the 9th Regular Cavalry (colored) arrived on the scene and reported to Wood as reënforcements. He pushed them through his lines to an outpost position, thus allowing the Rough Riders to relax their vigilance, to take a well-earned rest, and to care for their wounded.

The gallant 9th Cavalry, which had not been able to leave Siboney for more than an hour after the Rough Riders, was most chagrined to have arrived too late for the battle; they were not in action and had no casualties.

To any soldier, Wood's feat of tactics at Las Guasimas will immediately be recognizable as one of the most difficult in the lexicon of war, that of leading a strong flanking detachment in coöperation with a main body executing a frontal attack. It is a move which fails far more often than it succeeds, and which never succeeds except under able leadership. The feat which Wood performed for Young at Siboney was, on a smaller scale, the same which Stonewall Jackson with equal success executed for Robert E. Lee at Chancellorsville.

In this action the Spanish forces engaged numbered about 1,500 with two field guns, while there were about 500 reserves not employed. The Rough Riders numbered about 480, and the eight troops of regulars which attacked along the main

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road had a total strength of some 470 officers and men.

After the battle an examination of the Spanish position showed that the force directly opposed to the Rough Riders had been deployed on a front of 1100 yards,—about three-fifths of a mile, and that it had fired more than 100,000 rounds of rifle ammunition.

During this fight Wood, realizing that soldiers engaging in their first battle are sometimes nervous, deliberately exposed himself to the enemy's fire, in order to steady his men. Leading his horse, he walked up and down the firing line, encouraging the Rough Riders as they lay in whatever cover they could find, shooting at the Spaniards.

As he directed and encouraged his men he passed one private who was swearing a bluestreak,—not an uncommon reaction with a soldier in his first battle. Colonel Wood attracted his attention, smiled at him, and said:— "Don't swear; shoot!" whereupon the soldier immediately steadied down to his work.

The victorious conclusion of this action, the first in which American soldiers fought against their Spanish enemies, had a tremendous effect in elevating the morale of the American army in the field, and of the people at home, and in convincing them of ultimate victory.

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"I cannot speak too highly of the efficient manner in which Colonel Wood handled his regiment, and of his magnificent behavior in the field."

Wood was also mentioned in the dispatches of Major-General Wheeler, "for gallantry in battle. Colonel Wood disdained to take advantage of shelter or cover from the enemy's fire while any of his men remained exposed to it—an error of judgment but happily on the heroic side."

Roosevelt wrote of him:—"No officer ever showed more ceaseless energy in providing for his soldiers, in reconnoitering, in overseeing personally all the countless details of life in camp, in patrolling the trenches at night, in seeing by personal inspection that the outposts were doing their duty, in attending personally to all the thousand and one things to which a commander should attend, and to which only those commanders of marked and exceptional mental and bodily vigor are able to attend."

Wood's career as a regimental commander terminated with the important action at Las Guasimas, for shortly afterwards Brigadier-General Young was taken seriously ill with fever and had to be returned to the United States. Wood succeeded him in command of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which he continued to lead until the termination of hostilities.

`After Las Guasimas a delay of one week intervened before the battle of San Juan, the decisive

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engagement of the war. The Spaniards were strongly entrenched in semi-permanent fortifications outside Santiago, and an interval of time was necessary for the reconnaissance of their positions, for the bringing up of supplies and ammunition, for the making of plans of battle, and for the proper concentration and deployment of the American troops.

The city and harbor of Santiago now lay ten miles ahead of the American forces, and approximately west of their position. The city was defended by the natural barrier of the San Juan Hills, which extended across the path of the American advance, stretching from the sea on the left to the impassable upland jungle country on the right. It was the mission of Shafter's Army Corps to capture these hills; once they were in his possession, Santiago would lie helpless at his feet.

The task was an extremely difficult one, however, as the hills were defended by permanent block houses and by semi-permanent trenches, which overlooked and commanded the low country across which the Americans would have to advance in order to attack. Moreover, the San Juan Hills were further protected by the San Juan River, which ran all across their entire front and was at most points unfordable.

The hills were like a castle wall; the river like a moat to be crossed before the walls could be reached.

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Moreover, an isolated, fortified hill, since known as Kettle Hill, stood far out in front of the center of the San Juan Range, enfilading the whole front of attack and dominating the fords of the river.

The Spanish position could be approached by three routes. First, the Siboney-Las-Guasimas-Santiago road, along which the Corps was encamped; second, a railroad, skirting the sea on the American left; third, a wagon road, leading to El Canev on the American right.

The attack was set for the 1st of July. The tactics used at Las Guasimas were to be repeated. The main body, consisting of Kent's 1st Infantry Division and Wheeler's Cavalry Division, was to engage the enemy in front, approaching along the Siboney-Las Guasimas-Santiago road. while Lawton's 2d Infantry Division was to make a flank attack to the right, to smash in the Spanish flank in the neighborhood of El Caney, and enfilade the enemy line so that the main body would take advantage of his confusion and carry the San Juan Range. As a demonstration to distract the Spaniards' attention from Lawton's attack on the right, the 33rd Michigan Volunteer Infantry was sent along the coast-line railroad to make a demonstration on the left, supported by the guns of Admiral Sampson's fleet.

Lawton's 2nd Division marched off during the afternoon of June 30th, and commenced an attack upon El Caney at 6:30 on the morn-[89]

ing of July 1st, but his flanking movement was not as successful as had been Wood's at Las Guasimas. The Spanish positions included four block-houses, a stone church and a stone fort, which the American light field artillery was unable to batter down. The Spanish forces were commanded by the indomitable General Vara de Rey, who led the defense in person, who was first wounded and eventually hit again and killed, but who meanwhile inspired his men with such tenacious courage that only a hundred of them escaped death, wounds or capture; they held up Lawton's entire Division for nine hours, from 6:30 in the morning until nearly 3:30 in the afternoon, so that Shafter's original plan of action was checkmated.

Meanwhile Kent's 1st Infantry Division and Wheeler's Cavalry Division had begun their march before daylight, eventually taking up a position on the near side of the San Juan River, and facing the San Juan Hills which lay beyond it. Kent's 1st Infantry Division deployed into battle line to the left of the Siboney-Las Guasimas-Santiago road on a front of about two miles, and the Cavalry Division was placed at the right of the same road. The deployment was practically complete by 8:30, and the troops lay down to await the success of Lawton's attack, meantime suffering heavy casualties from infantry and automatic guns located on the outlying Kettle Hill in their immediate front, and also

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from long-range fire from the San Juan Hills. The Cavalry Division suffered most severely since Kettle Hill was directly in its front and only a few hundred yards away.

By 9:30, when Lawton had been in action three hours, the sounds of his battle indicated that he was making no progress and therefore from a tactical point of view, and as a component part of the whole battle, his attack was a failure.

Wood, riding about through his brigade to gain an immediate, first-hand knowledge of the situation, found that under the withering fire of the Spaniards his men had already lost about twenty per cent. of their total number, and realized that if they stayed there an hour or two longer, awaiting the completion of Lawton's attack, they would be practically annihilated, so that Lawton, even if eventually successful, would be too late to save the day. Wood's clear intelligence showed him that radical action and an immediate change of plans were necessary if the battle were yet to be won.

The situation was complicated by the fact that General Shafter, a man weighing nearly three hundred pounds, had been exhausted by the heat while making a reconnaissance the previous day, and in addition had suffered an attack of gout. He was confined to his tent the entire day of the battle, and was therefore unable personally to intervene now that Vara de Rey's heroic de-

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fense against Lawton had disrupted his original plan of attack.

He was, however, represented in the battle by his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Miley, who was at the front along the Siboney-Las Guasimas-Santiago road.

These facts were known to Wood, who, after consulting with his Division Commander, galloped over to the road at about 9:30, located Miley, whom he knew and for whom he had a high regard, and persuaded him that radical and desperate measures were necessary; namely, a direct frontal attack, without waiting longer for Lawton to break and turn the Spanish flank.

In General Shafter's name, Miley gave the necessary permission. Wood rode back to his 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which was lying slightly behind and to the right of the other Cavalry Brigade, and set it in motion forward. As it went through the other Cavalry Brigade it picked it up, and the entire Cavalry Division participated in a successful charge on Kettle Hill which was carried by assault.

After a brief interval another charge was led in person by Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, who, taking advantage of the disorganization caused among the Spaniards, went on and carried a section in the center of the San Juan Range. Simultaneously Kent's Infantry Division, released from the Spanish fire from Kettle Hill and supported by the fire of several units of the

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Cavalry Division which remained on that hill, charged and carried the left section of the San Juan Range. The troops of the two Divisions then looked down upon the white walls of the city of Santiago, lying helpless at their feet. Its fall was then inevitable. It was not until several hours later that Lawton finally succeeded in capturing El Caney.

Colonel Wood's gallantry and ability as a brigade leader at San Juan were such that Shafter recommended him for promotion to the rank of Brigadier-General because he had been "so conspicuous for bravery and had handled his troops so well." This was immediately acted upon by President McKinley, his promotion' taking place under date of July 8th, 1898.

To win a Generalship by gallantry on the field of battle is by all odds the highest honor within the reach of a field officer, and was attained by only two others during active hostilities in Cuba; —Colonel Carroll of the 6th Regular Cavalry, and Colonel McKibbon of the 21st Regular Infantry.

Leonard Wood's conduct at this battle showed that he was not the type of brigade commander who sits far to the rear and directs operations from a dugout, on the theory that his sacred person is too valuable to his country to be exposed to the enemy's fire. No matter what his rank, whether Major-General or Lieutenant, Wood has

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never asked his men to go into extreme peril or hardship without going with them.

While commanding his brigade at San Juan his horse was shot, one of his two aides was seriously wounded, and the other killed.

His innate democracy was demonstrated by the fact that, after the battle was over, he reverted to his profession of surgery and found time personally to dress the wounds of more than thirty of his injured enlisted men.

On that day he set a precedent for his staff officers which he has never altered. He has never allowed them during active operations to devote their entire time to desk work at the rear, but has by his example encouraged them to be true field soldiers. In later years in the Philippines his aide-de-camps could always be found at the head of the most desperate enterprises. Two of them were seriously wounded and one gained the Congressional Medal of Honor.

With the fall of Santiago, the American army was faced with new and very serious problems.

Spain had expected the American invasion of Cuba to take place near Habana at the western end of the island, and when General Shafter's expeditionary forces landed 400 miles away at Daiquiri near Santiago, at the southeastern extremity, the Spaniards were taken by surprise and Santiago had no reserve supplies of any kind.

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The Spanish forces, after being defeated at San Juan, had fallen back a disorganized mob into the already overcrowded tropical city and were there besieged by the Americans, until the rising tide of sickness and starvation forced them to surrender.

The city was not only filled with the men of the disbanded Spanish Army, but was surrounded by undisciplined bands of so-called "soldiers" from the Cuban forces who were eager to murder Spaniards, and who saw no reason why the surrender of the enemy should be made to interfere with this purpose.

The Generals of the American forces were appalled at the conditions of filth and disease which they found on entering the city, and which it was their duty to remedy, for the city was theirs by conquest and with it came the responsibility of administering its affairs.

The sanitary situation was acute, and the problem of clearing these Augean stables a truly Herculean one. There were over 15,000 sick in the population of 40,000. No one cared to assume the task of military governor except Wood, who volunteered.

Because of the brilliancy of his military record during the preceding two months, the old, hardbitten, regular officers recommended that the newest and youngest brigadier of the army be granted his request, and allowed to attempt the seemingly impossible task.

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### LEONARD WOOD

## Santiago, via Haiti, August 4, 1898. 4:17 P. M.

## Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington.

....I think General Wood is by far the best man to leave in command of this post, and perhaps of the whole district. If he is not to have the entire command, I would suggest Lawton as the only other man in every way equipped for the position....

# Shafter,

Major-General.

Thus Wood's astounding military career, which began against Geronimo, continued as Colonel of the Rough Riders, and culminated as Commander of the Second Brigade of General Joe Wheeler's cavalry division, lifted him to his first executive opportunity, and fairly launched a great administrative genius upon his real life's work.

The true significance of that career is found in the fact that it served him as a stepping-stone from the profession of surgery, which limited and circumscribed his peculiar abilities, and lifted him up to the high plane of administrative work, in which his executive genuis had full play, and through which he acquired international fame.

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# CHAPTER VI

### GOVERNOR OF SANTIAGO

SANTIAGO DE CUBA had for more than two centuries enjoyed the unenviable reputation of being the most pestilential and fever-ridden spot in the world. In olden times it was a common saying among merchant skippers that the city could be smelled ten miles at sea.

It possessed no street-cleaning department and, in spite of the fact that in many localities the streets served not only as highways but also as open sewers, there was absolutely no system of sewage, and no plan of drainage except of the most accidental kind. Garbage was thrown into the streets, there to lie until the next tropical storm should wash it down the gently sloping hillside upon which the city was built into the bay, where it floated about among the shipping, until it was eventually washed up on the beaches to decay under the burning sun.

In the United States it is the custom to surround houses with gardens; in Spanish-American towns the reverse is true; the garden is in the center of the house, and the house is built around

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it. In Santiago, the most conspicuous and important adjunct of this "garden" was an open cesspool, which was seldom if ever emptied and was the ultimate destination of all domestic sewage, which there decayed and in time of plague radiated disease throughout all the household.

The city was surrounded by malarial swamps and jungles, its water supply was full of typhoid germs, and even in normal times its death rate from yellow fever was the highest in the world. But when Leonard Wood became governor, the times were far from normal. The season was the most unhealthful of the year and the city was almost without water. The crowding and congestion during the siege had raised the daily death rate, from yellow fever alone, to one-half of one per cent. a day,—or five deaths daily for each thousand of inhabitants. The death rate from all causes reached four hundred a day in a population of forty thousand.

So many of the city's population were ill that there were not enough well people to care for the sick. Such numbers died daily that they could not be buried, but lay rotting in the gutters among other refuse or in the empty rooms of deserted houses where the bodies decayed and bred new pestilence. Unclean vultures waddled about the streets, or roosted full-fed in dismal rows along the house-tops until ready to lurch down into the street to gorge themselves anew.

The market place was practically deserted, for

there was almost no food for sale and what little was offered commanded fabulous prices which denied it to all except the rich. Meat, which had formerly sold for from five to ten cents, now brought a dollar a pound in gold and was scarce even at that price. The first meal which General Wood ate in Santiago was at the Café Venus in the Plaza de Armas; it cost him fourteen dollars gold and the *pièce de resistance* was horse meat. Bread was almost unobtainable, and vegetables could not be had at any price, for the transportation system had been disrupted during the military operations, and there was no way of carrying supplies into the city from the surrounding country.

Men and women, weak with fever and hunger, sat inert and hopeless upon their doorsteps. Gaunt children, little living skeletons, lay apathetically in corners.

The situation required a man of unbounded resource and of firm, energetic character. It also required a very considerable measure of special training. The difficulties to be overcome were to an equal extent sanitary, political, and military. The people to be dealt with had not the faintest idea of the first principles of sanitation; and having only just been freed from slavery, had no training or experience in selfgovernment.

To master the situation and solve its complicated problems there was needed a man who was

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an authority on modern sanitation and medicine, and who was at the same time an adept in the control of men. Leonard Wood possessed both these qualifications to a preëminent degree and in addition was a competent soldier, a necessary adjunct, for the physician and law-giver would have been powerless unless supplemented by the military leader endowed with the knowledge of how to apply martial law; and martial law is a weapon which but few men are able to wield judiciously.<sup>1</sup>

"The matters that first claimed Governor Wood's attention were the feeding of the starving people and the amendment of the city's sanitary condition. He obtained as many rations as possible and these were issued with a free but careful hand; he established food depots at various places; and before forty-eight hours had passed, actual famine had been brought to an end.

"The rations which he issued arrested actual starvation, and very soon provisions began to come from the ordinary sources and by the ordinary ways. As the supply increased, however, there was no diminution of prices. He sent for the aldermen representing the different wards of the city, and he also summoned the butchers.

"'How much do you charge for meat?"

"'Ninety cents a pound, señor.'

"'What does it cost you?'

<sup>3</sup> Quoted from *McClure's*, March, 1899.

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"There was hesitation and a shuffling of feet; then one of the butchers said, in a whining voice:

"'Meat is very dear, your excellency.'

"'How much a pound?"

"'It cost us very much, and----'

"'How much a pound?"

"'Fifteen cents, your excellency; but we have lost much money during the war and-----'

"'So have your customers. Now meat will be sold at twenty-five cents a pound and not one cent more. Do you understand?"

"Then, turning to the aldermen, he charged them to see that his order was carried out to the letter, unless they wanted to be expelled from office.

"Thenceforward meat was sold in the markets at twenty-five cents. A similar reduction was made in the price of bread, vegetables, and all food products. . . It was the first showing of the master hand to the public, and confidence in the American methods of administration strengthened rapidly."

Once the food situation had been regulated, Wood turned his attention to matters of sanitation. He realized that an exceedingly important element in the temperament of the Latin races is their attitude of immobility and inertia whenever any improvements contrary to tradition and custom are suggested. Tradition is the breath of their life, and logic has no effect upon them where

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## LEONARD WOOD

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precedent is involved. When logic attacks fixed custom the first reaction of the Latin-American is *Manana*—"to-morrow perhaps";—the second is a passive mule-like resistance;—the third active opposition, which savors of the fanatic defending his convictions and beliefs.

This resistance General Wood had to contend with when he first undertook to impose drainage, street-cleaning, and sanitary sewage-disposal upon the people of Santiago de Cuba. The popular view seemed to be that if the city had for four centuries managed without such innovations, that fact was sufficient proof that Divine Providence did not intend their introduction at this late date.

It is doubtful if this prejudice could possibly have been overcome, except under stress of martial law, and by the initial employment of working parties of American soldiers. It was not until the city had been thoroughly cleaned by the American troops assisted by native civil prisoners, and the value of the scientific sanitation demonstrated by results, that Wood began to receive in his efforts either sympathy or assistance from the population.

American fatigue parties with wagons proceeded throughout all quarters of the city collecting the dead bodies of disease-stricken men and animals. These being the most deadly among the many dangerous forms of filth were, therefore, the logical initial undertaking. The bodies were

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carted out of the city, stacked up in piles, soaked with kerosene, and burned.

It took four days to hunt out and dispose of all the dead bodies; then Wood issued the following order: "Every householder will report immediately to the Mayor and the Military Governor any death occurring in his household. Any person failing to do this will be arrested and put at hard labor on the streets for a period of thirty days. All policemen are ordered to report promptly to the Mayor and the Military Governor all deaths, any cases of malignant fever, and any place which is in an unhealthy condition, coming under their knowledge. Failure on the part of any policeman to do this will be followed by severe punishment."

The next step was a campaign of systematic street cleaning, for the fever was still on the increase, and the officers and soldiers who worked under Wood were decimated by it. Not a day passed but a score sickened and went to hospital to fight for life. The deaths among those who fought with Wood against disease in Santiago exceeded the total number of American deaths by battle in the entire Spanish-American war. Wood himself contracted both yellow fever and malarial fever before his governorship was terminated. But his superb constitution and his grim determination enabled him to be back at work in each case within ten days of the time he was first taken sick.

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The American soldiers doggedly stuck to their task, inspired by the example of their leader, who outworked them all and who in his daily inspections of every nook and cranny of the city shared their exposure to infection. Street after street was cleaned up, beginning with the most important and ending with the by-ways.

As soon as a street had been cleared of rubbish and scraped, it was treated to a liberal dose of chloride of lime, to disinfect the polluted ground. This caused loud protests from the population, who did not object to time-honored smells, but rebelled at new-fangled stinks such as chloride of lime.

One of the leading citizens came to Wood's headquarters to make a "very grave complaint." It seemed that the well, from which he obtained his drinking water, was situated in the same yard with his cess-pool. The Americans had placed chloride of lime in the cess-pool, which permeating the subsoil of the yard, had given an unpleasant taste to the well-water, which had previously been "delicious to the taste."

The existing stock of chloride of lime and other chemicals soon became exhausted, and there presently developed a most acute need of both chemicals and medicines. There was, however, no authorized appropriation for their purchase. When funds were needed, General Wood was supposed to requisition for them to Habana, where his requisition was examined and, if approved,

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forwarded to Washington, where it would be again examined by various departments with the possibility that after six months or more the needed money might be expected to arrive. Meanwhile, he had plenty of money in his charge, for one of his duties was to collect the revenues and taxes of Santiago.

These funds he was supposed to forward to Habana, for transmission to Washington. But with a plague of sickness on his hands, he boldly cut through all this red tape and used the money he collected to buy the medical supplies, which were absolutely necessary in conquering disease. He sent forward his accounts instead of the money, and took a chance on fighting them through. Meanwhile, by the prompt expenditure of this fund, he made the city thoroughly healthful and saved thousands of lives, not only among the Cuban natives but also in the United States forces.

While Wood and his men were feeding the starving, burning the dead, cleaning the streets and caring for the sick, they received no encouragement from the Cuban residents; the latter held aloof and never even so much as called at the palace to pay their respects to the new Governor.

When the streets were finally cleaned, orders were issued against throwing into them any more garbage. Householders were instructed to obtain barrels for their refuse and the new admin-

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istration took steps to have these barrels emptied daily. Many were the protests, infractions and convictions which resulted. The street-cleaning squads were daily increased by those who had disobeyed orders; for the standard sentence given by the military courts for breaking sanitary ordinances was "thirty days' street-cleaning."

Step by step the battle was won. General Wood was accused of interfering with the personal liberty of the individual citizens when he required them to empty their cess-pools and have them thoroughly disinfected. This was too much for the Cuban endurance. It was bad enough for "these crazy Americans" to alter the century old privileges with regard to throwing garbage into the public streets, but when they actually came into a man's private yard, it was positively too much for endurance. A man's home is his castle, and even if he chooses to be dirty,-and occasionally sick,-is it any one's affair but his own? Protests and remonstrances, however, availed nothing for the final argument was martial law, which the Governor never hesitated to use when it once became the last resort to secure a necessary result.

Before the last cess-pool was properly emptied the street cleaners had so many "thirty day recruits" that they were ahead of the game and were able to take up gutter and sewer building as a sideline. And this logically led to street repairs and the laying of new pavements. The first street

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### GOVERNOR OF SANTIAGO

which Wood paved was the Calle Marina, the main street.

It was exactly a hundred years since any of Santiago's streets had been re-paved. The task was a long one, but General Wood pushed it vigorously throughout his administration, and under that impetus the work continued long after his departure, until finally every street in Santiago was passable, had two gutters and at least one stone sidewalk.

In spite of the press of emergency work in the first weeks of his governorship over Santiago, Wood nevertheless found time to start an investigation of the city's water supply. The city received water from public hydrants every morning, but the supply invariably gave out when the day was five or six hours old.

The excentricity of the water supply was taken as a matter of course for it had behaved that way for decades; no one knew where it came from, nor why it gave out by noon, nor who furnished the water, nor what power caused it to flow.

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It was weeks before the mystery was solved, but eventually an American officer discovered a crude dam in the mountains nearly ten miles from the city. This dam had been built a century before by the Spaniards, but no official had taken the trouble to inspect it during a decade. It was much in need of repairs, and water leaked out of it almost as fast as it flowed in. It was managed [107] by an old Spanish water-tender who had received his last pay two years before, but had nevertheless stuck to his post, too lazy to protest effectively, too lazy to stop working and hunt a new job.

He was put on the pay-roll of the new government, and steps were taken to repair promptly the dam, stopping the leaks so that there would be water enough to last all day in Santiago.

Once the acute problems of starvation and fever had been conquered by rationing and sanitation Governor Wood turned his attention from these subjects of elemental physical importance to considerations of education and finance, wishing to evolve a system of Cuban law and order which could, at an early date, replace the arbitrary American rule of martial law, with its courtsmartial and its provost guards.

He caused a suspension in the foreclosures of mortgages, establishing what was, in effect, a moratorium to protect small shopkeepers and farmers from losing their property before they had had a fair chance to recover from the financial derangements incidental to the capture and invasion of their city.

He then devoted himself to the establishment and improvement of public schools, and caused English to be included in the curriculum.

To prepare the way for the termination of martial law, he organized a gendarmerie composed of Cuban soldiers, and led by ex-officers of General Garcia's Cuban Army of Liberation.

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He surrounded himself with Cubans, whom he trusted absolutely. His personal secretary, through whose hands passed all his dispatches, reports and confidential letters, was a Cuban named Alexander Gonzales, who had served with old General Gomez, a fact which was accepted by the Cubans as proof positive that he had no secrets from them and was at least trying to work for their best interests.

Wood was always accessible to Cubans. Under Spanish rule it had taken great influence to see the Governor-General, and even then an appointment had to be made days ahead. When Wood became Governor all this was changed. A strange Cuban would come into his anteroom, and say hesitatingly to an Aide-de-Camp:—

"Would it perhaps be possible for me to get an appointment to see the Governor?"

"Certainly. Right away?"

"Now?"

"Yes, this minute. There he is through those swinging doors. Go right in. Announce yourself."

"To this day," wrote Ray Stannard Baker in 1900, "the visitor at Santiago wonders at the apathy of the Cubans over the marvelous improvements in their city,—its beautiful pavements, its clean alleys, its enlarged water system, and its reorganized hospitals.

"'Yes, the pavements are good,' a Cuban said to me grudgingly; 'but most of our people are [109] just as well off without them. The asphalt hurts their heels.'

"These really wonderful public works, prosecuted in spite of many difficulties, have made General Wood famous wherever English is spoken; but they did not at first add appreciably to his glory among the Cubans.

"There are not only many men in this or in any other country who could have gone into the Santiago of August, 1898, with its thousands of dead and dying, its reeking filth, its starvation, its utter prostration, and made of it in four months' time a clean, healthy, orderly city. Another soldier might have been chosen who could have preserved order as well as did General Wood, a lawyer might have reorganized the judicial system, and a physician reëstablished the hospital, but it would not have been easy to find another man with the varied mental equipment and the requisite physical endurance to serve in a tropical country as lawmaker, judge, and governor all in one; to build roads and sewers: to establish hospitals; to organize a school system and devise a scheme of finance; to deal amicably with a powerful church influence; and yet to remain, in spite of such autocracy, the most popular man in the province."

When Governor Wood left Santiago for his first vacation to the United States in the spring of 1899, all Santiago came down to see him off, cheered him to the echo, and presented him with

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## GOVERNOR OF SANTIAGO

an illuminated diploma, which read: "From the people of Santiago de Cuba to General Leonard Wood. The greatest of your many successes is to have won the confidence and esteem of a people in trouble."

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## CHAPTER VII

#### THE WOOD METHOD

THERE is no more interesting study than the analysis of the methods used by America's great administrators and executives. Our history is one continuous record of their triumphs, as shown in the building up of organizations with which to conquer seemingly insurmountable difficulties, —physical, political and spiritual. Their successes now constitute the warp and woof of our national life. Their struggles and triumphs have become a vital part of our public consciousness.

Yet the methods by which our military, legislative, or economic administrators have accomplished their ends, have received less attention than the results which they obtained, although from an educational point of view the methods are not less important of the two. For every man who has left a record of achievement, there have been hundreds who have failed to accomplish anything of importance only because each one of them lacked the knowledge to combine into an harmonious unit, numbers of men united by his ideals, loyal to his person, and enthusiastic to carry out the details of his policies.

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Leonard Wood is one of the greatest administrators that America has ever produced, and it is correspondingly instructive to analyze the system by which he achieved his extraordinary results as Governor of the Province of Santiago, as Governor of the Island of Cuba, as Governor of the Moro Province, as Commander of the Philippines Division, as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and as initiator of Officers' Training Camps.

His method has already endured the two most severe tests to which any leadership can be subjected. On the one hand, it has lived through years of popular applause and general appreciation; on the other, it has survived and continued to produce the results he sought, during periods when his work was accorded almost no public recognition, when every possible official effort was systematically made to keep him in the background, and when reports were subtly spread derogatory to his mental and physical condition, to his discretion and even to his patriotism.

That Leonard Wood steadily held together and added to his following, through periods of repression and depression, is the highest possible tribute to his personal power and to his right of leadership. That his reputation and influence have steadily grown, through good and ill report, is high testimony to the soundness of his system. When one considers the high class of men who offer him allegiance and who look to him for

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guidance, it is a splendid tribute to his character, and a twice valuable evidence of the success of that "Wood Method," which has become a proverb and which is so clean cut and definite that it might serve as a model for future organizers.

All leaders confer, or are supposed to confer, with their co-workers; but there are two distinct methods of utilizing such conferences. In one, a leader first fully makes up his own mind on the questions under consideration, and then calls together his advisors, announces his decision, and measures their loyalty by the enthusiasm with which they acquiesce in his decision. This is a method which can achieve large and lasting success only when the age is an autocratic one, and the leader a superman like Napoleon or Frederick the Great.

The second method presupposes a leader who has the ability to select big men as his direct subordinates, demanding of them only that they be actuated by his ideals and by the desire to work towards the same ultimate ends, and not that they shall invariably recast their minds to the mold of his preconceived decisions. Such a leader when faced with a problem calls together his advisors and associates while his own mind is yet in a state of suspended judgment.

When interviewed by the writer upon this subject, General Wood said:—

"Every successful administrator must among other gifts possess two fundamental qualifica-

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tions for leadership:—he must have the ability to select the men best fitted for the work assigned to them, and the power so to coördinate the activities of the men selected that they may function as an effective unit.

"An efficient executive will have his own definite policy by which his subordinates will be guided, but to them he will leave the details of execution. He must have an instinctive grasp of the situation as a whole, and know by intuition if these subordinates are harmoniously working out his general plan. He cannot without waste of valuable time himself attend to details but he must, subconsciously as it were, be aware of the efficiency and faithfulness of each one working under him.

"An administrator facing a multiplicity of important problems cannot hope to know more than his assistants about each one of their specialties; presupposing, of course, that these advisors have been selected in a sincere effort to obtain the most competent men available.

"The successful executive must seek and duly consider the opinions of his subordinates, and of men who are experts on the subjects under discussions. Then and then only should he begin forming his own conclusions. This is the judicial method; the truly democratic one.

"It is the method necessarily used by the physician diagnosing a complicated case of physical

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ills; a method which can be applied quite as successfully to a diagnosis of public affairs.

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"The best example of this sort of leadership is, of course, Abraham Lincoln, who was great enough to select and hold together a group of men, who could furnish him with the soundest advice on all public questions, although several of them, like Secretary of War Stanton and Commander-in-Chief McClellan, were personally hostile to him and felt for him, in the beginning at least, neither admiration nor confidence.

"The ability to respect and accept suggestions from subordinates is a fundamental principle of all administrative success, and not the least of its uses is the important part it plays in winning their loyal support. Their enthusiasm and loyalty are greatly enhanced if they are allowed to help formulate the plans which they are later to aid in carrying out.

"Not only must a subordinate be loyal to his chief, but it is quite as important that a chief be loyal to his subordinates, and both to the Government they are serving. This implies frankness and definiteness in dealing with an assistant; sincere and cordial support as long as he is efficient and prompt and fearless removal as soon as he demonstrates his unfitness for the work assigned him."

When this step becomes necessary Wood always courteously gives a complete explanation of his reasons, thus enabling the man to understand for

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himself the cause of the change. He does this with such kindness and consideration that many of his most ardent supporters are men whom he has been obliged to remove from office.

"No organization can continue to be successful," he says, "unless the leader's support of the subordinate is contingent upon the latter's efficiency, for the continued maintenance in office of an unproductive individual is pure favoritism, and favoritism will wreck the morale of an organization more quickly than any other element of decay. No personal feeling can be allowed to obscure the leader's judgment nor induce him to retain a man who has proved unable to accomplish the task set for him. He may keep as a friend but cannot retain as a co-worker one who proves himself too small for the job assigned to him."

Leonard Wood's power to win the confidence of his subordinates is extraordinary. The loyalty which he receives is that of strong men of great individual ability, and often of a wide divergence of personal opinion, welded together by a harmony of ideals and a tolerance and respect for each other's opinions.

He has always been quick to realize that an administrator must decentralize; that the greater his task and the larger the number of his assistants, the more he must trust and support them. But this is impracticable unless the subordinates return in full the trust of their chief.

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He never forgets that a good administrator must be the servant, not the master, of the people for whom he works. His attitude reminds one of the old saying that the Pope is "The servant of the servants of God."

The time has long since passed when loyalty of men towards their leader, or of a people to their ruler, need not be reciprocal. Even as long ago as the French Revolution, Louis XVI was guillotined for what his subjects conceived to be disloyalty to France and to the French people. The American Colonies revoked their allegiance to King George III of England because he had first cancelled his loyalty to them.

Yet few superiors are truly loyal to their subordinates. Only too often, even in military life, a leader gives his officers verbal orders; then if success results he assumes all the credit, while if failure supervenes he allows them to be blamed, saying either that they disobeyed or exceeded his order, or that they were too stupid to understand it.

Leonard Wood goes to the other extreme, and in every case assumes all the responsibility for the acts of his subordinates, since it was he who selected them, trained them in their work, and maintained them in office. They know that Wood and Wood alone will justly deal out to them reward or punishment; if the man in error is competent and rarely makes mistakes, his failure will be overlooked; but if he fails often, he will

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be shifted to other work more suited to his training and temperament.

In 1904, towards the end of his Governorship of the Moro Province, it became necessary to wage a decisive campaign in the Island of Jolo, against a band of renegades who had gradually been collected from the outlaws of the section. They had made their headquarters in an old extinct volcano, which was about half a mile in diameter and towered two thousand feet above the surrounding jungle. It was by tradition a sort of holy mountain, in whose sanctuary they believed themselves safe from capture. There was an ample supply of the all necessary drinking water in the crater.

These renegades were slave-dealing, polygamous, Mohammedan savages who would neither allow their neighbors to live in peace, nor acknowledge any law or control for themselves. They were irreconcilable and kept their part of the Philippines in constant turmoil with their pillagings, their slave-hunts and their murders. Their fanatical hatred of everything Christian made them prefer death in battle, and the resulting attainment of the Mohammedan seventh heaven, to submission to white men.

They were the only group in the Moro Province which as a whole had been proof against Governor Wood's patience, diplomacy and arbitration.

It is one of his most definite characteristics

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that he never shirks an unpleasant duty, and when these renegades had finally become the only unpacified clan, when during eight months all attempts at arbitration had failed, and when it was evident that they would never submit, he approved a campaign against them.

The work was allotted to a reënforced regiment under Colonel Duncan, who eventually drove the tribe into the interior of their crater.

The robbers having positively refused to surrender, guns were taken up by hand or by block and tackle, and the hill was stormed with heavy losses, amounting to twenty-five per cent. of the American troops engaged. The battle ended on the restricted floor of the crater in a terrible hand-to-hand mêlée, bayonet against bolo. The outlaws, who neither asked nor gave quarter, were nearly all killed. In the excitement of the battle a number of women, whose habitual costume included trousers and was otherwise similar to Moro masculine attire, met death fighting side by side with their men.

A garbled account of their fate reached the United States, and resulted in a congressional investigation which seemed to demand a scapegoat, and was likely to ruin someone's career. General Wood was cabled for an immediate explanation. He sent a reply, the gist of which was:— "I will investigate. Colonel Duncan deserves all credit for winning the battle. I assume entire responsibility for the action of the troops in every

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particular. I do not believe that in this or in any other fight American soldiers killed a Moro woman unless unavoidably in close action." And he fought it out along those lines, protecting Duncan.

Wood's loyalty to his subordinates is boundless. It is the keynote of his administrative successes. In his personal character it is his most striking trait, save only his devotion to Americanism. He considers his men before himself, and never forgets any one of them who has served him faithfully, no matter in how humble a capacity.

An interesting example of this occurred in 1916, while he was stationed at Governor's Island as Commander of the Eastern Department.

He arrived at his office about 8:30 one morning to find a telegram from a woman in Indiana named Blizzard, stating that her husband was detained at the Immigration Department at Ellis Island, and asking the General to have him released. The telegram gave no intimation of the cause of detention and no clew as to the man's identity. The General, however, immediately remembered him as one of his old soldiers, and an aide-de-camp, who arrived shortly before nine o'clock, found the General occupied in personally telephoning to Ellis Island.

It developed that the man had no money and no proof of identity, and was violently insane. He had just been returned from Mexico, and his

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insanity was due to ill treatment at the hands of Mexicans during the only period of our history when American citizens in foreign countries were denied protection by their own government.

Our immigration laws forbid entrance into the country of either paupers or the insane, unless they are American citizens and can produce proof of that fact, which barred Blizzard until proof of his identity could be produced.

General Wood, upon learning these details, immediately dispatched to Ellis Island both an army surgeon and his personal orderly, Sergeant Heintzman, who had formerly served with Blizzard; the surgeon to examine the man and make certain that he was receiving proper medical attention; the Sergeant to identify him and permit his entrance into the country.

The General also telegraphed the State authorities of Indiana to arrange for the man's transfer to an Indiana Insane Asylum.

Meanwhile the General had Blizzard transferred to a hospital near his own headquarters on Governor's Island, and visited him there every few days. On his first visit the general wore a blue uniform of the old type; this caused Blizzard to have a violent seizure because it was to him the symbol of the country which had abandoned him; in his subsequent visits the General therefore wore khaki.

Eventually Blizzard was sent to an asylum in Indiana, near his own home, where he received

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every care; he was, however, beyond help, and died about a year later.

The aide-de-camp asked General Wood why he had taken so much personal interest in the man, and received this answer:—"He served under me eighteen years ago in Havana as a stenographer and he never watched the clock."

Wood's great powers of endurance and his ability to sustain long hours of intense activity, either mental or physical, have always been with his subordinates a most important point in his favor, for although it is part of his system to demand of them a tremendous amount of work, he himself outworks them all. At night the last light to be extinguished in headquarters is usually his own, and he is the first at work in the morning.

It is the rule of his own personal office that every letter be properly disposed of the same day it is received. Sometimes, in the morning, his big desk is piled high from end to end, with reports and correspondence, with more coming in every hour, but no matter how voluminous the accumulation he never lets up at night until every paper is disposed of. He goes through them like a snow-plow pushing through a drift. He has the grip of a bulldog on any task he once undertakes.

"An administrator," he says, "should excel all his subordinates in his devotion to their common cause. His self-sacrifice in behalf of their ideals,

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his hours of labor, and his endurance should ever exceed theirs. He must give the example. He must set the pace.

"He must realize that his own task is not so much material, as moral and psychological. By his example, he must embue each one of the departments under his direction with a spirit of mutual coöperation and support, not merely towards himself but also towards each other. This should include a desire to understand the work of others, a fraternal tolerance each of the other's mistakes or apparent mistakes, and a cheerful, constant watchtulness each of the other's interests.

"To be entirely successful this spirit must be founded upon some idealism, such as patriotism, religious conviction, altruism, devotion to public service, or family loyalty. In our American universities it is called college spirit. It underlies the team-work to which universities owe their football championships.

"Team-work is largely inspired and instilled by the team Captain, who must himself be an unswerving believer in his team's ultimate success.

"An administrator," continued General Wood, "must be able to decentralize. In giving orders to a subordinate he must explain what is desired in terms of results, without going into suggestions and details as to methods by which to accomplish those results. This not only saves time,

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but is an acknowledgment of the fact that an intelligent subordinate, on the ground, devoting all his thought and energy to a task is a better judge as to the ways and means than his superior, occupied with many other things and tied to his headquarters."

One of Wood's old aides said to me: "The first duty he gave me was to make a certain investigation, and to recommend the subsequent action to be taken. After completing the investigation, I made out a typewritten memorandum, stating my conclusions and my recommendations.

"When I took this to the General he held it in his hand, and without even glancing at it, asked if I were satisfied with the solution I had worked out. I replied in the affirmative. Still without reading the memorandum, he handed it back and directed me to draw up the orders necessary to carry out that recommendation.

"This threw upon me a responsibility I had not expected, and I spent a whole day going over my work again, before I finally dared draw up the orders.

"This experience showed me, more than any amount of talk, that what he wanted was a staff officer who would relieve him of details.

One of the many reasons for the love and respect which Wood invariably receives from his subordinates is his ability to make definite decisions promptly, thus allowing business to proceed without delay. When an assistant refers to him

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a matter upon which hinges all further action the necessary decision is always received on the minute, and in brief, decisive words which leave no room for doubt or hesitation.

As one who has worked under General Wood, I wish to say in conclusion that he is the most satisfactory superior in the world. The principal reasons for this are that his subordinates are encouraged to take the initiative and to assume responsibility; that they are helped to grow and to develop; that they are helped to grow and are not deserted if they get into trouble; that his ability to render quick, accurate decisions enables them to keep busy and to carry each appointed task to a prompt and successful conclusion.

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## CHAPTER VIII

### APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF CUBA

A VERY difficult problem of Colonial Administration faced the United States in 1899. We had freed Cuba from the Spaniard's misrule and were desirous to withdraw and leave the Cubans to manage their own internal affairs. We were, however, unable to do this immediately because the war had left the country in a state of complete anarchy which for the moment made selfgovernment utterly out of the question.

Yet to remain in occupation was to invite from all Cubans the suspicion that we intended to annex their island, a suspicion which increased in strength with every month that we remained in possession, and which might fairly be expected eventually to result in an insurrection against us similar to the one which did actually take place the same year in the Philippines under like conditions.

The Cubans desired immediate independence with a persistent impatience which made them chafe under the slightest delay. For generations they had suffered and fought in the long struggle for personal liberty and national freedom until

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the desire for it had become the ingrained obsession of their nature that they could not be patient under any arguments of mere expediency. They were unwilling or unable to appreciate any reasons for postponement.

Their suspicions were constantly fanned intoflames by certain Americans who openly and persistently claimed that the Cubans were permanently unsuited for self-government. These Americans, through the press, advocated annexation and spread the idea that this was not only for Cuba's ultimate best interest but was really desired by the better class of Cubans themselves. In consequence the great mass of the Cuban people began to look upon the American flag as a blight upon their land, and were rapidly becoming overwhelmingly anti-American. All their political factions and all their newspapers were increasingly unfriendly.

They feared exploitation by the American. They feared his industries and his capital. They feared him because he had so easily and so quickly whipped the Spaniards, against whom they had struggled in vain for so many decades. They disliked the individual American for his energy, for his physical superiority, for his ridicule of the duel, for his direct brusque manners which completely ignored the courtesies and amenities so dear to the heart of the Latin.

They were out of sympathy with the form of civilization offered by the intruder, with its puri-

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tanism, and its conventionality, its disrespect for traditions, its lust for sanitation, its disapproval of bull-fights and cock-fighting.

Gratitude is short-lived, and the newborn suspicion of the American motives had already supplanted the memories of the treasure and the lives which the United States had expended to free Cuba from Spain. The very magnitude of America's sacrifice made Cubans more suspicious for, made cynical by centuries of Spanish oppression, they said: "Is it not inconceivable that the Americans should have sacrificed so many lives and spent so much money for mere Brotherly Love?"

Roosevelt, keenly interested in everything pertaining to Cuba, well outlined the problems we then faced.

"I am certain that if the Cubans show themselves entirely fit to establish and carry on a free and orderly government the great mass of my fellow-citizens will gladly permit them to decide for themselves the destiny of Cuba and will allow them to be independent if they so desire.

"But I am also certain that our people will not permit the islands again to sink into a condition of squalid and savage anarchy. . . .

"In these tropical and far-off lands good government has got to be secured mainly not from Washington, but from the man sent to administer the provinces.

"What is really essential is to have first-class

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men chosen to administer these provinces, and then to give these men the widest possible latitude as to means and methods for solving the exceedingly difficult problems set before them.

"Most fortunately we have in General Wood the exact type of man we need; and we have in his work \* \* \* in Santiago an exact illustration of how the work should be done."

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Secretary of War Root wrote as follows of the Cuban situation as it was in 1899:

"There were not a dozen Cubans who believed that the United States was going to keep faith with them. We were daily on the verge of the same sort of thing that happened to us in the Philippines; namely, of having these people, who for years had fought for their independence and who believed that we were going to hold them in subjection in the same way that Spain held them, take to the woods and begin another insurrection, this time against us.

"And I can tell you that I had an uneasy time with the apprehension that any morning the newspapers might contain the news of American troops firing on Cubans.

"There was a most urgent necessity of getting the best man we could to do that most difficult and serious work. And I went to President Mc-Kinley and told him that I was satisfied that General Wood was the man. And he said, 'All right; go ahead.'"

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### APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF CUBA

Therefore Leonard Wood was appointed Governor of Cuba.

His predecessor, Captain-General Weyler, the Spanish Governor-General, had received a salary of \$60,000 and in addition to this had been provided with an entertainment fund of \$25,000 a year. He commanded fifty generals and nearly a quarter of a million soldiers, yet had failed either to subdue or govern the Island. The more his Spanish soldiers slew Cuban rebels, who in their eyes were incorrigible criminals, and the oftener they dragged them before Spanish judges for sentence, the more odious and hated became the name of Spain throughout all Cuba.

Wood went to Havana and established his office in the old Spanish palace from which Cuba had been oppressed and misruled for so many generations. He sat in the chair of Weyler the Damned, dispensing democratic justice where its former occupant had exercised the most pitiless tyranny.

From his windows he could look upon the old tower from whose casemated windows De Sota's wife watched so many long years for the return of the discoverer of the Mississippi, and could also see the Cathedral which for several centuries had contained the body of Columbus.

Amid traditions inherited from Spain and dating from the Middle Ages, he set up, in place of the medieval system of oppression which had been crushed, the democracy "of the people, for the  $\lceil 131 \rceil$ 

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people, by the people" after the truest ideals of Americanism.

His administration in Cuba has been likened to a curious mixture of old town-meeting republicanism and absolute autocracy; he never used his authority for the sake of exercising it as the Spanish governors had so often done, but when it was the last resort he set his jaw and used it to the limit.

When he assumed office, the Island was infested with bandits and renegades of the worst type whose pillaging and lawlessness cried out for immediate suppression. Regiments of American troops under his command were ready and anxious for action.

Nevertheless one of his first official acts was to pass regulations excluding his soldiers from the duty of running down or arresting Cuban criminals. To have had Americans capture or kill even this outcast class of Cubans might have resulted in making martyrs of them, and causing hatred and increased suspicion of the Americans.

He appointed Cuban judges to sit in judgment on Cuban criminals and establish their guilt by Cuban standards. To use his own words, Governor Wood insisted upon letting the Cubans "do their own rat-killing."

He organized a Constabulary or Rural Guard of less than two thousand natives, and this handful of men under his direction were able to restore order and maintain it, a task in which Wey-

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ler with 200,000 Spaniards had hopelessly failed.

As finally organized it consisted of 15 troops, totaling 1,604 officers and men, stationed at 247 different posts, and so distributed as completely to control the Island. It was commanded by Brig. General Alejandro Rodriguez, a famous soldier of the wars for Cuban Liberation. He had direct supervision over its work in each of the six Cuban provinces. Each provincial chief of the Rural Guard ranked as a lieutenant-colonel; his command consisted of two or more troops and each troop was commanded by a captain and two lieutenants. A captain was held responsible for public order in the section of the province to which his command was assigned.

Promotions were made only from among its own members, and in order to win a commission a man must start as a private. This system produced excellent morale, and as a result the Guard never became a political organization but was a thoroughly efficient force, comparing favorably with any similar organization in older republics.

A fair and just policy of discipline was pursued. Any abuse of authority was severely punished, while a proper performance of duty was always sustained, no matter what the results might be or how powerful the individual arrested by the Guard.

Thus public order was almost immediately restored and property and life became safer in Cuba than in the United States. Indeed, during the

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# LEONARD WOOD

whole period of Leonard Wood's Governorship there was only one instance of train robbery or robbery of the mails, when a courier who was carrying mail and dispatches between Holguin and Santiago in the fall of 1898 was killed and robbed by bandits, who were later arrested by the Rural Guard, tried and convicted by Cuban judges, and sentenced to life imprisonment in a penitentiary entirely run by Cubans.

Having taken these necessary steps to stabilize the country, Governor Wood was able to devote undivided attention to other matters. He made it his policy to surround himself with Cubans, as he had done at Santiago, and, giving them his full confidence, he began with their help and advice the study of his administrative problems.

These problems were exceedingly complex.

It was necessary to build up a republic in a country which hitherto had been a military colony, and which was prostrated by four years of incessant and destructive warfare; where general elections as we understand the term were unknown; where the vast majority of the prospective voters were illiterate, and where heretofore no native had been allowed to hold office.

It was not only necessary to draft new electoral laws, but to teach the people how to read and write so that they could learn the laws and be

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trained to use them wisely; could read their ballots and cast their votes.

It was necessary practically to rewrite the administrative law of the land, including the laws relative to railways, sanitation, taxation, charities, hospitals, public works, and schools; and to establish a sound system of accounting and auditing for public moneys, that the new republic might eventually start on its career well-equipped, free from debt, with a balance in the treasury.

On the one hand serious friction with the Cubans had to be avoided at a time when, to quote again Mr. Root's words, "there were not a dozen Cubans who believed that the United States was going to keep faith with them." On the other hand, unscrupulous Americans with great political or financial influence had to be prevented from exploiting or cheating the natives.

The Island had for many years been subdivided into six provinces,—Santiago, Puerto Principe, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Pinar del Rio, and Habana. Pending the first general election, General Wood appointed civil Governors over these provinces. Although he was entirely at liberty to select Americans to fill these positions, all six of the men chosen were nevertheless Cubans, and five of them had served as Generals in the Cuban Army of Liberation. In fact 98 per cent. of all the officials appointed by Wood in Cuba were Cubans.

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The provinces had long been subdivided into townships, of which there were 128 in all Cuba when Wood became Governor.

In the two eastern provinces, Santiago and Puerto Principe, which included 57 per cent. of the total area of the Island, there were only twenty-two municipalities. The municipalities of these two provinces were thoroughly efficient in protecting public interests and were much more economically administered than those of the provinces of the west.

In the four western provinces a very different state of affairs existed, for although they included within their limits only forty-three per cent. of the total area of the Island, they were nevertheless divided into 106 municipalities, a great many of which had been created by the Spaniards for political reasons subsequent to the war of 1869-1878. Their excessive number added greatly to the expense of the National Government and was justified by no corresponding benefit to the general management and conduct of public affairs.

The suppression of these municipalities had been demanded for a long time, as they were lacking in the population and resources necessary to furnish the needed revenues for the proper and efficient maintenance of their government. Governor Wood deemed it absolutely essential that this reduction should be accomplished under the military government, as later it would be dif-

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ficult for the administration which would succeed him to carry out radical measures of this character.

Governor Wood gradually abolished many of those small municipalities, whose existence was not justified by any necessity and entailed a great unwarranted burden of taxation, until forty-six had finally been consolidated with other larger townships. The *alcaldes* and officials who were about to lose their jobs vehemently protested against the innovation. It meant for them the loss of the little mantle of authority with which they had been clothed, and the discontinuance of the small salaries which they had received.

Nevertheless the consolidations were gradually carried out and, when completed, resulted in municipalities having, as a rule, not less than 12,000 inhabitants, and territory with a sufficient number of properties in production to yield the necessary income for the maintenance and support of such public obligations as they are called upon to fulfill.

Governor Wood had superseded General Brooke who had not understood the Cubans and who had not been liked by them. The government which he inherited from Brooke was largely made up of Americans. It was organized into four departments presided over by four American civil secretaries, who formed the Governor's cabinet. These departments were (1) State and

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Government; (2) Justice and Public Instruction; (3) Agriculture, Commerce, Industries and Public Works, and (4) Finance.

The four incumbent American civil secretaries offered Wood their resignations, which were accepted. After careful consultations with Cubans he made arrangements to increase the number of the national government departments from four to six. Justice and Public Instruction were separated; and Public Works was divided from Agriculture, Commerce and Industries. These radical steps were taken only after a careful investigation had shown that the two original departments were too large and unwieldly, and that each had been handling two classes of administrative work in no way related to each other.

While the mechanical part of this reorganization was taking place Governor Wood scoured Cuba to discover the Cubans best fitted to fill the six cabinet positions. He already knew much about the qualifications of the various public men of Cuba, acquired from his work and contact with them in Santiago; this knowledge he supplemented by consultations with many leading Cubans. His old friend General Gomez was of great assistance to him in his efforts to find the best cabinet material.

It is interesting to note that some of the men he finally selected were not only distinctly anti-American but were personally hostile to the Governor himself, but as soon as he was convinced

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that they were the best men in Cuba for the positions, he not only invited them to serve, but persuaded them to accept.

It has always been characteristic of him that he not only invariably selects the most competent and expert men to serve as his subordinates, but is always able completely to ignore any previous personal opposition towards himself, and to persuade even his opponents to work under him harmoniously; he then supports them so loyally that they soon fit into his organization and work enthusiastically and effectively. This is largely due to the fact that he never resents an honest difference of opinion on the part of an associate or subordinate, and never assumes the mental attitude that any one who disagrees with him must have a puny intellect.

He realized that, even in so small a nation as Cuba, the chief executive could not possibly be allwise and omnipotent and that, provided he used proper care in selecting his cabinet officers, the latter would inevitably know more than he about their particular specialties.

Señor Diego Tamayo became Secretary of State. He was a gentleman of acknowledged ability, formerly a member of the Central Committee of the Autonomist Party, and later a leading spirit in the conservative element of the Revolutionary Party. He had also been President of the Academy of Sciences. He had never been an active participant on the field of battle, but had

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repeatedly represented his country at home and abroad in positions of great diplomatic importance.

Señor Lius Estevez y Romero, a noted Cuban jurist, was made Secretary of Justice. Señor Juan Bantiste Hernandez Barreiro, Professor of Roman Law at the University of Havana, became Secretary of Public Instruction; General Rius Rivera, Secretary of Agriculture, Commerce and Industries; Señor José Ramon Villalon, a civil engineer of great ability and a graduate of Lehigh University, Secretary of Public Works; and Señor Enrique José Varona, a Cuban banker, Secretary of Finance.

In addition to large staffs of native Cubans, the cabinet officers were provided with a few American assistants, who worked under their orders and in that way instilled American methods of efficiency into Cuban affairs.

Each of the six provincial governments was provided with a cabinet which in a general way followed the lines of Governor Wood's national cabinet, the members of which supervised and coordinated the work of their subordinates in the various townships of their province.

In addition to the six national departments, headed by cabinet officers, there were at first certain independent bureaus which were not placed under the direct jurisdiction of any one of the six departments, but remained under the direct supervision of the Governor. These included the

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Customs Service, from which Cuba obtained nearly her entire income; the Treasury, which paid out all public funds; and the Auditor, who had charge of examining the accounts and vouchers submitted by public servants. For the time being these three departments were presided over by carefully selected American officers.

Governor Wood, having thus fashioned the various tools with which he was to work, set out upon his long and arduous task of reconstruction and administration.

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# CHAPTER IX

#### GOVERNOR OF CUBA

ALTHOUGH the results obtained during Leonard Wood's governorship of Cuba were spectacular in the extreme,—were in fact absolutely unprecedented, his methods were so moderate and diplomatic that there are no crises to study and no exciting moments to depict.

His administration was a strictly business one, and he made no pretense of obtaining results by startling get-there-quick methods, but proceeded by patient, plodding, drudgery along the lines of carefully thought-out plans founded upon sound economic principles. The great bulk of the work was accomplished, under his supervision, by his six carefully selected and thoroughly competent Cuban cabinet officers and their respective departments of State, of Agriculture, of Justice, of Education, of Public Works and of Finance.

Their work was so colossal in scope and so gigantic in volume that it is impossible here to more than touch upon a few points illustrative of the whole. This may perhaps best be done by con-

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sidering the six departments in turn, commencing with the State Department.

This Department was in direct touch with the six Cuban provincial governors, who were responsible to it, and through it to Governor Wood. The *alcaldes* (presidents of the townships) were in turn responsible to the provincial governors.

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The difficulties in the reorganization of the townships, through which measures of government were directly applied to the people, were exceedingly great, for the work had to be performed by men who in most instances were without previous experience in business or in government.

During the first eight months of his governorship all township officers were Cubans appointed by Wood, either directly or upon the recommendation of his military and civil subordinates. Although every effort was made to select suitable men the only ones willing to accept office were, in many cases, men from the revolutionary army who had been efficient in the field, but were not qualified for the discharge of civil duties nor for the upbuilding and reorganizing of the shattered municipalities over which they were selected to preside.

Moreover, they were much hampered in the performance of their official duties by the continued prevalence of old customs and ideas which had in the past been responsible for an almost entire destruction of public spirit. There was a tendency to an abnormally large personnel, and

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an outlay for official salaries entirely disproportionate to other expenditures and much greater than was necessary to perform the proper work of the municipality, which came primarily from the old system of too many officials and too few hours of work.

So discouraging and far-reaching had been the effects of the war, that the municipalities were practically without revenues from municipal taxation, and were deeply in debt. In order that the entire energies of the country might be devoted to reconstructing the agricultural interests upon which the island's prosperity depended, it was Governor Wood's policy to assist them in every way possible until the harvesting of the first crop, and until affairs should be placed upon a somewhat stable and normal basis.

This necessitated allotments from the general revenues of the Island, since the amount of money received from the collection of local taxes was so insignificant that the salaries of municipal officials were about all that could be paid from that source. The Central Government paid in full from its own revenues the other expenses of the different municipalities, such as the cost of administration, courts, police, sanitation, sewage, jails, hospitals and asylums.

Yet, after paying all these expenses, the Central Government was still called upon at the close of the calendar year 1899 to make good further municipal deficits amounting to nearly

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#### LEONARD WOOD AS GOVERNOR OF CUBA


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GOVERNOR WOOD'S HEADQUARTERS IN HABANA





THE AMERICAN ARMY ENTERING HABANA



THE CUBAN RUBAL GUARD Organized by Governor Wood to preserve order among their countrymen.





HABANA HARBOR



MORRO CASTLE

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\$300,000. Such large deficits, incurred after the state itself had paid all the principal cost of maintenance, made it apparent that the municipalities were not attempting to collect their proper revenues; a systematic series of investigations confirmed this fact. In consequence Wood published a general order to the effect that the state would not pay any municipal deficits incurred subsequent to December 31, 1899, but would continue to pay the expenses of the police, public instruction, justice, jails, asylums, charities, hospitals, and sanitation, until further notice.

What was needed more than anything else for the proper management of municipal affairs was the creation of a public spirit aiming at economical and efficient conduct of all municipal business. This spirit was so totally lacking that the people were too indifferent even to protest against abuses or to submit charges against alcaldes and city councils.

No more striking illustration of this lack of public spirit manifested itself than the condition of the prisons. The prison system of the Island consisted of the presidio or penitentiary of Habana, the provincial prisons at the capital of each of the six provinces, and the district prisons in the judicial districts.

The six provincial prisons situated respectively in Habana, Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago were all comparatively large prisons, but were conducted

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### LEONARD WOOD

with little system, the sole object being to retain the prisoners within the walls. The administration of prisons had been one of the most medieval features of the Spanish Government in old Cuba, and when Governor Wood assumed control of the Island he found conditions worse than ever as they were without proper arrangements for sanitation, cooking, lighting, or ventilating. Bathing facilities and sanitary arrangements were of the crudest possible description or were entirely lacking. There was no system looking toward the reformation of the inmates. Hardened criminals with previous convictions and young boys awaiting trial were herded together. The sole purpose was always to punish, never to correct.

Records were imperfectly kept; in many cases prisoners awaiting trial had no idea of the charges under which they were held, nor of the date of their trial, nor had they any means of procuring witnesses. They were often detained for months awaiting trial and then discharged for lack of evidence, their small plantations in the meantime having been ruined and their families scattered. Very few of the persons arrested and charged with crime were able to furnish bail, and many of them from remote points in the interior were unable to communicate with their witnesses. The judicial authorities were inactive in procuring witnesses and bringing cases to trial. The result of all these conditions was that the jails were overcrowded.

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Orders were promptly published by Governor Wood requiring that prisoners detained and awaiting trial should be kept apart from those already sentenced and that boys, whether sentenced or awaiting trial, should be separated from adult prisoners.

All the prisons were thoroughly cleaned up and nearly all received general repairs, which in some places amounted almost to reconstruction. Wherever possible, bathing facilities were furnished and the condition of ventilation improved. Suitable bedding was supplied. Immediate steps were taken to install modern cooking apparatus and proper sanitary arrangements. Steam kitchens and steam laundries were established in all prisons.

Another problem which perplexed the Department of State, and illustrates the difficulty and scope of its work, was the question of the orphans of dead soldiers, and the children of destitute parents who had lost everything in the war. They were found in such numbers that measures to care for them systematically were imperative. Governor Wood was opposed to the principle of institutionalizing the children, and every effort was made to place each orphan in a home, where it was visited from time to time by a traveling agent of the government. This method proved far superior to that of segregation in orphan asylums.

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# LEONARD WOOD

The hospitals of Cuba were found to be hospitals in name only. They were without equipment, without sanitary arrangements, or any system of nursing. Proper methods of hospital administration were accordingly introduced and in the larger hospitals training schools for nurses were started, Cuban girls of ability and good character being placed under the instruction of nurses from the United States.

Homes for the aged and infirm, and refuges for lepers were also organized.

The insane asylums were found to be in very bad condition. In the one at Mazorra near Habana the suffering and mortality during the last years of the war were frightful; in two years there had been 900 deaths among the 1,200 inhabitants.

Governor Wood's predecessor had already commenced the work of reconstruction in this establishment, a work which was continued. Plans were drawn up for new buildings which would render the control and treatment of the insane much more easy and beneficial.

When Leonard Wood was appointed Military Governor of Santiago in 1898, he found most of the insane people in civil hospitals where they were sometimes confined in little wooden boxes or pens which in some instances were placed on wheels, the general effect being that of a large

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dog kennel. In size they were about ten feet long, five feet wide and seven feet high, with a door in front and in the door was a small grating through which food and water and other supplies were passed. On one side, secured to the wall, was a board about fourteen inches wide which served as a bed.

In many towns the insane were found in the prisons where no effort was made to effect their cure. The conditions which existed tended to increase rather than modify the malady of the inmates.

Early in the year 1900 Governor Wood issued orders that all the insane through the Island should be sent to the general asylum at Mazorra, where special efforts were made to protect them and also to prevent undue advantage being taken of persons under charge of insanity.

The Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry of Cuba was practically non-existent before Leonard Wood's governorship, and its policy and personnel had to be built up from nothing. It soon became one of the most important departments of the Island.

Cuba is essentially an agricultural country and derives its wealth principally from the soil. Frost is unknown and the opportunities for the agriculturists and planters are unexcelled. Her lands are fertile to a wonderful degree, but had been only slightly developed.

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The largest crop was sugar and even prior to the liberation there had been annual harvests of over a million tons, and this large yield was made while only a small portion of the available sugar lands were under cultivation.

In the mountains of the east some of the best coffee in the world was grown, and in former times this industry was extensive; but it had been largely destroyed during the ten years' war.

Fine cocoa was produced in large amounts. Lemons and oranges of excellent quality also grow with little cultivation.

The tobacco raised on the Island was the finest in the world.

In addition to the most important work of aiding and coördinating the cause of agriculture, the Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry had also to take under its supervision patents and trade-marks, mines, forests, and fisheries, and was charged with making complete surveys of Government lands and forests and also with patrolling the coast and enforcing the fishery laws.

The department's first Secretary, General Rius Rivera, took up its organization with energy and devoted himself to establishing it upon a sound basis. Señor Rivera resigned on May I, 1900, and was succeeded by Señor Perfecto Lacoste, president of the Planters' Association and a man who had always been deeply interested in the development of agriculture. He was a graduate of

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the University of Pennsylvania, and was particularly well qualified for the task assigned to him.

A tremendous amount of research and administrative work was carried on in relation to sugar and fruit plantations, forestry, sponge and tortoise fisheries, mines, fisheries, and cattle ranching; and also with problems relating to labor and railways.

Under Leonard Wood's administration labor was constantly encouraged and protected. Strikes were few in number and were settled by arbitration. After being signed by the interested parties, the final agreements were embodied in a government order. It is worthy of note that the Governor saw to it that the agreements were lived up to absolutely by both parties; he positively refused to tolerate bad faith on the part either of employers or of labor leaders.

He dealt with the Cuban railways on a basis of private ownership under government control, and was the first who had ever put such a system into operation. As applied by him it worked with perfect satisfaction to the railway owners, the employees, and the public.

The railway laws upon which this system was based are masterpieces. They were drawn up by Wood after careful consultation with the greatest living authorities on railway administration, such as William van Horn, president of the Canadian Pacific, and Grenville Dodge, the builder of the Union Pacific, who came to Cuba to advise with

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the governor. With slight modifications these laws are still in successful operation. It is greatly to be regretted that they are too voluminous to be included in this book,—they comprise 130 pages of fine type and are so concise that they can not well be abridged; therefore limited space forbids their insertion.

The work of the Department of Public Works included every variety of engineering. Señor Villalon, its Secretary, directed the improvement of many of Cuba's harbors, in almost every one of which there was some bank or reef which needed to be removed, the actual work being carried on by General Harry L. Hodges and Colonel Borden of the U. S. Engineers. In Cardenas, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, and Caibarien extensive dredging and pier construction were required in order that freight and merchandise need not be lightered to and from ships of deep draft, thus laying a heavy additional burden upon the exporter and importer. At Caibarien the distance of lighterage was about eighteen miles.

The bar at Cardenas was reduced at a cost of \$400,000. At Matanzas a government wharf costing \$300,000 was built in accordance with the plans of an American army engineer. The sunken battleship *Maine* was removed from the roadstead of Habana. New government wharves were built at Santiago, Guantanamo and Gibara.

In Guantanamo an aqueduct, nine and one-half

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miles long, was constructed, capable of supplying 45,000 people. The water was taken from a point well above all possible sources of contamination and was of excellent quality. The construction
of this aqueduct very greatly improved the sanitary conditions existing in Guantanamo, nearly abolished typhoid, and tended to build up the town and increase the population.

There were in Cuba no public roads, with the exception of the public highways in the Province of Habana, a few in Matanzas and Pinar del Rio, and some very indifferent ones in Santa Clara. The Island of Cuba was without a public road system and lacked means of thorough inland communication other than the roughest country roads, difficult to pass in the dry season, except for pack animals, and absolutely impassable in the rainy season.

The Province of Santiago already had a start in the right direction, for much systematic work had been done by Wood round about Santiago when he was governor of that city. He had constructed many miles of first-class roads and had opened up country highways and made them passable at least for freight carts and wagons in dry weather.

Doctor Miguel Gener continued in office as Secretary of Justice until the first of May, 1901, when he tendered his resignation, having been elected Mayor of Habana. He was succeeded by

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Señor José Varela Jado, Justice of the Supreme Court of the Island, who was appointed by Governor Wood upon the unanimous recommendation of the Supreme Court.

The Governor fully appreciated the importance and value of the work of this department and gave it an unusual amount of personal supervision.

Before he went to Cuba he held long conferences with U. S. Chief Justice White, who was a profound student of Spanish law, who declared that while the substantive body of Spanish law was sound, the procedure by which it was administered needed reform. The reforms needed were to facilitate the trial of persons arrested, to see that they were duly informed of the charges against them, and that they were supplied with competent counsel. Leonard Wood never lost sight of this opinion, and made it the basis of the judiciary system which he established for Cuba.

It can safely be asserted that no Department was more in need of thorough and radical reform, rigid inspection, and constant supervision than this Department of Justice, which was lacking in efficiency, energy, and attention to duty. In its subordinate branches it was justly charged with partiality and lack of honesty and the courts were commonly said to be corrupt.

The long and unnecessary detention of prisoners awaiting trial seemed to be a matter of lit-

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tle concern to the judges, who occupied themselves in a leisurely manner for a few hours each day in a feeble attempt to dispose of an infinitesimal proportion of the enormous volume of business awaiting their attention. The people naturally had little confidence in such tardy justice.

The judiciary and legal body had surrounded itself with an intricate network of tradition and conservatism and had adopted a procedure so cumbersome and slow as to render impossible any prompt administration of justice. There seemed to be an unlimited number of ways of getting a man into prison and tangling up his affairs, but unless he were rich and influential it was difficult for him to find his way out again.

Under the old Spanish criminal law the accused had been held *incommunicado*,—isolated from his friends. He did not have the right to face his accuser, was forced to testify against himself, and was denied the right of *habeas corpus*.

The conditions growing out of the old methods of procedure were shocking and indicated an absolute disregard for personal liberty or any reasonable consideration of the rights of those accused. Whether a case against a prisoner was disposed of in a day or a year had long been deemed a matter of trivial importance and one counted in no way worthy of serious consideration or special effort. The administration of justice slept, and the rights of the people to be tried

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promptly did not enter into the consideration of those in power.

Governor Wood found it necessary to establish a special Board of Pardons charged with the investigation of the status of all prisoners throughout the Island. Five hundred and twenty individuals were released on the unanimous recommendations of this Board, many of them on the ground that they had been confined awaiting trial for a longer period than they would have served had they been found guilty.

At first it was difficult to get any person in Cuba to sign his or her name to a complaint against an official or any person of importance. To such an extent did this condition prevail that even brigands and outlaws arrested almost red-handed could not be convicted, for lack of witnesses, although the people were fully cognizant of the facts and confidentially reported them to the judges. It was necessary to find some point of departure, and therefore upon the receipt of a sufficient amount of reliable. trustworthy evidence, even if confidentially given, sentences were frequently imposed. Once offenders had commenced to be thus summarily dealt with, general confidence in the judicial decisions began to be established. After two years a point was reached where the people were willing to make formal and duly signed complaints against those who broke the law, even when they were in positions of authority and influence, or were dan-

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gerous members of the criminal classes. Every legitimate and proper method was employed to foster this confidence, for until this was developed and fully established, it was impossible to maintain an efficient and democratic administration of justice.

Leonard Wood made the people thoroughly understand their individual rights. He impressed upon the official classes that their offices were offices of public trust and not of personal gain. Thus he laid the foundation of a secure and stable government in the Island.

Correctional courts were established in all of the larger cities of Cuba. The procedure was oral and summary, and the judge had jurisdiction to impose a fine of \$30.00 or thirty days' imprisonment or both. If in his opinion the offense was one which demanded a more severe punishment, the law provided for the impaneling of a jury of five members in a manner very similar to that employed in the courts of the United States. If this jury found the accused guilty, a sentence of one hundred and eighty days' imprisonment and a fine not to exceed \$500.00 could be imposed.

The value of the correctional courts was soon clearly demonstrated and their good results generally appreciated. Much of the work formerly thrown upon the audiencias was now disposed of by these courts, to the great relief of the au-

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diencias and to the benefit of persons held for trial.

Before Wood left Cuba, the courts, almost without exception, were discharging the duties imposed upon them with promptness and energy and had won the confidence of the public. Complaints against them had practically ceased; justice was administered more promptly, both in civil and criminal cases, than in the courts of the United States. The average time for serious civil and criminal cases, from the date of arrest to final action in the case, was three months. Rich and poor received equal treatment and consideration. The judges were efficient, discharging their duties in a fearless manner.

In addition to the reconstruction of the entire judicial fabric of the Cuban courts, many knotty problems of law had to be faced by the Department of Justice; for instance, there had been strong antagonism between Spaniards and Cubans, and all sorts of private revenge had been plotted by both parties through the instrumentality of the corrupt conditions and the cases had become warped before Governor Wood had had time to straighten out the courts. He deemed it advisable to start anew with a clean slate and therefore quashed charges against persons alleged to have committed crimes while on active service prior to the declaration of peace.

Prior to Wood's arrival an excellent supreme court, to replace that of Spain, had been formed

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by the appointment of able Cuban lawyers selected from various parts of the Island.

A less fortunate step had been the issuance as early as 1899 of an order making civil marriages the only legal ones. This had been done with the double purpose of curtailing the power of the Roman Catholic Church and of regulating vital records. The issue at stake, however, was an exceedingly complicated one; for while the new law recognized that marriage, as far as its validity in law was concerned, was a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable of making a legal contract was essential, it failed sufficiently to take into consideration its religious significance. The original order was therefore modified by Governor Wood so that marriages might be either civil or religious at the option of the contracting parties, providing, however, that in a religious marriage solemnized by a clergyman or priest, the officiating minister was required to make out the proper civil certificates.

Every effort was made to legalize the marriages which during the war had been contracted without due form. In certain sections of the country the situation existing was one of almost universal common-law marriage, and it was desired to make these of record and throw about them the protection and sanction of the law. To this end the legal period for the inscription of marriages was repeatedly extended in order that

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the people in remote country districts might avail themselves of the opportunity.

Under the old régime the ecclesiastical courts had had exclusive control of divorce and of the nullification of marriages. These matters were transferred to the civil courts.

All the cemeteries had been controlled by the church, and burial was entirely dependent upon its regulations and imposts. The sanitary and police arrangements of burial were now transferred to the civil authorities and in addition each municipality established a civil cemetery.

Knotty questions involving property belonging to the religious orders of the Roman Catholic Church were brought to Governor Wood for settlement. In the period between 1837-41, Spain had secularized a great portion of the property belonging to the various religious orders. At the time of the secularization Spain directed her Governors-General on seizing this property to seize also all titles thereto. This act of the Spanish government led to a protracted controversy between Spain and the Holy See, the final outcome of which was embodied in the Concordat, published in 1861, in which it was agreed that the properties which had been sold should be dropped from consideration; that where possible other properties should be returned to the Church; that those which had been put to secular uses and were needed by the government should be retained, but that the government should pay

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a rental therefor which amounted practically to an allowance for the maintenance of worship. These moneys had been regularly paid by the State to the Church from the time of the Concordat to the date of the American occupation and in round numbers amounted to an approximate total of twenty-one million dollars.

From the date of the American intervention payments to the Church for the use of these properties had ceased, although the property continued to be in the possession and use of the government. The claim of the Church was concretely: "Either give us back our property, or pay rent for the use of it."

The properties consisted of real property, such as lands and buildings, of mortgages, and of *Capellanias*, a type of religious mortgage placed upon property to pay for masses and religious observances for the dead. The latter were usually in perpetuity. In certain sections of the Island properties were literally covered with *Capellanias*.

After considerable discussion and extended investigation, it was apparent that the claims of the Church were in the main just and reasonable, and that it was incumbent upon the Military Government to take such steps as were necessary to recognize the rights of the Church.

Governor Wood and the Bishop of Habana, representing respectively the Government of Intervention and the various orders of the Roman Catholic Church, came to an agreement as to the

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real property which consisted principally of land and large public buildings in the city of Habana; the value thereof was appraised by expert appraisers. The nominal value of the mortgage and *Capellanias* appeared on their face, but there was considerable difficulty in coming to a basis of agreement as to their real value. This, however, was finally accomplished, and amounted to an acceptance by the Church of approximately thirtysix cents on the dollar.

This agreement was embodied in a formal document, in which the State was granted an option to buy the real property at the value agreed upon, at any time within five years from the date of the agreement; and until such time as the State should buy, it was agreed that it should pay an annual rental at the rate of five per cent. on the accepted value. The mortgages and *Capellanias* were bought outright. The Church was also compensated for the use of the property from the date of American intervention to the date of the signing of the agreement.

Governor Wood said: "I consider this settlement of the question of Church property as most important, and one which will remove from the coming Cuban government a great and fruitful source of annoyance.

"The position of the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba during the American occupation has, to a certain extent, been a trying one, as it found itself under entirely new conditions incident to

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the severance of those relations which had formerly existed in Cuba between the Church and State. The attitude of the Church, however, has been one of coöperation with the Military Government in the work it has had to perform in Cuba, and the existing relations have always been harmonious and friendly."

Towards the end of Leonard Wood's governorship of Cuba, the Bishop of Habana, Monsigneur Donatus, was called away by the Pope to become Bishop of Ephesus. His gratitude for the fair-mindedness of the Governor was expressed in the following letter, written at the time of his departure:

# "Honored Sir:

"Called by the confidence of the Holy Father to a larger and more difficult field of action, I feel the duty before leaving Cuba to express to your Excellency my sentiment of friendship and gratitude, not only for the kindness shown to me, but for the fair treatment of the questions with the Government of the Island, especially the Marriage and Church Property questions. The equity and justice which inspired your decisions will devolve before all fair-minded people to the honor, not only of you personally, but also to the Government you so worthily represent. I am gratified to tell you that I have already expressed the same sentiment to the Holy Father in writ-[163]

ing and I will tell him orally on my visit to Rome. "Yours very respectfully, "X DONATUS, Bishop of Habana."

The last years of the Spanish rule in Cuba were characterized by an absolute neglect of everything connected with public instruction. Popular teaching had sunk to the lowest level. There was not a single schoolhouse in the Island. Teachers, always badly paid, lived in penury. School attendance had become insignificant, so that the greater portion of the population was illiterate. Nothing was taught in the institutes, while they were the scene of the most barefaced traffic in degrees and certificates of excellence. In some, certificates were subject to a regular tariff. Students who could not write a well spelled letter received an A.B. degree.

After the war broke out, this class of institute located at Pinar del Rio, Santa Clara, Puerte Principe, and Santiago de Cuba were entirely suspended. The University of Cuba in Habana alone dragged on a sickly existence without in any way influencing public culture.

The Department of Public Instruction under General Wood therefore faced a colossal task. It began its work at the top, with the university, where in 1900 the faculty consisted of 72 professors and 24 assistant professors, while the number of students was only 200.

A great many of the professors were entirely

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unfitted for their positions, which in many instances had been obtained in an irregular manner and were held very much as a sinecure, without any feeling of responsibility as to amount of quality of service which ought to be rendered in return for the salaries. They looked upon themselves as privileged officeholders and were members of an irresponsible bureaucracy. Some even lived in Spain yet drew their salaries with due regularity. Others enjoyed practically limitless leaves of absence. Still others were venerable gentlemen whose days of activity had long since passed.

It soon became apparent to Governor Wood that a thorough reorganization, combined with radical changes in personnel, would be necessary. No one disputed the fact that the university was thoroughly inefficient, but no one was willing to put his hand to the work of reformation, until Secretary Varona was persuaded by Leonard Wood to accept the portfolio of Secretary of Public Instruction. He brought singular courage and devotion to his task.

Indifferent to the storm of personal abuse which was poured upon him, and regardless of the loss of personal friends or the creation of numerous enemies, he proceeded to mark out a straight line of advancement and firmly adhere to it. In this he was given through thick and thin the Governor's full support. The result was the reëxamination of the great majority of the

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professors in the university, as well as those of the institutes of secondary instruction. Consequently many new men were obtained who brought with them the necessary energy and ambition to make the university one in fact as well as in name.

Certain qualifications were prescribed for students desiring admission, and the curriculum was rearranged, modernized and made into a fouryear course similar to the courses in American universities.

The Department of Public Instruction next turned its attention to the public schools which at the close of the year 1899 were in a deplorable state. Under Spanish rule the school-teachers were all paid by the government, but having little or no political influence were continually robbed by Spanish officials by means of deductions from their salaries made on behalf of a fictitious pension fund.

Señor Varona and Governor Wood plunged into the work by which public schools were initiated or reëstablished.

A system was built up by which the teachers, fanitors, and owners of houses were all required to submit proper monthly statements as to salaries, rentals and other expenses. It was many months before the agents of the Finance Department, charged with the payment of these salaries and expenses, ceased to find innumerable errors in the accounts; mail facilities in many localities

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were extremely poor, and in consequence much confusion resulted in the early months of the school year of 1899; in fact it was not until the close of the summer vacation that the innumerable tangles had been thoroughly straightened out.

Books and other supplies had to be distributed throughout the Island, until in all the schools was to be found an amount of school material sufficient to meet the most urgent needs of the situation. The text-books were carefully selected, were well printed, and were in every way a revelation not only to the school children but to their instructors.

Early in the spring of 1900 the plan of sending a certain number of teachers to Harvard was taken up and actively discussed. The idea was first brought to Wood's attention by Mr. Cameron Forbes, of Boston, and Mr. Ernest L. Conant, of Habana. He at once assured them of his hearty endorsement and support. Shortly afterwards he received a communication from President Eliot of Harvard, asking if he approved the plan, to which he gave an affirmative answer.

The War Department, through the Quartermaster-General, arranged to transport all the teachers free of charge, and to return them to Cuba at the completion of their course of study. The work of caring for them in Cambridge was conducted with the greatest attention to detail, and was in charge of a committee of young men,

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under the supervision of Mr. Clarence C. Mann.

At the conclusion of their university work the teachers were taken on a trip to New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, before finally reëmbarking for Cuba. In addition to the technical information acquired, all members of the expedition went back to Cuba with new and favorable ideas concerning the United States, its people and their sentiments toward the Cubans.

In July, 1900, a new school law was published, the old one having been found defective in many essential features. This law was framed after the school law of the State of Ohio, and worked with entire satisfaction, giving most excellent results. It was written by Lieut. M. E. Hanna, one of Governor Wood's aides, who had for four years been a teacher in the public schools of Ohio.

Firmly believing that Cuba's future as a nation depended more upon the education of her children than upon any other one element, Leonard Wood devoted especial attention to upbuilding the public school system. In 1901, out of a total revenue of seventeen million, he spent four million dollars on public education alone, threeand-a-half million being devoted to Public Schools.

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Before he left Cuba in 1903 there were in the Island some 4,000 efficient public schools with a total enrollment of 254,000 pupils, which [168] í

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amounted to sixty-five per cent. of the total population between the ages of six and fifteen.

The Department of Finance was charged with the care and safe-keeping of public buildings and public properties, the collection of State taxes, the preparation of tax laws, the supervision of municipal taxation, and the collection of internal revenue. Under Spanish administration it had also had direct control of the treasury, but Governor Wood maintained this as a distinct department, with one of his aides as treasurer.

Enrique José de Varona was Secretary of Finance until the 1st of May, 1900, at which time he was appointed Secretary of Public Instruction, and Señor Leopold Cancio, former Assistant Secretary, was made Secretary.

The office of the Secretary of Finance contained records of all public properties, and to it were submitted all appeals against tax ordinances and decisions. It was likewise charged with the disbursement of all funds expended for the payment of salaries in the various other departments of the government.

On January 22, 1900, the following order was issued:

"No. 34,

Headquarters Division of Cuba,

HAVANA, January 22, 1900.

"The military governor of Cuba directs the publication of the following:

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"The herein-named persons are hereby designated as members of a commission to consider the general subject of taxation in all its aspects in the Island of Cuba; to wit: Enrique José de Varona, Pablo Desyerine, Leopoldo Cancio.

"The commission is requested to meet in the office of the military governor on Wednesday, January 24, 1900, at 3 P. M. for organization."

The purpose of this commission was to consider the general subject of taxation in all its aspects. It was hoped the commission would recommend the abolishment of the tax on incomes and adopt one on values. This, however, was not done, and Governor Wood respected the decision since it represented the well-nigh unanimous views of the Cuban citizens, and because there had necessarily been so many radical alterations in the methods of administration and government, and so many of the new officials were entirely without experience, that each and every serious new change meant a certain amount of confusion and delay in the conduct of public business.

Leonard Wood's general policy was as far as possible to relieve the agricultural classes from taxation in order that their resources might be applied to the reëstablishment and reëquipment of their estates, most of which have been seriously injured or totally destroyed by the war.

In spite of this handicap, however, rural Cuba

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was built up and her properties put in production with a celerity never before exceeded. In two and a half years, the Island was brought from the wretched state of poverty and starvation to a condition in which suffering disappeared, and beggars were almost unknown. The marks of war were removed, towns were rebuilt and large crops of sugar-cane and tobacco were in the fields. With her own revenues Cuba maintained 4,000 schools, an excellent and extensive system of charities and hospitals, adequate public works, a splendid system of sanitation, and had reconstructed her public buildings. She had even reimbursed the United States for funds which had been expended upon quarters for American troops and for American sanitary work in Habana. With all these expenses she had a reserve of over one million dollars in her treasury.

Throughout his administration Wood's fairness and broad-mindedness won the coöperation of the Cubans. Whenever opposition was stirred up it quickly yielded to his frank explanations of the reasons for his action, which he was always willing to give. His frequent visits to all parts of the Island and his personal inspection of local conditions did much to preserve harmony and to create ever-increasing confidence and good will. Although his government was called "military" it was so in name only; the Cuba courts from first to last exercised full and untrammeled jurisdiction.

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Four years after Leonard Wood landed on the pestilential semi-savage Island of Cuba, he departed again, leaving it a successful self-governing republic, with a constitution modeled after that of the United States, with healthful cities, with public schools in every part of the Island and an upright, intelligent judiciary. Moreover, the new republic was free from debt, an extraordinary tribute not only to Wood's own integrity but also to his ability to exact integrity from the Latin-Americans and from his American associates.

In four short years the almost unbelievable miracle of transforming a people from the plane of medieval barbarism to one of modern civilization had been accomplished by this greatest of living administrators. So economically had he managed that he paid the expenses of government out of the ordinary revenues as already established, which amounted to not more than sixty million dollars during the entire four years, and at the end had a balance in the banks, so that his administration cost the United States absolutely nothing.

To-day, fifteen years later, the Republic of Cuba still continues to function efficiently, a proof that Leonard Wood knows how to build for permanency. It is the only Latin-American republican government which has ever endured for more than three or four years. . . . "One can

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not stay long in Cuba," wrote Ray Stannard Baker in 1900, "without being convinced that it was not so much what General Wood did as what he was. He stood for Americanism. For years the Cubans had been looking to the great nation of the North for succor in their struggle. They had at last been rescued and the Spaniards had been driven from the Island. Their ideal of the bravery, the honesty, the power, the wisdom of the American was high. He must be everything that the Spanish oppressor was not. And here they had General Wood, the American. He was calm, firm, simple, accessible to poor as well as to rich. He was direct and absolutely truthful in what he said. He had none of the airs of the Spanish governors, this sturdy man in a khaki suit, who went everywhere, saw everything, and could neither be flattered, nor cajoled, nor deceived: a man who quelled riots with his ridingwhip instead of with rifle volleys. That was the American they knew.

"It is Wood the man and the American whom they love and respect; and it is Wood who has won their confidence more fully, perhaps, than any other American."

Wood's success in Cuban administration was commented upon by Roosevelt as follows: "Credit to him. Yes, in a way. In another way no particular credit, because he was built so that he could do nothing else."

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Secretary of War Root said of Wood's Cuban administration—"Out of a prostrate Colony, a free Republic was built up, the work being done with such signal ability, integrity, and success that the new nation started under more favorable conditions than has ever before been the case in any single instance among contemporaneous Spanish-American republics. This record stands alone in history, and the benefit conferred thereby on the people of Cuba was no greater than the honor conferred thereby on the people of the United States."

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# CHAPTER X

#### TURNING THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO CUBANS

A PROBLEM which is of especial interest at the present time, when constitutional matters are of paramount public importance, is the far-sighted policy pursued by Leonard Wood, from 1900 to 1903, in arranging for the adoption of a sound national constitution for Cuba, so that he might eventually turn over the Island to the exclusive control of the Cubans. His efforts along this line began almost as soon as he assumed the Governorship.

Before six months had passed he had so far overcome the acute problems of local diseases and disorder, and had so systematized the vast bulk of administrative and developmental work, that he was able to give time and energy to a consideration of the future problem of turning over to the Cubans the governing of their Island.

He foresaw that the most vital step would be the election of delegates to a convention to draft a national constitution. Such a convention could not immediately be chosen, for the Cubans had never participated in an election of any sort; and he realized that some preliminary training would be necessary.

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Therefore, Governor Wood wisely decided to let them cut their political eye-teeth on a less important general election. The first of these was held on June 16th, 1900, six months after he became governor; its purpose was the election of township officers to replace those who at first had been arbitrarily appointed by himself.

This preliminary election was held in accordance with an exceedingly interesting new election law, which lack of space forbids giving in full, but which resulted indirectly from the following order:

"Headquarters Division of Cuba,

"Навана, February 16, 1900.

"The military governor of Cuba directs the publication of the following:

"The herein-named persons are designated as a commission to draw up rules and regulations to govern municipal elections: Diego Tamayo y Tejeda, Louis Estevez y Romero, Juan Bautista Hernandez y Barreiro, Enrique José Varona, Juan Rius Rivers, Manuel Sanguily, Fidel Pierra, José Maria Galvez, Rafael Montoro, Antonio Govin, José Garcia Montes, Eusebio Hernandez, Martin Morua Delgado.

"The commission will meet at 104 Prado as soon as practicable. The services of the commission, being voluntary, are without salary."

The personnel of the commission, designated in the order, had been selected by the Governor with a view to represent fairly all the different Cu-

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ban political groups and parties. After a long and heated session, two plans were submitted to Governor Wood, one drawn up by the majority, the other by a minority of the commission. After due consideration the recommendation of the minority was accepted.

The elections were held on the 16th day of June and with the influence of the new Cuban Rural Guard were carried on throughout the Island without disturbance or disorder.

They resulted in an overwhelming victory for the most radical and extreme political elements, and in the defeat of the safer conservatives.

This was what Governor Wood had anticipated. He permitted it to occur because he knew it to be a necessary first step in the education of the people for self-government, and that in no other way could they learn the dangers of allowing themselves to be led astray by the glittering and impossible promises of political extremists, who would perhaps to-day be called Bolshevists.

Nevertheless with the assumption of office by the newly elected township officers began a period of great difficulty for his government. The men elected found themselves entirely unfamiliar with sound economic principles, with existing methods of taxation, with municipal law, and with accounting and auditing.

In many cases, they were at the very outset confronted with serious contentions, since in their

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eagerness to be elected they had made the wildest promises to their followers,—promises they could not even begin to fulfil. As a result, their popularity collapsed like a pricked balloon, and gave way to complaints and fault-finding. They made vain efforts to appease their erstwhile adherents by appointing them to minor offices and clerkships, thus unduly expanding the payrolls and laying up even more serious troubles for the future.

The natural result was that they rapidly lost the confidence of the business and industrial elements over which they had been called to preside. To avoid serious confusion the Governor found it necessary to keep numerous fiscal inspectors constantly at work in the provinces, protecting the interests of the Departments of State and Finance, and straightening out and correcting the abuses which arose—as often from ignorance as from deliberate wrongdoing.

The Secretary of Finance found that only a comparatively small portion of the municipalities were keeping their accounts as they should be kept. By constant exercise of the supervision above referred to, the township administrations were, however, secured against serious losses or confusion, but the indications were very clear that, without this supervision and watchfulness, very serious confusion would have arisen; confusion which would have jeopardized the government.

The minor irregularities due to ignorance or [178]

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incapacity were legion in number, and in addition there were more serious offenses which made it necessary for the Central Government to suspend some alcaldes (mayors), to remove others and to indict still others.

By the end of 1900 it had become unpleasantly apparent to the Cubans that in future they would need to exert far greater care and perspicacity in the election of officials. They became fully alive to their mistakes in the first election and anxious to correct them at the next one.

Thus the education of the Cuban people in the problems and difficulties of self-government was wisely begun several years before they were actually called upon to rule themselves in accordance with the principles of democracy.

Confident that the bad results of electing radical demagogues or impractical theorists had been somewhat borne home to the people by their unpleasant experience following the first election, Governor Wood proceeded towards his second general election, this time looking towards a constitutional convention.

He first visited the United States to confer with the President, with the Secretary of War, and with the Chief Justice. As a result the following order was published after his return:

"Headquarters Division of Cuba,

"HABANA, July 25, 1900.

"The military governor of Cuba directs the publication of the following instructions:

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"WHEREAS, the Congress of the United States by its joint resolution of April 20, 1898, declared—

"That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent;

"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.

"AND WHEREAS, the people of Cuba have established municipal governments, deriving their authority from the suffrages of the people given under just and equal laws, and are now ready, in like manner, to proceed to the establishment of a general government which shall assume and exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control over the island:

"Therefore it is ordered that a general election be held in the Island of Cuba on the third Saturday of September, in the year 1900, to elect delegates to a convention to meet in the city of Habana, at 12 o'clock noon on the first Monday of November, in the year 1900, to frame and adopt a constitution for the people of Cuba, and, as a part thereof, to provide for and agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist between that Government and the Government of Cuba, and to provide for election by the people of officers under such constitution, and the transfer of government to the officers so elected.

"The election will be held in the several voting precincts of the Island under and pursuant to the provi-

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sions of the electoral law of April 18, 1900, and the amendments thereof.

"The people of the several provinces will elect delegates in number proportioned to their population as determined by the census, viz.:

"The people of the province of Pinar del Rio will elect eight delegates.

"The people of the province of Habana will elect three delegates.

"The people of the province of Matanzas will elect four delegates.

"The people of the province of Santa Clara will elect seven delegates.

"The people of the province of Puerto Principe will elect two delegates.

"The people of the province of Santiago de Cuba will elect seven delegates."

During the month preceding the election, Wood visited the principal cities of the Island, held numerous conferences with the most prominent and influential members of all parties, and exerted every effort to induce them to drop for the moment all political differences and select their ablest leaders, irrespective of party, for the very important duty of framing a new constitution.

The convention met in Habana, November 5, 1900, at the Marti Theater, which had been prepared for their occupancy. The occasion was one of great public interest, and the city was crowded with visitors from all sections of the Island. Upon the assembling of the Convention

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#### LEONARD WOOD

the following proclamation was read by Governor Wood, who then withdrew and did not thereafter visit the Convention:

"Gentlemen:

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"As Military Governor of the Island, representing the President of the United States, I call this convention to order.

"It will be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a Constitution for Cuba, and when that has been done, to formulate what, in your opinion, ought to be the relations between Cuba and the United States.

"The Constitution must be adequate to secure a stable, orderly and free government.

"When you have formulated the relations which, in your opinion, ought to exist between Cuba and the United States, the Government of the United States will doubtless take such action on its part as shall lead to a final and authoritative agreement between the people of the two countries to the promotion of their common interests.

"All friends of Cuba will follow your deliberations with the deepest interest, earnestly desiring that you shall reach just conclusions, and that by the dignity, individual self-restraint and wise conservatism which shall characterize your proceedings, the capacity of the Cuban people for representative government may be signally illustrated.

"The fundamental distinction between true representative government and dictatorship is that in the former every representative of the people, in whatever office, confines himself strictly within the limits of his

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defined powers. Without such restraint, there can be no free constitutional government.

"Under the order pursuant to which you have been elected and convened you have no duty and no authority to take part in the present government of the island. Your powers are strictly limited by the terms of that order."

The sessions of the Convention were marked by very full discussions, and resulted in the adoption of a Constitution and an electoral law. The Constitution in its final form was adopted on June 12, 1901, seven months after the Convention first met, and the new election laws were published several months later. Meanwhile another general election for the appointment of municipal officers was held on June 16, 1901, and this gave the Cubans another chance to learn self-government. Although they had learned much by sad experience during the year intervening since the first election, they still showed a tendency to vote for radicals and demagogues. This was particularly true in the larger towns, and as a result the Cuban public was again betraved by its officials, though to a lesser degree.

In Habana, the municipal government was characterized by very marked incompetency, and by a disposition to neglect public needs in a struggle for personal advancement and profit. The City Council did not fairly represent the most intelligent element of the city, which had a large

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proportion of educated, conservative people, but who unfortunately had neglected to take any active interest in public affairs. Results injurious to the city were only checked by the constant supervision of the Governor. Much direct intervention in municipal affairs was on his part made necessary by scandalous conduct of officials of the city.

In the city of Santiago de Cuba, the administration was so bad that it necessitated the removal of the mayor, and the election of a successor. Bad municipal government was most in evidence in the larger towns, where political adventurers, supported by the unprincipled portion of the press, had been elected to office. In each and every instance they gave a poor administration. Due to Governor Wood's foresight they had their day under conditions which rendered their control easy, made the people less likely in the future to repeat the mistake, and caused the ultimate disappearance of the demagogue type of candidate from successful Cuban political life. On the whole, however, the administration had improved so much over that of the preceding year that the prospects for the future were bright.

By the end of 1901, after three years of American occupancy, Governor Wood was able to initiate the final steps looking towards the transfer of the reins of government to the Cubans.

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In accordance with the terms of the electorallaw adopted by the constitutional convention, a preliminary general election was held on the last day of the year 1901, exactly three years after the Americans had formally taken control of the Island, and a final one on February 24, 1902. A President, a Vice-President, a Senate and a House of Representatives were there elected.

The newly elected congress held a preliminary session in Havana on May 5th, and on May 16th the following order was issued by Governor Wood, the final one of his administration.

"Headquarters Department of Cuba,

"HAVANA, May 16, 1902.

"It is hereby made known to the people of Cuba:

"I. That the Congress of Cuba elected on December 3I, 1901, and February 24, 1902, under the provisions of the electoral law published in Orders No. 218, October 14, 1901, these headquarters, having been duly convened in Habana on the 5th day of May, 1902, pursuant to orders No. 101, April 14, 1902, these headquarters have examined into the credentials and decided that the following-named persons have been duly elected."

Then followed a list of the twenty-four newly elected Senators, and of the sixty-one members of the new House of Representatives.

"2. That the Congress so convened after counting and ratifying the electoral vote has found and proclaimed to be elected President of the Republic of Cuba Tomas Estrada Palma, and to be elected Vice-

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President of the Republic of Cuba Luis Estevez Romero.

"3. That the said Congress has adjourned to meet at Havana on the 20th day of May, 1902, at 12 o'clock noon.

"4. That on the said 20th day of May, 1902, at 12 o'clock noon the constitution adopted by the constitutional convention at Havana on the 21st day of February, 1901, together with the appendix to the said constitution adopted by said convention on the 12th day of June, 1901, will be promulgated as the constitution of the Republic of Cuba, and will go into full force and effect and thereupon and at that time the occupation of Cuba by the United States and the military government of the Island will cease and determine, and the government and control of the island will be transferred to the President and Congress so elected, to be held and exercised by them under the constitution so promulgated.

"Such transfer will be upon the understanding and condition that the new Government does thereby and by the acceptance thereof, pursuant to the provisions of the said appendix to the constitution, assume and undertake all and several of the obligations assumed by the United States with respect to Cuba by the treaty between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, signed at Paris on the Ioth day of December, 1898.

> "LEONARD WOOD, "Military Governor."

Thus terminated Leonard Wood's governorship of Cuba, of which his direct superior, Elihu [186]

## TURNING GOVERNMENT OVER TO CUBANS

Root, Secretary of War, said officially before the Military Affairs Committee of the United States Senate:—

"From December, 1899, until General Wood came out of Cuba in May, 1902, I kept track of what was done, and studied the subject as carefully as any business man ever studied his own business, or any lawyer ever studied a case which he was to try. I went to Cuba three times and went all around the Island and visited the camps and the army posts and the prisons and hospitals and asylums and the schools and public works; I talked with everybody I could get hold of and got all the information I could get by conversation with soldiers and civilians and Americans and Cubans. I read the reports and I directed the course of the Government in Cuba, and I knew what was going on; and I feel under a debt of the greatest gratitude to General Wood for what I think is one of the most conspicuous and meritorious pieces of work ever done by an American."

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# CHAPTER XI

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#### THE CONQUEST OF YELLOW FEVER

It is generally appreciated that the final building of the Panama Canal, under General Goethals, was made possible through the application by Surgeon Gorgas of certain measures preventative of yellow fever, based on the knowledge that the disease was transmitted by mosquitoes.

But many have forgotten that the original conquest of yellow fever was one of the triumphs of Leonard Wood's Cuban administration, and that it was under his supervision that the cause of the plague was discovered, and its prevention first accomplished.

Dr. Rixey, the well-known army surgeon, once said: "When history has forgotten General Wood the Soldier, and Governor Wood the Administrator, it will still remember Doctor Wood the Surgeon who conquered Yellow Fever."

When reminded that the actual work was carried out by Surgeon Walter Reed and a Board composed of Doctors Lazaer, Kean and Carroll, he replied: "There were a few of us doctors who suspected that mosquitoes were responsible for the transmission of the fever, but it was only

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# THE CONQUEST OF YELLOW FEVER

the least credited of several theories. We never had any opportunity to prove which theory was true and which false, until we worked under Wood. Then, at last, we had one in authority who possessed sufficient medical knowledge to realize that careful and extensive experiments were absolutely necessary; one who had the power to authorize and finance such experiments; and above all, one who had the courage to brave the disapproval of the vast majority of his fellowphysicians and fellow-countrymen."

The cause of yellow fever had been a problem which had puzzled mankind for centuries. At the time when Wood first went to Cuba, the most advanced theory was that the dread sickness was a filth disease, due to unsanitary conditions, and that it could best be prevented by individual cleanliness and public sanitation.

The general opinion of physicians prior to the date when Governor Wood's investigations began is fairly represented in the ninth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, published a few years before the liberation of Cuba. To reread a portion of that article will make more impressive the tremendous advance made by the experiments in Cuba. The article says—"Yellow Fever is a \* \* \* filth disease, the infection issuing from the soil or from some medium equivalent thereto.

"In New Orleans in the epidemic of 1878 the deaths numbered 4,056. During the great period of Yellow Fever (1793-1805) the disease [189] found its way time after time to the ports of Spain, the last severe epidemic on Spanish soil was at Barcelona in 1821 when 5,000 people died. In Lisbon in 1857 more than 6,000 died within a few weeks. . . .

"It is admitted that the endemic influence which causes it, is effluvial or miasmatic from the harbor mud, or from the bilge-water of a ship that had lain in the harbor, or from the alluvial foundations of houses nearest to the beach. So far as prevalence on shore is concerned, it seems to follow the same laws as cholera and typhoid fever; that is to say, it is an exogenous or soil infection, a fermentation of filth in the ground, with a seasonal activity closely following the movements of the subsoil water.

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"To establish an epidemic in a distant port, it has been necessary that there should be carried thither a material quantity of the specifically poisonous harbor-filth in a ship's bilges, and that the conditions favorable to its increase and diffusion by fermentation should exist in the new soil.

"Steady accretions of the filth of slave ships, from the beginning of the traffic to America, down to its abolition in 1808, and its final cessation previous to 1860, would account for a peculiarly pestiferous state of the Habana harbor mud, of the beach and even of the water; in fact, the water of the Bay of Havana was pestiferous and full of organic matter, even where it was several fathoms deep, and there was a standing order in the British navy against admitting it into ships.

"There is no other theory of yellow fever to contest the field with the slave-trade hypothesis; that alone satisfies all the conditions of a correct syntheses-historical, geographical, ethnological, physiological, and, some would say, even ethical. \* \* \* \*

"The part played by putrefactive organisms is a subordinate one. In the general grouping of factors they can only come in after we have found the specific integral of the yellow-fever soil in its endemic seats; they can not elaborate the miasmatic poison of yellow fever without a definite pabulum, any more than the 'lactic bacillus' can produce lactic fermentation without milk-sugar.

"In regard to its sanitation at the endemic seats in the West Indies, Guiana, Brazil, Central America, and the Gulf States of the American Union, the same principles apply as to the other filth-diseases. The object is to secure a clean soil, and to that end drainage and sewerage serve best."

Proceeding on this accepted supposition that yellow fever was a filth disease, the most probable one so far advanced, Leonard Wood opened his campaign against the fever in Santiago, in the [191] autumn in 1898 along that line and at first appeared to attain good results. By mid-winter of 1898-1899 the city was spotless, the streets were clean, all refuse was promptly disposed of, and an exceedingly efficient sanitary system was in operation. As a result the general death-rate fell rapidly, until it was lower than in many cities in the United States.

Six months later, however, in the summer of 1899, suddenly and unexpectedly, a terrible epidemic of yellow fever broke out, although when this happened the town of Santiago was as clean as any town could possibly be.

At the moment, Governor Wood was absent from Cuba; in June, 1899, he had gone north to New England to receive an LL.D. degree from Harvard, intending to be away for ten days, but the very day his degree was presented to him, he was informed by cable that this virulent epidemic of yellow fever had broken out in Santiago.

Within twenty-four hours, and without a moment's thought of his own danger of infection in his then run-down condition, he started for Cuba, taking with him a ton of sublimate of mercury, twenty tons of chloride of lime, and 50,000 gallons of petroleum with more to follow.

He reached Santiago on July 9th, at the very beginning of the hot tropical summer weather. Ten days after his arrival the plague was broken,

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and the daily numbers both of deaths and of new cases sharply declined.

It was, nevertheless, a hard fight and meanwhile thousands had died. The epidemic was controlled only after Governor Wood had taken the most heroic and extreme measures, which included the removal from the city of all non-immunes, the closing of all infected houses, and a thorough cleansing of the city with fire and disinfectants, with the additional precaution of isolating all persons stricken with the fever. All infected material was burned. Vaults and cesspools were saturated with kerosene and fired.

Disinfection was carried to the extent of sprinkling the streets and yards with a solution of corrosive sublimate of mercury. Triple disinfection at suitable intervals was carried out in all quarters where the disease broke out. Regulations were promulgated to the effect that all infected houses should be subsequently inhabited by immunes only. Ships were forbidden to approach the piers, and non-immune passengers were prohibited from landing in the city. Army Headquarters and all the troops were sent to high ground, fifteen miles inland. Non-immunes were not allowed to return until the epidemic had entirely passed. These radical measures were finally effective in checking the disease.

When the epidemic broke out, Santiago was as clean as a town can be kept. According to then existing theories there was absolutely noth-

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ing in the condition of the city itself to account for an outbreak of yellow fever. This fact made Wood suspect that although every improvement in sanitation decreased the number of cases of all true filth diseases like dysentery and enteric, and also of semi-filth diseases such as typhoid and malarial fever, nevertheless yellow fever could not be eliminated by sanitary precautions alone, and that the theory which classed it as a filth disease was incorrect. Such a conclusion was a discouraging one, for it not only proved that all his past efforts had been mistaken and fruitless, in so far as yellow fever was concerned, but it threw into darkness the whole subject of the cause and prevention of this plague. In short, it left him without a single proven fact on which to base future operations.

That same summer there were very few deaths from yellow fever in the city of Habana, where General Ludlow, the American Military Governor, who also believed the fever was a filth disease, had most thoroughly and efficiently cleaned the city. As a matter of fact, the fever was continually present in Habana, but the cases were few in number simply because there was comparatively little non-immune material for it to feed on.

In the fall of 1899, however, Spanish immigrants began to flow into Cuba, and during the autumn and winter approximately 12,000 Spanish settlers arrived at the port of Habana, about one-

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half of this number remaining in that city. Although yellow fever was unusual during the winter months, there resulted a serious outbreak in December which lasted throughout the winter and increased in intensity during the spring and summer. It was kept within bounds only by a most thorough systematic house-to-house inspection, by careful supervision of all sick persons, by the immediate removal to the yellow fever hospitals of all persons without regard to class or position who were taken sick with the disease. Nevertheless approximately 1,400 cases developed in Habana during the first six months of 1900.

During that summer, the fever also appeared in the garrisoned towns of Pinal del Rio and Santa Clara, where the sanitation was under military supervision and where there was nothing in the conditions of the towns themselves which could possibly account for the outbreak. The troops had to be sent into camp and rigid local quarantine measures were inaugurated. In this manner the spread of the fever was eventually checked.

During these various epidemics, the loss of United States officers was very serious, and in spite of all precautions there was also a considerable loss of life among the enlisted men and civilian officials.

The existence of this deplorable condition in a perfectly clean city, added to his own experience

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in Santiago, finally convinced General Wood that the spread of yellow fever could not be controlled by sanitary and disinfecting methods alone, and that a new scientific explanation would have to be worked out.

The situation was one of great discouragement. It was evident that the disease could be combatted in the small towns by controlling the local non-immunes and cutting off all intercourse with infected districts, or in extreme cases sending the non-immunes to the mountains above the fever level, as was done in Jamaica. Such methods though difficult were feasible in villages, or in times of great emergency were possible even in towns of 40,000 to 50,000 inhabitants like Santiago, but they could not be employed in a large city the size of Habana, without seriously and permanently injuring its commerce and industry.

As early as 1881 a physician in Habana, named Finlay, had begun to express and publish the seemingly preposterous theory that yellow fever might be transmitted by the bite of a mosquito. He was ignored or ridiculed by the entire medical profession, but nevertheless adhered to his belief, for which he was still vainly trying to get a fair hearing when Wood became Governor of all Cuba in 1900.

He had never been able to make any impression upon the Spaniards, or even to gain an audience with their officials, but he now received an

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## THE CONQUEST OF YELLOW FEVER

immediate and sympathetic hearing from Leonard Wood, to whom everything relating to yellow fever had become a matter of vital interest.

Finlay could not substantiate his theory as he had lacked the time and funds, and perhaps the temperament, for experimental work. This had prevented him from forging a single link in the necessary chain of evidence. He had no opinion as to the type of mosquito which might carry the fever, nor how the mosquito itself became infected, nor of the conditions under which it could transmit the disease.

Upon Wood's suggestion a board of army surgeons was appointed by Surgeon-General Sternberg and sent to Habana to investigate Finlay's theory. Doctor Walter Reed was chairman of this Board and his principal associates were Doctors Kean, Lazaer and Carroll. Governor Wood allotted to them, from the Cuban Treasury, the necessary appropriation of funds with which to begin experiments. The medical officers took up the work in a very thorough and conscientious manner, starting at the point previously reached by Doctor Finlay. For the purposes of experiment, they accepted his theory that yellow fever was transmitted by a mosquito. After several preliminary investigations, they finally succeeded in inoculating mosquitoes with yellow fever germs.

The next step was to prove that the inoculated mosquito could transmit the disease to human be-

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ings. Doctor Lazaer submitted himself as a subject for an experiment. He allowed himself to be bitten by an infected mosquito, took the fever and died,—died for his country and humanity, and seldom since the dawn of history has the sacrifice of a single life wrought such good to his fellow men.

Doctor Carroll also allowed himself to be bitten and had a serious case of yellow fever, but finally recovered.

The two remaining physicians, Reed and Kean, then presented themselves at Wood's headquarters, and stated that they believed the point had been reached where it had become necessary to make a considerable number of experiments on human beings, if their final conclusions were to be decisive. They wanted new and larger appropriations to pay those who were willing to submit themselves to experiments, and they also needed official authority to make the tests, which were almost certain to cause further loss of human life.

They were informed that whatever money was required would be made available, and that Governor Wood himself would assume all responsibility for the experiments. They were cautioned to make tests only upon people who were in sound health and of legal age, and who had been made to understand the humanitarian purpose of the experiment, as well as the risk they assumed. Reed and Kean were always to secure the writ-

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ten consent of those who offered themselves as subjects.

A large number of experiments were thereupon commenced, the details of which and the results obtained are now matters of general knowledge among members of the medical profession and sanitarians.

The Stegomyia Mosquito was found to be bevond question the sole means of transmitting the vellow fever germ. It was proved that this mosquito could become infected only when it had bitten a person sick with the yellow fever during the first five days of the disease. It then required approximately ten days for the germ to develop within the mosquito, before the insect could transmit the disease. All non-immunes who were bitten by that species of mosquito, under the conditions described, invariably developed a pronounced case of yellow fever in from three and a half to five days from the time they were bitten, irrespective of the surrounding sanitary conditions and apparently irrespective of their own physical condition.

It was further demonstrated that infection from cases so produced could again be transmitted by the Stegomyia Mosquito to another person who would in his turn contract the fever.

It was also proved that yellow fever could be transmitted by means of the hyperdermic introduction of infected blood or blood serum, even after it had been forced under pressure through

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porcelain. This experiment indicated that the organism was exceedingly minute,—so small, in fact, that it was beyond the power of any microscope then in use to detect, which explained why the germ had never been recognized or discovered.

It was thus positively demonstrated that yellow fever was not a filth disease, that it could not be transmitted by clothing or contact and that consequently all the old methods of fumigation and disinfection were only useful in so far as they served to destroy mosquitoes, their young and their eggs.

In short, it was proved that the yellow fever germs could exist only in two places: in the body of a Stegomyia Mosquito, or in the body of a man. Therefore, if Stegomyia Mosquitoes could be prevented from biting those who were sick with yellow fever, the germ would gradually perish from the earth, and eventually become as extinct as the dodo.

With the establishment of these facts, it was possible for Governor Wood to inaugurate an entirely new method of dealing with the disease, —a method very similar to that now adopted in the treatment of malarial fever, only carried out more thoroughly.

Yellow fever cases, as soon as discovered, were carefully isolated in premises inclosed with fine wire screens to prevent the mosquito from reaching the patients. The houses in which the dis-

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ease had occurred were sealed up and filled with formaldehyde for the purpose of killing all mosquitoes which might by any chance have bitten the patient. The same precautions were taken in the houses adjoining on either side.

The effect of this method of dealing with the disease was startling. The fever was not only immediately checked but was soon brought to an end at a time of the year when it was usually on the increase. This was accomplished in spite of the fact that a large number of non-immunes were constantly arriving in Habana and in other parts of the Island.

Cuba was completely freed from yellow fever almost at once. Not a single case originated in the Eastern end of the Island during the last three years of Wood's governorship and none in Habana for more than a year before his departure. Moreover the Island has been free from the disease ever since.

The disagreeable and costly process of disinfection, formerly in use, was now practically done away with. The new means employed were much less destructive to property and much less annoying to the people.

Thus a plague, which in Habana alone had for years claimed an average of 600 deaths a year and probably caused ten times as many cases, was absolutely blotted out and became non-existent.

Yellow fever still continued at Brazilian, Isthmian, and Mexican ports, and against these

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### LEONARD WOOD

countries Cuba maintained a rigorous and effective quarantine with the result that from this source no new cases came into the Island from which mosquitoes might spread the contagion.

The work of the commission, conceived and encouraged by Leonard Wood, and of which Doctor Reed was the President and directing spirit, was of the greatest importance to humanity at large. No medical discovery of equal importance had been made since vaccination for smallpox was first used.

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## CHAPTER XII

#### THE RATHBONE CASE

WHEN Leonard Wood was appointed Governor of Cuba, he appreciated that one of his greatest problems would be to prevent American politics from being introduced into Cuban administration, in the form of appointments made by political influence with the resultant inefficiency and graft.

Roosevelt was equally alive to the dangers of the situation and wrote in an article in *The Outlook*:

"If political considerations of the baser sort are supreme in the administration of New York City, that is New York City's own fault; but in Cuba it would be the fault of the American people and not of the inhabitants, and would establish a just cause of grievance on behalf of the latter."

It was not long before Wood was brought face to face with the very complication which he had feared.

Prior to his appointment as Governor of Cuba,

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a man named Estes G. Rathbone had been made Director of Posts for the Island.

In the early part of Wood's government, frauds were suspected in the Cuban Postal Department. It was charged that over a hundred thousand dollars' worth of stamps, which the records claimed had been destroyed by fire, had actually been secretly preserved and sold.

Rathbone was implicated, and was indicted by the Cuban courts. His political friends in the United States came to his aid. They furnished him a hundred thousand dollars bail, and moved Heaven and Earth to keep him from coming to trial. Some of them, evidently convinced of his innocency, threatened to "get" Wood if the matter were not hushed up.

The case nevertheless took its due course in the Cuban courts, and after a trial, which lasted for over two years, Rathbone was convicted and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. He then appealed his case to the Cuban Supreme Court, but before it could come up for reconsideration, Wood had completed his work as Governor and had turned over the administration of the Island to General Maximo Palma, the recently elected President of Cuba.

The new Cuban Government, as an acknowledgment of its debt of gratitude to the United States, decided to pardon and release all Americans who were then confined in Cuban prisons or who were under sentence, including those

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convicted of the Post Office frauds. Rathbone was given the alternative of taking his chance to clear himself by standing on his appeal to the Supreme Court, or of admitting his guilt and accepting the certainty of liberty on the basis of this general amnesty to Americans. He accepted the latter alternative.

About this time Wood left Cuba, having successfully completed his gigantic task of reconstruction, which had won for him world-wide fame. Had he been an Englishman and rendered the British Empire such signal service he would probably have been made an Earl by his grateful country, and given an extremely generous annuity. Lord Cromer, the organizer of Egypt and recognized as Britian's greatest Colonial Administrator, said that Wood's work in Cuba was the best colonial work of the century and that he was the only man in the world who was completely fitted to carry on the work which Cromer himself had initiated in Egypt, and only regretted that Wood was an American and not a British subject.

It certainly was only reasonable that his own country should wish to confer some reward on him as a scant acknowledgment of her debt to him. The only reward available, however, seemed to be his promotion to the rank of Major-General; but this he was already entitled to by seniority, independent of his work in Cuba, for he had been made a brigadier-general of the reg-

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ular army by President McKinley, several years before and was now the senior brigadier of the Army and as such in line for the first promotion to Major-General.

There being at the time two vacancies in that grade, President Roosevelt named the two Senior Brigadier Generals to fill the vacancies, Leonard Wood and Samuel S. Sumner.

Contrary to popular belief this was the only promotion ever given to Wood by Roosevelt, and Roosevelt never "jumped" Wood over any single officer of the Army. The only time Wood was ever jumped over anybody was when he was made Brigadier General for gallantry in battle in Cuba by President McKinley,—just as Funston received that same rank for similar bravery in the Philippines.

When Wood's appointment went to the Senate for the necessary confirmation, Rathbone stirred up opposition, and charged that he had not been given a fair trial in Cuba and that his conviction had been engineered by Governor Wood. In an effort to strengthen his case, he also endeavored to discredit Wood and preferred various formal charges against him, even insinuating that he had accepted bribes. This held up Wood's confirmation as Major-General, and gave rise to a complete and searching investigation of Wood's past record by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs.

The history of Rathbone case is of particular

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importance because it is the only time in Wood's entire career when his sinister enemies have ever dared to come out into the open. The resulting Senate investigation ended in their utter rout, and in the complete vindication of Wood's entire record; for once under way the Senate Committee not only dealt with Rathbone's specific charges, but also examined fully into Wood's military record.

Rathbone indirectly rendered Wood a great service, for the Senate investigation lifted the record of his patriotic work from out the musty files of the War Department, and spread it conspicuously upon the pages of American history, thus preserving for future generations a most conclusive record of his great service to his country, and of the high opinions which the leaders of his generation held of his character and achievements,—a record which might otherwise have been lost.

It is to be regretted that lack of space forbids giving in full the report of the Senate Committee ("The Confirmation of Leonard Wood," Executive Document No. 1, 58th Congress, 2d Session, January 4th, 1904, made public Jan. 18th, 1907) for its eighty-five pages of print are crammed with evidence and endorsement favorable to Wood.

The rest of this chapter is made up of quotations from the report, which includes the following statements:—

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"Mr. Rathbone testified at length, and submitted numerous exhibits in support of his charges.

"In the examination of Mr. Rathbone and the other witnesses produced by him, or subpœnaed at his request, the utmost latitude was given by the committee.

"The only restriction of the committee was, that purely hearsay testimony should not be received; and this restriction was not in all cases adhered to; on the contrary, a number of witnesses were allowed to state what had been told them in regard to facts concerning which they disavowed having any personal knowledge.

"This statement is made because of the fact that it was widely published in the newspapers during the progress of the investigation that the committee were applying the strict rules of the courts with respect to the admission of testimony and that, on that account, it was made difficult to establish the charges preferred.

"The Secretary of War appeared before the committee and testified upon all the charges and points made that involved in any way the War Department or to which the War Department had any official relation. \* \* \* \*

"So far as the general charge is concerned that Rathbone and others implicated in the postal frauds did not have a fair trial, because of inter-

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ference by General Wood, no evidence was produced to the committee in support of the same. On the contrary, in so far as the committee were required by the charges they investigated and the testimony they heard to consider the trial of the postal fraud cases, and particularly the trial of Rathbone, they were of the opinion that General Wood stated the exact truth when, at page 362 of the record, in closing his statement made in answer to the statement of Mr. Rathbone before the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba, he said:

"'I reiterate most positively that every effort was made to give Mr. Rathbone an absolutely fair trial, and I declare that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, he did have such a trial; that he was given every opportunity to prepare his defense; that he was defended by the ablest lawyers in the island; that no influence whatever, directly or indirectly, was used to influence in any way the judgment of the court or affect its personnel. . . .

"'In conclusion, it might not be inappropriate to invite attention to the fact that Mr. Rathbone's charge practically implies that the military governor, the inspector-general on duty in Cuba, the Fourth Assistant Postmaster-General, a large number of post-office inspectors of established reputation, the auditors of the island of Cuba, and five judges of the audiencia of Habana (three of whom were appointed by Lenuza, Mr. Rathbone's attorney, who was secretary of justice under General Brooke), all conspired to convict him.

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The creation of such a situation would have been impossible.

"'The complaint would have had a truer ring had Mr. Rathbone declined to accept a pardon and taken his case before the supreme court of Cuba.'"

With regard to the charges made by Rathbone against General Wood, and the Senate Committee's action thereon, the following extract from the report may be taken as a sample:—

"I (Rathbone) charge General Wood

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"With accepting gifts from an organization commonly known as Jai Alai, to which he had granted a ten years' exclusive concession, the same being a violation of the so-called Foraker law, which prohibited the granting of franchises or concessions during the occupation of the Island by the American authorities. The acceptance of these gifts constitutes a violation of Article 397 of the Penal Code of Cuba."

"The charge was serious," says the report, "and it was proper to hear testimony with respect to it at great length as the committee did, only because it carried with it the insinuation that General Wood had granted a concession to the Jai Alai Society as set forth in the charge in consideration of the gifts referred to—in short, that he had been guilty of corruption in the matter. There is no testimony whatsoever that supports any such insinuation. On the contrary the testimony, facts, and circumstances are of such [210] character as to warrant the statement that such an insinuation is but a baseless slander.

"Aside from the failure of the testimony to support any such insinuation, the evidence affirmatively refuses it. The record shows that General Wood did not grant any concession to the Jai Alai Society of any character whatsoever, and that consequently, to begin with, there was no basis for any such charge."

The really important question before the Committee was the promotion of Brigadier-General Wood to be Major-General. The more the Committee investigated and cross-questioned, and the more they learned of what his past commanding officers thought of him and his work, the clearer became his well-earned right of promotion.

The Committee's report concludes with the following statements:—

"When General Wood was made a brigadiergeneral in the Regular Army by appointment of President McKinley, and by the unanimous vote of the Senate, he was advanced over many officers who had been longer in the service and who, until then, held higher rank than he had held. There might have been at that time some propriety in urging objection on such an account to his confirmation, but there was no objection of the kind because it was then well understood that his promotion by President McKinley was because in the judgment of the President, who, under the

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Constitution and the laws, has a right to select without regard to seniority in the appointment of generals—General Wood had rendered conspicuous and meritorious services and had shown abilities and qualifications that well entitled him, in the judgment of the President, to the rank he was thus giving him, especially in view of the service he was then rendering as military governor of Cuba. The Senate and all others who were interested to have knowledge on the subject were familiar with the fact that the advancement of General Wood at that time was made for these reasons; and that, as a result of it, he was given rank over brother officers who had theretofore been his superiors.

"That appointment and that confirmation do not seem to be now open to objection; but if it is to be considered at all attention is called to the testimony of the Secretary of War:

".... Upon a review of General Wood's entire military record, I think it fair to say that no officer of the American Army below the grade of major-general has held more important commands, rendered more distinguished service, or demonstrated to a higher degree the possession of the qualities which fit a man to render valuable services to the country as major-general.

"Will you permit me to add an observation upon the principle which sound policy requires the President to follow in making appointments to general office?

"'The law which recognizes seniority alone as the

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title to promotion up to the grade of colonal abandons that rule when it deals with general officers and imposes upon the President the duty of selecting the best men for generals without expressing any limitation upon the class from which he is to make the selection. When such a selection is to be made, two different considerations always present themselves to the appointing mind. One is the desire to reward long and meritorious service; the other is the duty to secure the best possible man. . . . It frequently happens that these two considerations do not coincide in pointing towards the same man. . . . Public discussion of promotions to general office usually proceeds upon the view that promotion is to be considered only as a reward, but grateful as it is to reward past services and important as it is that they should be rewarded, I can not doubt that the highest duty of the appointing power, which is responsible for the future efficiency of the Army, is to secure the man of exceptional capacity. Where these two considerations point to the same man, as they sometimes do, the course is plain. Where they do not point to the same man it seems judicious to fairly divide the appointments to general office, making a part primarily with a view to reward and a part primarily with a view to future service. I think both considerations unite in this case.

"'These facts in General Wood's record and these views of public policy were the reasons which led President McKinley to select General Wood for brigadiergeneral of the Regular Army in preference to many officers of higher regular rank and to appoint him to that office upon the nomination which you confirmed

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three years ago next February. The present nomination is in the regular order of seniority according to the rank then established by the action of the President and Senate and indicates that the President sees no reason for reversing or departing from the conclusion then reached.

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" 'Very truly yours, " 'ELIHU ROOT, " 'Secretary of War.'

"... There seems to be an opinion widely entertained," continues the report, "that General Wood is now by this appointment being 'jumped' over other officers senior to him in rank and of longer and more important service. Such is not the case. General Sumner and General Wood were, when this nomination was made, the ranking brigadier-generals of the Army. Both were at the same time nominated, to fill the two vacancies then occurring, to be major-generals. General Sumner has been confirmed. Only one vacancy in the rank of major-general remains, and that is the one to which General Wood has been appointed.

"It would seem to be enough, in view of his good record, to justify the President in giving him this appointment, that he is now the ranking brigadier-general, and naturally the first man to be considered of the whole Army in connection with such an appointment. . . .

"If, therefore, the question of determining who shall have this appointment must be confined, as

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it is, to the 15 brigadier-generals, a mere glance at their respective records will show that, while all are apparently capable and efficient officers, not one of them has a better claim, by reason of his past record and experience as a commander, than has General Wood; and, in the opinion of the committee, no one has, in view of his present rank, equal claim to him on the ground of merit, measured by the considerations suggested. . . .

"For the reasons stated, the undersigned joined with the committee recommending confirmation.

"Respectfully submitted.

"J. B. FORAKER."

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## CHAPTER XIII

### GOVERNOR OF THE MORO PROVINCE

WHEN the United States took over the Philippines, the Department of Mindanao, the Moro Province, was considered the most dangerous and difficult post in the Philippines. It included the Island of that name containing 16,000 square miles, and all of the islands south of it as far as the British possession of Borneo.

The Moros were bloodthirsty, polygamous, Mohammedan savages, living in the almost inaccessible fastnesses of its tropical, fever-infected jungles. They would not accept civilization for themselves, nor allow their neighbors who did accept it to live in peace; frequently they refused to let them live at all. The chiefs of the various clans were jealous and suspicious of one another and carried on inter-clan and inter-family feuds, some of which had endured for centuries. They usually postponed these feuds, however, when they wanted to attack any invader on their territory or to combine for forays against the Christian tribes along the coast lines.

It had been their custom to perpetrate sudden raids of a most frightful nature upon the villages

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### GOVERNOR OF THE MORO PROVINCE

of pastoral Christian natives until the latter were almost exterminated. They would surround an unsuspecting village, assault it with the cold steel, pillage and burn the huts, slay or crucify all the men and carry off the women into a slavery from which there was no hope of return. Their piracies extended as far as the Celebes Islands, hundreds of miles from Mindanao, off the north coast of Luzon, and their slave-hunts to points beyond Manila.

They were fierce fighters, nourishing a bitter fanatical hatred of all whites and all Christians. They knew every path, cliff and gorge in their wild jungle home, and how to use them to the best advantage in preparing ambushes. The Spaniards had found them equally proof against European troops, or against the gentler methods of civilization. Spain had never been able to subdue them, although her Governors and Captain-Generals had earnestly struggled to do so during three centuries and a half. Therefore, Spain's policy had gradually degenerated into one of bad-tempered neglect.

After the Americans took over the Islands, there had been much fighting in Mindanao between the natives and the United States troops, in which the Moros had usually come off second best. Captains McNair, Pershing and Helmick had criss-crossed the country with strong offensive parties, falling into ambushes and fighting their way out again, laying ambushes of their

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own, or capturing and destroying Moro strongholds. While this fighting had not brought about real submission from a single sultan or dato, it had at least convinced the natives that American troops were much more dangerous opponents than their predecessors, the Spaniards.

On account of these insurgents, our army was forced to maintain itself in a state of constant hostility, without attempting to set up among the natives any form of civil government. No real progress had so far been made in establishing order, because the American leaders operating against the Moros were not of sufficient caliber to dominate the situation, which could not be handled by military measures alone, and required an administrator rather than a soldier.

The problems to be faced were so complex that President Roosevelt was in a quandary as to whom he should assign as governor of Mindanao.

One day, soon after General Wood had returned from Cuba, he was in Washington in conference with President Roosevelt, when the latter spoke of his worry over the problem of the Moro Province.

"I should like to go out there," said Wood.

"Bully," exclaimed Roosevelt, "nothing could be better! I hadn't considered you because you have just come back from five years' service in the tropics, and it hardly seemed fair to start you off again."

Roosevelt made Wood not only Military Com-

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mander of Mindanao, but Civil Governor as well. His power was thus complete and absolute. He was law-maker, chief executive, judge, chief of police and executioner. Strong medicine was needed for a radical disease. President Roosevelt said to him in effect:—"Your authority is absolute. The military forces necessary to back up your decisions are under your direct orders. We want results. The blame or credit for the results you obtain will all be yours."

General Wood went to the Philippines by way of the Suez Canal, stopping in Egypt to make a study of Lord Cromer's methods of government; he also visited India, Ceylon, Java and the Straits Settlements, that he might before attacking his own problems in the Philippines be primed with all possible fresh impressions of successful colonial administration, gained both from the British and the Dutch. Thus he let slip no opportunity of adding to the sum of his own knowledge which he had acquired while governor at Santiago and in Cuba.

He was not satisfied with even this ample preparation for his approaching responsibilities, but collected and carefully read a library of several hundred volumes on various phases of Colonial administration. After his arrival in the Philippines, a visitor who saw these books, which covered three walls of the office, said to Wood:----"This is certainly a complete collection, but when do you expect to find time to read it all?" "Read

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it all?" replied Wood; "I've already read every book and they have helped me immensely."

This intense study before undertaking any new task has been characteristic of Wood all his life, and in it may be found the root of the success with which he has met all his appointments. That he was always ready for each duty which faced him was due not to accident but to the most careful and painstaking foresight.

Upon his arrival in the Philippines, and before proceeding to his post in Mindanao, General Wood spent ten days in Manila conferring with Governor Taft, and with General Davis whom he was to succeed in command. He also studied all available records relative to Mindanao.

In going to the Moro Province for duty in the field with the regular army, Leonard Wood had to contend not only with a tropical climate and with exceedingly difficult military and administrative problems, but he also faced antagonism from the subordinates he was about to command.

He was met by that singular and well-known hostility which the regular officer of the United States Army sometimes shows towards the officer from civil life, be he a National Guardsman, a Reserve Officer, or a Regular recently appointed. Then, as now, this prejudice was not based upon any question of comparative efficiency, nor upon any estimate of capability for service to our country, but simply on professional jealousy of

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the narrowest sort—a surprised jealousy which bitterly resents any outsider who shows unexpected ability in troop-leading, as Wood had done both in the Geronimo Campaign and during the Spanish War.

This feeling towards General Wood among the officers in the Philippines was similar to that held at the same epoch by officers in the United States towards General Funston. The officers in the Philippines knew little of General Wood's work in Cuba and those in the United States were ignorant of Funston's feats in the Philippines. Neither general had graduated from West Point and neither came from the old line of the Army.

This antagonism was so contagious that it affected even the most broad-minded and capable of the regulars. It was strongest among the oldtime officers, but the younger officers soon followed their lead. Thus Wood had not only to deal with the rebellious Moros, but also to overcome this opposition of his own countrymen.

Very soon after he had settled down to work, however, the younger men began to swear by him. They soon appreciated that he achieved astonishing results and did so quickly. They found he was loyal to his subordinates, always considerate of them, and ever willing to delegate responsibility and generously to judge them by the results they obtained.

Soon even the older men began to like and admire him.

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"Before I met General Wood his very name stirred indignation in me," said Colonel Duncan, who commanded in the Bud Dajo battle. "T couldn't help feeling that the promotion of a mere doctor over the heads of so many experienced and deserving officers was an outrage on the service. The bill which made me a Colonel made him a Major-General, yet I was so bitterly opposed to his promotion that I was willing to see the bill defeated even if I thereby lost my Colonelcy. Afterwards when I served under him in the Philippines, I found him to be one of the biggest men I had ever come in contact with, a magnificent officer with a remarkably broad way of looking at and dealing with things. He is a great soldier." \*

Governor Wood sailed from Manila to Mindanao in a gunboat, and the day he arrived at the Capital of the Moro Provinces he said to his staff:—"Gentlemen, we have left no stone unturned in our efforts to locate and study documents bearing on the problems before us. We have also consulted all the officials who have pertinent experience, but this knowledge will be of small value until we have verified and coordinated it by actual observation in the field. Therefore, we leave at six o'clock to-morrow morning on a trip which may last six weeks or even longer, during which time we will study the

\*By James Creelman—Pearson's—April, 1909.

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country and talk with as many of the native chiefs as can be persuaded to meet us."

Next day his party plunged into the jungle, carrying only their horse equipment, and disappeared for more than a month; marching through wet jungles, crossing high volcanic mountain ranges, fording rapid rivers or ferrying across inland lakes in dug-out canoes.

Among the natives, tales of the "Great White Sultan" ran before him, and chiefs and datos and rajahs and sultans came out to meet him, partly from cunning curiosity and partly to measure their wits against his. They came to meet him accompanied by their full retinues;—Prime Ministers, Secretaries of War, umbrella bearers, body-guards and personal attendants.

In these conferences the General tried to impress the Sultans with the fact that while America gave them certain privileges, and a fixed monthly stipend for themselves and many of their followers, she also imposed upon them certain obligations as, for instance, that of keeping order.

Before Governor Wood returned to his headquarters, he had not only met every native chief of importance, and visited all the American military posts under his command, but had found time to cross a hundred miles of ocean and pay a flying visit to Borneo, where the administrative problems faced by the British were in many ways

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similar to his own, and where he obtained many valuable pointers from the Governor.

When his long trip was over and General Wood had returned to his headquarters, he sat down quietly with his staff to work out a scheme of government for the Islands.

The plan which he eventually adopted was the result of his painstaking study of Colonial administration, checked by the first-hand knowledge acquired during his trip and by his many conferences with the Moro Sultan who had told him much of value concerning their beliefs, wishes and prejudices, all of which he wisely took into consideration and respected, wherever it did not conflict with his general plan of government.

He had found that there were in the Moro Provinces more than two score different tribes, all of them Mohammedans or pagans, except in a few seacoast towns, where the population was divided in religious allegiance between Christianity and Confucianism.

Each religion had within itself many different sects, and in almost every case the tribal chief was closely associated with the tribe's particular religion, so that religious tenets were inextricably entangled with matters pertaining to politics and trade, polygamy and slavery, warfare and social relations. The situation was, therefore, infinitely perplexing.

Inter-clan murders were usually condoned

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"BEFORE AND AFTER TAKING" MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIVE CONSTABULARY

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A MOHAMMEDAN MORO AND HIS FAMILY



THE PRINCESSA OF COTABATO AND THE SULTAN OF MAGINDANAO



A MORO BOLOMAN





A SEA MORO PIRATE CHIEFTAIN



A RUINED SPANISH CHURCH IN MINDANAO

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GOVERNOR WOOD

IN THE PHILIPPINES



A TYPICAL VILLAGE STREET IN THE MORO PROVINCE

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and went unpunished by any law; even murders committed upon fellow clansmen were never adequately punished. The penalty for killing a neighbor was limited to a fine of fifty dollars, a woman's life cost twenty-five, and the murder of a slave could be atoned for by twelve dollars given to the owner. The payment of these specified sums constituted full legal satisfaction for murder, no matter how wanton or cold-blooded. An idea of the comparative insignificance of these amounts may be gained from the fact that stealing a buffalo was punishable by a fine of forty-five dollars, while the market value of a repeating rifle was a hundred and fifty.

The datos and sultans claimed absolute right of life and death over all their subjects, without trial or appeal to higher authority. Many of them were hereditary chiefs whose titles dated back for centuries so that their rule was supported by the Oriental devotion and respect for precedent and heredity.

Governor Wood divided Mindanao into five districts, Jolo, Davao, Lanao, Zamboanga and Cotabato and made an American officer governor of each one. These districts were subdivided into wards, one ward for each tribe. The ruling dato or sultan of the tribe was made Headman of the ward, on probation, in order as far as possible to enlist his coöperation under the new régime and give him a fair chance to make good, no matter how bad his previous reputation had

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been nor how many raids or revolts he had in the past perpetrated.

Governor Wood himself dealt directly with the five American district governors, and they in turn dealt with the Headmen. Thus the native population had no direct official contact with the Americans, but continued to be ruled by their native chiefs.

None of the dato's legitimate functions were taken from him when he was appointed Headman; in fact, he became far more powerful than he had been before, for, provided he upheld the law, he was in his turn upheld by his district governor and by Governor Wood, backed by all the armed resources of the United States.

If any one of the new Headmen did not maintain order or failed in any other way to obtain the desired results, he was reprimanded. If the reprimand proved ineffective, he was then superseded by a new Headman. If he resisted removal, the District Governor sent troops to effect it. If he tried to evade capture he was relentlessly pursued until he could be run down and brought to book. If between the time of his removal and capture he led any revolts which resulted in casualties or other damage, he was held personally responsible and brought to trial. If when surrounded he resisted capture, he was killed.

When a tribe revolted, the Headman alone was punished, and every effort was made to capture

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him without more fighting than was positively necessary. Once he was eliminated as ruler, the tribe was forgiven, on the theory that the Headman was responsible for their misconduct, and a new Headman was then appointed.

Under the old tribal system, the priests had also acted as judges; Wood made them the tribal judges under the supervision of the Headman, and in all minor cases their sentences were final. In major cases and in cases between a tribesman and an outsider, an appeal to the district court was allowed.

One of the chieftains whom the Governor made Headman was the Sultan of Sulu, who had long sustained a bad record, both under Spanish rule and since the American occupation. The Sultans of Sulu had for generations not only misgoverned their own people but had, by their piracy on the sea and their slave-raids on land, kept their part of the Archipelago in constant turmoil.

In 1899 General Bates had concluded by arbitration an agreement with the Sultan, by which the latter was to govern his province and keep order. The Sultan gladly signed the agreement, which he had no intention of keeping, because he thought it meant that the Americans would leave him alone, while he could continue to do exactly as he despotically pleased. If there was trouble he imagined he had only to write a note or make an apology.

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Everything worked out exactly as he had calculated until Wood became Governor. Up to that time he had cynically disregarded all parts of the treaty which were in any way hampering to him, and when called upon for explanations he made evasive answers.

As soon as Wood was certain of the situation, he sent a force under Colonel Scott and Captain Howland to visit the Sultan. The expedition was not a punitative one, it was simply instructed to carry to the Sultan an invitation to come and confer with Governor Wood near Maibun, which was one of the Sultan's own towns.

It developed that the Sultan had gone to Singapore on a visit, to dispose of pearls, which were his principal source of revenue. His method of collecting this revenue was unique. Every pearl fisherman was required, on penalty of death, to bring all his pearls to the Sultan, who put them through a sieve. All the pearls which stuck belonged to the Sultan; those which fell through were returned to the poor fisherman.

During the Sultan's absence in Singapore the heir apparent, known as the Rajah Mudah, was ruling in his stead.

Colonel Scott had been ordered by General Wood to see that the Sultan accepted his invitation; and no one who has ever worked under Wood has dared fail to bring back results. In the absence of the Sultan it was evident that the

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Rajah Mudah was the only person who could possibly serve as "results."

Colonel Scott, therefore, said to the deputy chief that in view of the Sultan's absence, he had better accept the invitation.

The Rajah Mudah regretted that he had a bad boil, which was so painful that traveling was for him out of the question.

Colonel Scott was at once all sympathy. "I have had boils myself," he said, "and they were Hades. Americans are not infrequently afflicted with them but have made marvelous discoveries in their quick cure. My hospital orderly happens, very fortunately for you, to be an expert boilhealer."

The hospital orderly was brought forward. The Rajah was so reluctant to show his boil that it became fairly evident it had no existence except in his own imagination.

Colonel Scott then signaled to Captain Howland, who marched his company into the street in front of the Rajah's palace, and squads-righted them into line facing the door. The Moro bolomen of the village came out of their houses and stood alert, awaiting developments. Colonel Scott with the utmost courtesy pointed to the company and said to the heir apparent:—"This is the Guard of Honor sent by the Great White Sultan to escort you to his presence."

The Rajah Mudah had, during the past two or three years, learned that a battle with American

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infantry was a serious affair, and realized that although he might eventually annihilate Captain Howland's company, it would be at a cost of hundreds of Moros lives. Then, too, it is so messy to fight a battle in one's own front yard. All things considered, the Rajah Mudah decided to reconsider his refusal. He announced that perhaps a ride in the open would help his malady.

General Wood received him with all possible ceremony; troops were turned out on parade, and the camp was made ready for inspection. The Rajah Mudah was given an exhibition of target practice and watched the American soldiers consistently hit a target the size of a man at a third of a mile off. He saw the mountain guns taken to pieces and loaded on a string of mules which could penetrate the roughest mountain fastnesses. Then he saw the guns reassembled and made ready for action in less than a minute. He was much impressed by the machine guns, one of which seemed able to fire as many bullets as a whole company of infantry. As a result of this exhibition he decided that diplomacy would be . the best weapon to use with the Great White Sultan.

There followed a very formal official luncheon with many courses, and speeches, and addresses of welcome; the Rajah in the seat of honor at Governor Wood's right hand.

Afterwards the Governor conferred alone with him; and confirmed the Rajah Mudah's [230] brother as Headman of Sulu. He also explained with exactitude what the Great White Sultan expected of a Headman and also just what would happen to him if he failed to produce satisfactory results.

Thus the Governor organized Mindanao, setting natives to rule the land and parceling out the country among them until no corner was left without its little chief. Each one was supreme in his own bailiwick but was instructed to respect the authority of neighboring chiefs. Each one was in explicit terms told exactly what he could not do and what he was expected to accomplish. He was warned that he would be judged solely by results and that excuses, apologies and explanations would have no value. If he would not or could not give satisfaction he would be removed, by force of arms if necessary, and some one else would be set to rule in his place.

General Wood at first concentrated most of his time and attention on building up his general system of government and making it function smoothly. He carefully selected his five American district governors and made certain that they were drilled to their tasks. Through them, he taught the ex-sultans and the priests the details of their new duties as Headmen and judges. Until this had been accomplished he postponed initiating certain other important reforms which he had in mind and which he knew would meet

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with the strongest opposition. The most inportant of these contemplated attacks was against polygamy and slavery, which had been a fundamental part of Moro life from time immemorial.

He supervised the organization of schools and the formation of the district courts, which were the courts of appeals, and the courts for the trial of inter-tribal disputes. He relentlessly punished murderers, head-hunters and feudists. He also improved sanitary conditions.

Incidentally, many curious disputes were brought to him to be settled. For instance, a bitter feud was raging between an inland Moro tribe, and the Samals or sea Moros who dwelt in stilted villages, built over the water in the tidal marshes of the coast and who lived by fishing and piracy. The cause of the strife was Turtle Eggs versus Turtles. The inland Moros ate turtle, eggs, which are laid in the hot sand above tide-water, but not the turtles; while the sea Moros, on their part, ate the turtles but not their eggs.

The sea Moros were in the habit of killing the turtles when they came ashore before they had laid their eggs, thus depriving the inland Moros of their most prized delicacy; while the sea men maintained that the inland Moros, by eating up so many of the eggs, were causing a rapid decrease in the supply of turtles.

Governor Wood ruled that the sea Moros [232]

might kill the turtles at sea and in the white water of the surf, but that they must not molest them on land or on the wet sands where the tides washed smoothly.

The Americans had promulgated a ruling against polygamy before Wood became Governor, and when his general system of administration was in fair working order, he began strictly to enforce this law, acting as usual through the five district governors and the various Moro Headmen. Violent opposition immediately developed. No man knows better than Wood how to rescue a difficult situation by the saving grace of a sense of humor, and this was liberally applied in his handling of this problem. 'A savage Mohammedan Chieftan came to him to plead against his ruling that polygamy must cease.

The Chieftan, sitting cross-legged before Governor Wood, began:—"The prophet has said that a man may have many wives. The Koran, the Bible of the Mohammedans, so ordains it."

Wood's strong face widened out into an aggressively friendly grin as he replied, "Quite true, I have read it there myself." The savage Chieftain looked up with a pleased smile at this unexpected knowledge of the Koran. "But," continued Wood, "the Prophet has also said that a wise man will be content with one. I am certain that you are a wise man, and therefore will not oppose my ruling against polygamy, which I shall continue to enforce."

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Early in his governorship he took the first active step towards the abolition of slavery, although at the time none of the Moros appreciated its true significance.

The Spaniards had tried for several centuries to suppress slavery by issuing laws forbidding it, and then waging war on those who offended against their orders. This method had always been a signal failure because it lacked native cooperation, without which slaves could always be concealed. Moreover, the Koran specifically permitted and encouraged the enslavement of non-Moslems.

The Moros had at first captured Christians for slaves, not only raiding the coast towns, but making slave-hunting expeditions to neighboring islands for hundreds of miles in all directions. When, for any reason, Christian slaves were not available, the Moros were not above enslaving true believers from neighboring clans.

Wood's first step was to protect the coast villages with small American garrisons. This made slave-raiding against these settlements too precarious to be profitable. Then, by arrangement with the Navy, the gun-boat patrols among the Islands were strengthened and coördinated to an extent which made piracy and slave raids to neighboring Archipelagos practically impossible. All sources of supply for Christian slaves were thus cut off from the Moros, leaving them no choice but to do without new slaves, or to enslave

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fellow Mohammedans. Still worse for them Christian slaves were, by Wood's orders, rescued and liberated whenever this was possible without stirring up a rebellion, which he wished to avoid until he was prepared to deal with it effectively.

Gradually the Moros became more and more in need of new slaves, and in order to secure them indulged with increasing frequency in the enslavement of their co-religionists.

Then, when the stage was set, Wood began his campaign for the absolute suppression of slavery, the last and most difficult step in his organization of Mindanao. He called before him the various Headmen. Among the first to appear before Wood to defend the practice of slavery was Hadji Butu, High Priest and Chief Judge to the ex-sultan and new Headman of Sulu. He stated that the Americans had by solemn treaty agreed to respect the religions of the Filipinos, and that the Mohammedan religion distinctly encouraged slaveholding.

"That is true," said Wood, "the law of the Prophet Mohammed authorizes slavery, but the Kitab of the Koran forbids the enslavement of true believers, does it not?"

Hadji Butu nodded uneasily.

"Yet to-day the majority of the slaves held by your master are Mohammedans."

Hadji Butu nodded again, and explained:

"Before the days of the gunboats, we could go to the neighboring islands and to Cebu and even

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as far north as Manila to get Christians for slaves, but after your gunboats came we could do so no longer and we then began to make slaves of our own people. As high priest I disapproved, but I was not powerful enough to put a stop to it without help, but you, General, with your soldiers, will have the power to give that help. I am glad that you are going to stop this custom, and I will aid you."

"I rule over both Christians and Mohammedans," said the Governor, "and the fact that I protect the Christians from harm is your best guaranty that I will also protect you. I am glad that you agree with me about slavery. Together we will suppress it. Thus you will continue to help me enforce my laws and I will help you make your fellow-tribesmen live up to the precepts of their religion of which you are the High Priest."

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### CHAPTER XIV,

#### DATO ALI

THE reorganization of Mindanao proceeded without concerted opposition, until Wood took steps to enforce his ruling against slavery, with special reference to the capture and mistreatment of women.

Most of the datos and sultans had been diplomatically induced to give up this practice, forbidden by the Koran, especially after they were made to understand that its continuance was opposed not only by their own priests, but also by the "Great White Sultan."

But there were two or three datos who were proof against conciliation or arbitration, who were so frankly unscrupulous that even the precepts of the Koran were to them of minor consideration. Slavery was one of their time-honored institutions, and an economic basis upon which they had depended for many centuries. In their minds its financial advantages outweighed both their reverence for the Koran and their respect for the fighting ability of the Americans.

Dato Ali was particularly incensed when American expeditions began to appear in his vil-

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lages to liberate recently captured slaves and return them in safety to their homes. He was the most powerful of all the Moro chieftains, and his influence among his people was correspondingly great. He was not only a man of personal force, but was an hereditary sovereign, who traced his ancestry by written records for nearly four hundred years, and by tradition for a thousand.

With the single exception of the Sultan of Magindanao and the latter's Princessa, Dato Ali was of the bluest-blood of the Moros of Mindanao. He had the additional prestige of success in whatever he attempted; and possessed one of the three largest and most carefully selected harems in that part of the world; he also dealt in slaves on a wholesale plan, and was a daring and successful gambler.

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His reign over his people had always been one of terror for he never failed to torture or kill a subject who did not obey him implicitly. His personal prestige was based upon many years of chieftainship, and this, added to the hereditary honors of his family, made him seem so invincible to the Moros who lived near him, that they never conceived it possible to remonstrate much less to revolt against even his most high-handed acts.

When Governor Wood named him Headman of his tribal district, he had accepted the appointment rather grouchily, but nevertheless played the game fairly well, until the ruling against slav-

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ery was promulgated and energetic measures were taken to enforce it.

This finally brought him into open revolt. He not only roused his people, but exacted help from neighboring clans, and defying the new order of things proceeded to organize a wide-spread rebellion.

Many of the clans, and even many of his own subjects, had no desire to engage in a war with the Americans, whom they had learned to respect as terrible fighters. Most of them had nothing to gain and much to lose by a revolt. The chieftains were the only large slaveholders, so that the average Moro had no personal interest in the perpetuation of slavery, while war jeopardized his life and his home.

He nevertheless found himself between the devil and the deep sea, for he was forced to choose between loyalty to the Great White Sultan or obedience to Dato Ali; either choice was likely to have fatal results. Most of the Moros chose submission to Ali simply because he was nearer, and his vengeance more immediate. They calculated that such a choice had at least the advantage of postponing the evil day of reckoning. Moreover, the Great White Sultan had shown leniency in the past, and there was hope for similar forgiveness in the future, while Ali had always been pitiless.

Ali was encouraged by a simultaneous revolt of the mountain Taracas of Lake Lanao, a race

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of fanatical Mohammedans, who were the only tribe which had never been subdued, even by the Americans. He then led attacks against the natives of the lowlands and against the tribes who remained loyal to the American administration. His part of the island was promptly thrown into tumult and red war menaced everything which had been accomplished by the Americans in Mindanao.

The average colonial administrator would have assumed that the revolt was spontaneous, and have waged vigorous warfare against the tribe as a whole, instead of concentrating against the guilty chieftain. But Governor Wood was so closely in touch with the situation and had so much sympathy and understanding for his dusky subjects, that he sensed the truth, and, although the revolt eventually affected nearly all of Mindanao, he faithfully adhered to his rule of holding the Headman and not the people responsible. He, therefore, directed his principal effort towards capturing Dato Ali with as little general bloodshed as possible.

Meanwhile Ali ambushed several bodies of American troops and attacked the garrison of Cotabato, basing his operations upon a fort which he constructed in the swamps of Sirinaya, into which he planned to retreat in case of American successes.

This fort had been cleverly laid out by an ex-Sepoy of the British Indian army, whom Ali had

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persuaded to join him, and was constructed after the type which had been used by European armies from 1870 to 1880. It had a perimeter of over a thousand meters and was situated in the midst of a huge swamp many miles in extent, impassable except by a few narrow trails leading across to the fort, which was surrounded by an entanglement of pointed bamboos (in lieu of barbed wire). It contained twenty-one large old-type cannon, ranging from three to five and one-half inches; in addition there were five hundred small portable bronze hand-cannon, known as lantakas. The garrison consisted of about twenty-five hundred Moros, including many women and children.

These details were reported to Wood by his native scouts and he personally organized and led against the fort an expedition which included several picked battalions of infantry of about two hundred and fifty men each, with two  $2\frac{2}{7}$ -inch mountain guns and one 3-inch field piece.

The expedition proceeded up the Cotabato River until it reached a point about twelve miles from the fort, there it disembarked and commenced its march across the swamp.

Almost immediately a very sluggish marshy stream about twelve feet deep and nearly a mile wide was encountered. This was not navigable, even for the smallest boats, being covered with "sudge" much like that encountered by the explorer Stanley at the headwaters of the Nile. This sudge consisted of a spongy, floating layer

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of intertwined water grasses and water-grass roots about two feet thick.

It was found that an infantryman, if he went at a run, could cross this mat without sinking above the ankles, the sudge giving away behind him much as rubber ice sinks behind the daring skater. An advance guard was first established on the far bank to protect the men en route, and then the work of transporting the mountain guns was started. Their barrels, towed by runners, were with little difficulty rapidly dragged across on improvised sleds of bamboo; the ammunition was taken over by hand a round at a time. But the cradles and trails of the guns were so heavy that they frequently broke through the surface. Whereupon the gunners were obliged to dive down through holes in the sudge, into the dark water beneath in order to attach fresh ropes.

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After several days of arduous progress, complicated by two ambushes, the expedition finally arrived before the fort.

Knowing that there were inside the Moro fort many ignorant and deluded people, who really had no desire to fight the Americans and had joined Ali merely because they feared him, Wood was anxious to disperse them before inflicting any casualties. Moreover, he never forgot his policy of punishing the chief and not the people.

All attempts at parleys, however, proved unsuccessful, the American emissaries being fired upon by the defenders.

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It would have been easy to surround the fort, lay siege to it and eventually carry it by storm, but this would not only have involved serious loss of life to the American troops, but would have meant the practical annihilation of all Dato Ali's misguided Mohammedan followers, who in a battle with Christians felt bound, one and all, to fight to the bitter end.

General Wood disposed his forces on three sides of the fort, but well out of range of its guns. He carefully left open the fourth side which looked towards the mountains.

The cannon used by Ali's men were of old types, which, though extremely deadly at close quarters, have a maximum range of only a mile. Wood emplaced his modern American artillery in the open in full view of the fort but about one mile and a half away.

When all was ready and the defenders had had ample time to take in the situation and to count the American guns, one solitary shrapnel was fired, which went screaming through the air and burst squarely in the middle of the fort. Instantly the Moro artillery responded with a furious cannonade, but all their shells fell harmlessly into the swamp half a mile in front of the American position. It was soon evident to the defenders that they were powerless to reply effectively.

Five or six hours later, toward evening, a second shell from the American gun followed the first one. The American artillery commander

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arranged a framework of sights in front of a gun, so that it could with the aid of a small lamp be accurately aimed even in the darkness. At midnight a third shell was fired.

Next morning at sunrise the three-inch field gun sent a single shot into the fort. Breakfast and lunch were announced to the Moros in similar manner.

This intermittent firing had a moral effect upon the Oriental temperament even greater than would have been produced by a continuous heavy bombardment. Years afterwards Moros who had been in the fort would complain "We never knew when a new sheave of shrapnel bullets would come down from heaven like rain; the waiting was worse for us than death."

Dato Ali's followers began slowly to understand the hint General Wood intended to convey. They clearly perceived that their batteries were powerless to injure the Americans, while the American artillery could, if it chose, easily fire twenty shells a minute.

The hopeless, helpless waiting finally became unendurable, and by twos and threes the Moros began to steal away to the mountains through the gap which Wood had left open for that very purpose. Ali, powerless to stop them, finally fled himself; with him a fugitive in the mountains, his revolt was manifestly a fiasco.

This ridiculous failure of his most carefully laid plans, caused him to lose face with his fol-

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lowers, and greatly decreased the hereditary and personal prestige upon which his power was founded. His people gradually returned to their villages, where they were not molested by the Americans. Leonard Wood's generosity won their confidence and respect, which more than compensated for the trouble which Ali caused during the succeeding ten months before he was finally run down.

American expeditions now relentlessly hunted him through the jungles to which he had fled, accompanied only by his personal followers and the members of his family.

On one occasion, Ali ambushed a small American scouting party and succeeded in killing a number of the men. This occurred near Simpitan, just west of Lake Liguasan, a large shallow body south of the Cotabato River covered with floating islands of sudge. This water is very shallow and only navigable for small ship-boats and dugouts. A channel runs between the islands of sudge, but as these move about with every change of wind, the channel is constantly shifting, so that even the natives living on the shores often get lost in attempting a crossing. The shortest trip on record was eighteen hours.

The General collected all the available dugouts in the vicinity and started through to Simpital with as many men as the available canoes would carry, in the hope to corner Ali before he could get back to the high ranges. The guides

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in the leading boats often took false channels, and the party would then be obliged to turn back and try again. The General himself was in a small American boat, with one aide and two Moro paddlers, the four men taking turns at the paddles, two at a time.

When darkness came on and it was necessary to tie up for the night, the boats were shoved well into patches of lotus plants which were encountered from time to time. There were two excellent reasons for selecting these refuges. The patches of lotus, which often cover an acre or more of surface, are fixed. They grow in very shallow water, are firmly rooted and are the only immovable bodies in all these miles of floating sudge. Again, the mosquitoes of the lake which are terrible pests, making sleep impossible, do not for some reason come near the lotus plants. In these patches alone can one be free from the torment of their sting. The odor of the lotus flower. which is most agreeable to human beings, is presumably disagreeable to these insects.

The small size of even the General's boat can be estimated from the fact that there was no room for the two Moros to sleep, except by lying across the legs of the aide. At intervals during the night when he became so cramped and numb that he had to change his position, he was first obliged to wake the two Moros before he could move.

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Even during the pursuit of Dato Ali every possible last effort was made to persuade him to surrender and thus save more bloodshed.

Shortly after the Simpitan affair, a half-caste reported that he believed he could get into communication with Ali. The General had a Navy gunboat put at his disposal, and sent an aide with him up the Cotabato River to see what could be accomplished.

Ali's brother, Jimbangan, had been captured near Sirinaya, by troops pursuing Ali, and was then a prisoner in the town of Cotabato. One of his sons was secured as a messenger. He would start out with a message, going to the last place that Ali had been heard from and then tracing him from place to place until he caught up with him. Ali would then send back his reply and immediately move on, fearing treachery. In this slow manner the parleys were carried on. There would often be an interval of a week or ten days between the sending of a message and receiving the reply.

A meeting was finally arranged to be held on the banks of the Cotabato, for which very detailed arrangements were made through the messenger. These included the cutting out of the high grass in an area of some four or five acres, so that the conference could take place in its center without chance of an ambush by either side. Each party to the meeting was to consist of five persons. The District Governor and the aide

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were to head the American party, which also included the captain of the gunboat and two armed enlisted men.

After several postponements, the parley was finally held in a pouring rain, and after a great deal of talk Ali agreed to surrender, but stated that before doing so he wished to give presents to the Governor and the aide.

These presents were quickly produced and proved to be two very handsome bronze lantakas. Ali, however, began to be nervous, and after a little time said he had not been informed that the Captain of the Gunboat was to be one of the five Americans present at the meeting, and that he wished to give him a present also.

In courtesy there was nothing to do but wait patiently for the arrival of this third present, although the Americans suspected it was merely a ruse of Ali to gain time for some secret purpose.

During the long wait for this present, Ali's principal lieutenant definitely persuaded him to put off his surrender until another effort had been made to regain his lost prestige with the clans. Eventually the present for the gunboat Captain arrived, and proved to be an old pony. After it had been duly presented, Ali made an appointment for a new meeting the following Sunday, at which all the arms of his followers were to be turned in. The conference was then terminated.

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Although Ali did not keep this appointment, he did agree, after a great deal more correspondence, to meet the Americans at another point and there again consented to surrender. When he asked how he was to begin his surrendering, he was told to turn over his arms. He said, for that he would have to go back to his people to give the necessary orders. In a few minutes, guns of the older patterns, including some Tower muskets loaded with broken glass, began to arrive. This sort of thing continued until dark, but it was afterwards learned that all the time Ali was getting away as fast as ever he could. As a truce had been agreed upon, there was nothing for the Americans to do but let him go, and some ten days later, negotiations were finally broken off. They had covered a period of several months, and illustrate Wood's patient efforts to induce the chief to surrender without bloodshed, and thus avoid inflicting hardships on the few ignorant people who still followed him, and who obeyed him only through fear.

It now became clearly evident that Dato Ali had really no intention whatever of surrendering, that he was simply playing for time, in the hope that the matter would blow over and his sins finally be forgotten.

It is characteristic of Leonard Wood that when all efforts at conciliation or arbitration have failed and an issue must finally be squarely faced.

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he always meets it fearlessly, no matter how unpleasant it may prove.

Therefore the pursuit of Ali was now taken up relentlessly. Expedition after expedition went out to capture him only to return empty-handed. Every clew to his whereabouts was carefully investigated and followed up. Finally, after nearly a year of persistent but fruitless effort, one of Wood's personal aides, Captain McCoy, led a desperate band of Americans across two hundred miles of unbroken jungle on a secret forced march, during the last days of which they were reduced to living on lizards and roots, until one morning they walked into Dato Ali's camp, taking it completely by surprise. There was a brief and savage fight, during which Lieutenant Remington shot the Dato with his pistol as Ali stood on the porch of his hut firing with a rifle at the American soldiers.

Thus the man who had once been Mindanao's most powerful chieftain died a fugitive, and from his fate the other Moro sultans learned a crowning and never-to-be-forgotten lesson.

Wood welcomed assignment to the "most dangerous place in the Philippine Government, and fought Moros through woods and swamps and mountains and jungles for a year and a half, during which time he was practically continually under fire. He sent no soldiers where he would not go himself; he shared every hardship and fought shoulder to shoulder with the regulars. His men

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loved him; his associates respected him; and his Government had confidence in him.\*

"Nowhere did his genius shine brighter than in dealing with the natives in a diplomatic way. Where force availed nothing, he won by diplomacy and established peace and prosperity in regions where such things, presumably, had never been obtained since the world began.

"He went from the rulership of this bad province of Mindanao, leaving behind him a land of law and order, of schoolhouses, and of courts of justice, a land of liberated womanhood that before his coming had been enslaved and held as chattel. He created a new world in the short space of three years."

In 1905, when Wood returned to America on sick leave, he left the Moro provinces the best governed section of the Philippines, and for the first time in history the Moros were at peace with the world and with each other.

\*The Wilmington (N. C.) Star.

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## CHAPTER XV

#### THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR

As a Military Administrator General Wood has filled a greater number of important positions than any other living American soldier. He was Commander of the Philippines Division from 1906-1908, Commander of the Eastern Department of the United States 1909-1910, Chief of Staff of the United States Army 1910-1914, Commander of the Eastern Department 1914-1917, Commander of the Southeastern Department for a few months in 1917, Commander of the 89th and 10th American Infantry Divisions during their training periods, and is now Commander of the Central Department.

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The most striking characteristic of his work as a military administrator is the extraordinary degree to which he has been able to subordinate the idea that an army is an engine of destruction, and the extent to which he has succeeded in making it an instrument of constructive work in every community where he has been stationed.

He has never employed military force, except as a last resort, after all other means of accom-

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plishing his object have been tried and have failed; he has an unerring instinct for the moment when further diplomacy is useless, when it will only be interpreted as weakness, and when force is the only road to peace.

In his official reports we continually find such statements as the following, written in the Philippines:

"Conditions among the Moros throughout the department are generally peaceful. The establishment of civil government, and the extension of certain laws and regulations have caused some excitement, and at times serious resistance, especially the laws prohibiting slavery, slave dealing, and slave catching. . . . Force was only resorted to after peaceful means had failed, and in almost every instance actual fighting was initiated by the Moros."

A year later he was able to report:

"Conditions in all which pertain to public order and the observance of law have greatly improved during the past year, and many people never before reached have been brought under the influence of the Government.

"Slave-catching, slave-dealing and slave-holding have practically ceased, and observance of the instructions of the duly constituted authorities has become the rule rather than the exception. Occasionally there have been fanatical attempts to cause an uprising; in every instance these have been promptly suppressed and the au-

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thors severely punished. It is regretted that the operations necessary to this end have resulted in the death of some excellent officers and men, killed in the performance of duty, and in a very considerable loss among the Moros. At present officials of the Government can go without an escort, where it formerly required an extremely strong one."

In a lecture given before the American Academy in 1916 on the "Constructive Work of the Army" he forcefully summed up his views of the mission of our military forces. His ideas are by no means those of the majority of his fellow officers, but are rather an expression of his own ideals and conceptions of the rôle of the army:

"I want to say a word to you about the lifesaving work of our country in the tropics through its principal agent, the Army, \* \* \* an agent whose life-saving work has been of infinite value to mankind and to the nation.

"We in America understand too little the work of the Army, too little of what it has done to save life, and we talk too much of it as a destructive force. There are very few who realize that in ten peaceful Fourth of July celebrations of a war finished about 135 years ago we killed some 1,800 people, mostly young boys, and wounded some 35,000, mostly boys and young children. The killed of those ten peaceful single day celebrations about equal all the killed of the Spanish war and the Philippine Rebellion and the In-

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### THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR

dian wars of the preceding ten years. And the wounded of those ten peaceful day celebrations, were, roughly, seven times the wounded of all those wars.

"War is by no means the greatest cause of death among the human race. Typhoid fever every year in this country, until some doctors discovered how to control it, cost 40,000 lives. That number almost equals the loss of life on the battlefield of all our wars since the foundation of our Republic, excluding those of the Civil War. Our industrial accidents each year amount to some 462,000, with a death list of 79,000.

"You take little interest in correcting the causes and conditions which make such things possible, but talk a great deal about the destructive nature of the Army, of which you know extremély little.

"We have heard here to-night, from the speaker who preceded me, that international peace can best be secured by doing away with patriotism, and that there is no such thing as a national conscience. So far as America goes, I claim that there is such a thing as a national conscience, and a very strong and a very active one. . . . The best type of national conscience will only be found where the training of individuals has been broad and sound. The national conscience as a whole consists of the collective conscience of individuals; consequently it depends upon individual training and individual morals. International

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### LEONARD WOOD

congresses can do very little if the training of the people has been unsound and they are wanting in proper moral principles. It is the education of the individual, after all, which counts and this education must begin in the home. If we have decent, moral boys and girls and sound teaching in the home we shall have good morals in public life; and we shall have a quiet, strong, God-fearing nation which, while not aggressive, will. I hope, always be proud of its flag and all that it stands for, willing to defend its interests when attacked, and, while seeking to avert war through justice and fair dealing, will nevertheless be ready and willing to resist injustice and, accept war rather than peace-with-dishonor or peace which involves conditions worse than war.

"When, in 1898, we took over our trust in Cuba, the conscience of the American people decreed that we should not exploit that island, but that we should do all that we could to build up and better the people. For four years the work was entirely in the hands of the Army, acting as an agent of reconstruction. Although the form of government was one of military intervention, with the absolute power of life and death, the Army nevertheless never interfered with the Cuban Courts, but on the contrary supported and protected them; and the record for the prompt punishment of crime was better than in any state of the Union.

"The death-rate in that Island was reduced by

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the Army from one of the largest in the world to one of the smallest. The wonderful results which grew out of the work and discoveries of Surgeon Walter Reed and his associates, who nobly and generously gave health and even life itself to the work, have been applied to the control of yellow fever in our own southern states, in Central America, and in northern South American countries, as well as in Cuba and the islands of the West Indies, and have brought untold blessings to those lands through the doing away with their most terrible scourge.

"The tropics have been made a white man's country so far as this disease is concerned. The number of lives saved in the tropical lands every year are many times the number of those lost during the war, and the saving in our own country has been very great, not only in life but in money, exceeding in all probability many times the cost of the war. Business men appreciate what the periodic quarantines against yellow fever, extending from the mouth of the Rio Grande, along the Atlantic Coast sometimes almost to the Potomac and away up the Mississippi above Memphis, cost the people of the South. All freight was tied up, all movement of individuals greatly curtailed and business practically paralvzed.

"In Porto Rico one of our young army medical officers, Dr. Bailey K. Ashford, interested himself in what is known as tropical anæmia, or

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hookworm disease. He established the method of its control, established a systematic campaign against it throughout Porto Rico, and finally reduced the death-rate from this disease alone in this little island of a million people by 1,400 per year. Here again is a great sanitary discovery growing out of the work of the Army; and, like the prevention of yellow fever, is a discovery which is of immense value to tropical and semitropical peoples. What we for a long time considered as tropical laziness or shiftlessness is traceable very largely to the effects of this disease, so that the discovery of its cause and the establishment of a method of treatment and control means the revitalizing of the people of these tropical countries, as well as of the people of a considerable portion of our own southern states. A recent estimate by planters in Porto Rico places the increased efficiency of their men, incident to doing away with this disease, at 60 per cent. It is hard to estimate the economic value of a discovery of this kind, and it is still more difficult to appreciate the far-reaching effect in the way of the saving of human life and adding to the measure of human contentment and happiness.

"You are no doubt familiar with the recent assembling of troops on the Mexican border, and that at first a great deal of typhoid existed on the Mexican side of the river. This made it necessary to take up the systematic control of ty-

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phoid through the use of a typhoid serum now used in the British Army. It was taken up by our medical officers with such success that last year, with something over 100,000 men scattered all over the world, there was not a death from typhoid in the Army. Contrast this with the conditions at Chickamauga, in 1898, when there were over 1,500 cases of typhoid in that one camp alone, with a huge death-rate. This discovery, made in the Army, is destined to be of inestimable benefit to all mankind.

"Again, in the Philippines, our medical work incident to the occupation of those islands has done away with beri beri. This was not directly the work of the Army, but was accomplished by the medical officers connected with the Insular government, working under the direction of the Insular Bureau of the War Department.

"Other great results have been accomplished in the control of malaria and the general betterment of sanitary conditions. In fact, the whole work in these tropical possessions has tended to the betterment of conditions under which people live, both from the standpoint of government and the standpoint of sanitation. The improvements in sanitation have been more generally appreciated than in any other department of our work, and have undoubtedly resulted in building up bonds of lasting sympathy with the people who have come under our control, for they appreciate [259] in their hearts the great work which has been done for them.

"So, when you think of our Army and its work, do not think of it always as an aggregation of fighting people, bent only on fighting, but remember that it is one of the great constructive lifesaving agencies of the Republic. Its work has been continuous from the earliest days. It was engaged for years in opening up the West, controlling the Indian situation, safeguarding the mail routes, keeping roads open, aiding in surveys. It was the advance guard of civilization and the protecting agent of people crossing the great unsettled section between the Pacific slope and the eastern frontiers.

"In recent years the control of conditions resulting from Mississippi floods has been handled by the Army, handled so quietly and so effectively that few have ever heard that at times 200,000 destitute people were being taken care of each day by the Army. This work was done quietly by young officers who were trained to be obedient, to do things as told, to do them promptly and not to talk about them.

"There is no more democratic element in this country than your Army and your Navy and this is as it should be; and no class stands abuse or misrepresentation with less resentment than the two sister services. We know you do not understand us, our purpose or our work, because you constantly refer to the Army as a destruc-

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### THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR

tive element. You might as well say that your police force is a destructive element simply because it is trained to do certain things with force if it has to.

"Another idea you must get out of your heads is that soldiers and sailors are fond of fighting for its own sake. You might just as well say that the life-saving service down on the coast in winter is praying for gales of wind and rough work at sea simply because they are trained to it. The Army and Navy are willing to do cheerfully what the nation decrees in this line because they are the people to do it. Try to look at the constructive work the nation has done through its Army and Navy and remember that it is always subordinate to the will of the nation. that it is without unworthy ambition, that it hates militarism, that it is simply your agent. When you turn to the work of your country in its dealings with the tropical peoples who came under our control as a result of the war of 1898, remember that none of these countries has been exploited for our profit, that their people have received great benefit as the result of our control, and that they are living under far better conditions as to education, material comforts and health than ever before."

Another point of interest in General Wood's career as a Military Administrator is the strict economy he has enforced, and the minute attention which he has given to insure judicious expen-

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diture of all the Government funds and property entrusted to his care. The supervision of disbursements, he never entirely delegates to subordinates, no matter how competent and trustworthy they may be.

This phase of his work is illustrated by the following extracts taken at random from his official reports while in the Philippines:

He recommended "that articles of clothing, including shoes and other articles liable to be injured by moths, white ants, or tropical conditions, be packed in tin-lined cases. Attention is invited to the fact that this method is employed by commercial firms here, and if adopted by the Government would prevent much loss of stores that under the present method of packing is unavoidable. This recommendation has been repeatedly made by the undersigned. It is believed that the cost of packing in this manner would not exceed 10 per cent. of the present loss due to inadequate protection against insects and moisture."

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"It is the policy in this department to limit the construction of nipa (thatch) buildings, and to have all future construction of a permanent character. In this connection it is recommended that a much larger proportion of native lumber be supplied than at present, for, although the first cost may be somewhat higher than that of imported lumber, its greater durability and comparative  $\lceil 262 \rceil$ 

freedom from the attack of insects will in the end make its use more economical.

"Moreover, when the cost of transportation and the expense of the numerous handlings of the lumber which is brought from the United States have been added to the original price, it is believed that it is far more expensive than is at first sight apparent. As there is an almost inexhaustible amount of lumber in these Islands, it is held that the greatest possible use should be made of it, not only because it will in the end be more economical, but for the additional and very important reason that it will help build up local industries."

"The water transportation allowed this department has been reduced by giving up the chartered transport *Buluan*, which cost the Government, including coal, in the neighborhood of \$6,000 per month."

Under General Wood's economical management the diminution in wastage and spoilage of army stores in the Philippines was so marked that at the end of 1906, his first year as Commander of the Philippines Division, he was able to report:

"This year the value of the stores submitted for condemnation was only \$6,483.94, a reduction of \$35,084.38 as compared with the preceding year."

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It would be a mistake to infer that, because General Wood gives personal attention and supervision to the details of the expenditure of Government moneys, he ever allows himself, from a false notion of economy, to lose sight of broader financial issues, or limits himself to those matters for which he is directly and legally responsible.

We continually find in his reports recommendations relating to general construction of an industrial character, such as the following:

"Plans and estimates have already been submitted and approved for the construction of a narrow-gauge railroad from Overton to Lake Lanao, at a cost of \$320,000. Statements have also been submitted showing that the saving which will be made in the cost of maintenance of transportation, sufficient to meet present demands will, in a single year, be almost sufficient to pay for the construction and equipment of the road....

" "The construction of the railroad is therefore strongly urged from every standpoint. . . .

"The saving in the expense of transportation alone not only justifies but demands the construction of this road, and aside from the military features of the case, the railroad will do much to help open up the interior of the country."

This interest in the "interior of the country" is typical of his constant effort to make the [264]

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# THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR

Army in all things the servant of the people among whom it is stationed, as will be indicated by the following characteristic statements in other parts in his Philippine reports:

"Seeds of various grasses have, during the past year, been procured from the Agricultural Department of the United States for the purpose of making experiments, especially about Lake Lanao, to determine the feasibility of raising forage. It is believed that alfalfa and other grasses will do well in certain portions of these islands. It is recommended that experiments on a large scale be authorized in order that steps may be taken to furnish forage for transportation animals, and for cavalry and artillery horses. It seems poor policy to transport hay from the central portion of the United States to a country where vegetation is as luxuriant as it is in the Philippines, and where it is certain that nutritious and entirely satisfactory grasses for animals can be grown.

"It is believed that as soon as the adaptability of various grasses has been established, the inhabitants of the islands will be able to produce fodder equal to the demands of the market. Such a procedure would not only very greatly reduce the cost of the maintenance of mounted troops in these islands, but would add very materially to the income and prosperity of the inhabitants."

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"In the department of the Visayas there has been a general condition of good order except in the Island of Samar, a large portion of which has been kept in a condition of disorder as a result of the operations of a large number of ignorant fanatics of a low type, known as pulajanes. . . .

"The pulajanes are a combination of ignorance and fanaticism. They obey implicitly the orders of their popes and other leaders, religious or political. Covered with *anting-antings* and other equally worthless charms they believe themselves to be invisible and invulnerable. . . They illustrate the undeveloped condition of the great mass of the people and the readiness with which these naturally peaceful people are led to extremities by false leaders. These disturbances, as military matters, are of little significance, but they are very injurious to the welfare of the Island in that they disturb the economic life of the people and thereby prevent the investment of capital and the extension of industry."

While Commander of the Philippines Division, General Wood took a leading part in organizing the annual Carnival at Manila on a new basis. He dignified it into a national fête which has since become known across the world, and in which the Americans and Filipinos jointly participate; he used it successfully as a means of drawing together the two races.

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As a military administrator General Wood long ago appreciated the necessity of improving the standard of the regular army officer, and clearly foresaw the weaknesses which only became generally apparent a decade later when we entered into the World War. As far back as 1906 he wrote:

"In the line and staff there are a considerable number of officers who entered the service as a result of the war with Spain, and . . . who, now that a condition of peace is established, are found to be of a type which is not desirable to continue in the regular service. . . .

"The class of officers referred to is made up of the men who find the hard and serious work of an officer's career different from what they had expected. This, combined with the lack of excitement, has rendered them indifferent to improvement and in some instances to the discharge of duty.

"It is difficult to eliminate this class by the means now afforded, as many of them, while far from keen, consider the position of an officer a sufficiently good one to hold on to as a means of livelihood. . . Under present conditions it requires a most serious breach of discipline or of law effectually to retard or prevent promotion. As long as this condition exists, we must expect that lazy and indifferent officers will take advantage of it. It is most desirable to get rid of these.

"Moreover, a large percentage of the field offi-

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cers are too old for their positions. They have reached field rank only in the latter stages of their career. Many of them fully realize what is apparent to others, that their condition is not such as to enable them . . . to perform their full duty in the field or even in the office. Elimination among such officers, provided it can be made in such a manner as to do them no injustice, would be to the material benefit of the service. . . . Troops are energetic and efficient in accordance with the energy and efficiency of the officer who commands them, and his energy and efficiency depend very much upon his physical fitness.

"It is desirable to promote deserving colonels ... to general officers, but if the officer has less than five years to serve it is believed that he should be promoted and then retired.

"A policy which tends to keep the list of general officers filled with men who have only a year or two of active service ahead of them, will take the initiative and energy out of the best army ever created. Either promote to high command for a reasonable time or use such promotion as a reward for service and retire the recipient, but do not fill the positions of high command with men who can not, on account of age and infirmity, hold the position to the advantage of the country in time of war, or whose time of service is so short as to cripple their initiative. . . .

"With our small Army there is no excuse for

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carrying a heavy load of inferior personnel. The military profession, like every other profession, has among its members many men who are in it simply for a living, men who have drifted into it, or been induced to enter it through the ambition of parents to have their sons in the military service, men who have almost no soldierly qualities. It would be as idle to suppose that all officers are keen, intelligent men, well up in their profession and devoted to it, as to suppose that all lawyers, doctors, or other professional men are conspicuous for these qualities.

"It is also futile to expect that every officer who is able to pass the entrance examination to the Army, whether he be from West Point, from civil life or from the ranks, will possess those qualities which make a good soldier or entitle him to high command.

"... Some searching system of elimination is necessary to get rid of those who are indifferent or worthless, either through lack of aptitude or through physical or mental infirmity; and also some system by which those who possess special qualifications which in the competition of civil life would take them over the heads of their fellows, shall have their abilities taken into consideration and given weight in the question of promotion.

"... There are many men who are able to pass into the service but who develop very little after entering it, and whose capacity in civil life

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would never have taken them above the lower grades of any profession. In the Army . . . they are at present eligible for appointment to positions of a relative importance far beyond that which they would attain under a system based upon comparative merit.

"It is therefore believed that not only should we have a system of elimination, but that at least a percentage, say two in five, of all promotions should be by selection. By this means alone we can advance over others those who by virtue of their qualifications and ability are entitled to such advance. I believe that Army boards can safely be trusted to make such recommendations; and even granting that there may be isolated cases of injustice, such cases will in no way compare with the great injustice which, is now imposed upon the Army, and upon the really able and efficient officers who are compelled to mark time for a generation behind those who are generally known to be of very limited capacity."

Although General Wood repeatedly made recommendations of this sort, and although for ten years he pressed them to the best of his ability, he was unable to overcome the personal inertia and the caste-feeling of the old-line officers. As a result the regular army faced the World War with the quality of its commissioned personnel far below what the country had a right to expect.

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General Wood also earnestly advocated giving American officers opportunities to travel, that they might thereby acquire the languages of foreign countries and study the tactics of their armies. Admiral Dewey's success at the naval battle of Manila was in no small degree founded upon his first-hand knowledge of the racial characteristics and temperament, not only of the Spaniards against whom he was fighting, but also of the British and Germans who were present with their fleets, and with whom he had to deal.

In 1905, while in the Philippines, General Wood made the following recommendation to the War Department:

"Much valuable information could be gathered by our officers if they were permitted to see more of the armies of other countries. So far as officers serving in these Islands are concerned, this could be effected at small expense by authorizing five officers of each regiment serving in the Philippines to be selected by the colonel upon the relief of the regiment from duty and ordered to proceed to the United States via the Far East and Europe. They should be given four months for the journey and should be called upon for a report on some designated subject. The mileage allowed would almost pay expenses of the trip, and the value to the service incident to such journeys would be very great. The officers selected would see what Eastern and European armies

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#### LEONARD WOOD

are doing; their mental horizon would be enlarged, and their military value greatly increased. The selection of officers should be based upon their record for efficiency.

"Leaves for purpose of military investigation and study of foreign military systems and languages should also be encouraged.

"Systematic efforts should now be made to have a number of our officers acquire a knowledge of Japanese and Chinese. We are at present entirely in the hands of interpreters in all matters where these languages are concerned.

"Most European governments, especially England, encourage their officers to acquire a knowledge of foreign languages and deal with them very liberally in the way of leaves for this purpose, the officers, after the proper period of study, being required to pass an examination in the language selected."

Nearly ten years later, while Commanding the department of the East, he was still emphasizing the same necessity; his report in 1915 contains the following:

"Attention has repeatedly been invited to the value of travel in foreign countries, especially to officers of command rank, for the purpose of military observation and study. The recommendations of previous years in this connection are renewed and urged. As large a number of officers as possible, especially those of the higher

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#### THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR

grades, should attend the maneuvers of the larger European armies each year. . . ."

The good Military Administrator is "he who takes care of his men" (conversation between Socrates and Xenophon). While the thought is an old one, it has been applied by General Wood in many new ways.

In the Philippines he instituted a new yearly schedule, calculated to increase the health and contentment of his troops. He devoted the rainy season to training in garrison, and the dry season to maneuvers in the field. Moreover, he added general education to the curriculum of the training season, and athletics to the order of business of the dry season.

It was he who first officially introduced organized athletics on a large scale into the American Army. He encouraged competitive efficiency in military affairs, and a wholesome interest in athletic prowess and feats of horsemanship.

His quartermaster's department was instructed to keep always on hand the essential articles of athletic supplies, such as horizontal bars, baseballs, hammers and shot, footballs, etc., for sale to company and post exchanges.

Athletic work became a regular feature of the soldier's life. Wood organized an annual competitive military and athletic meet at which all

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#### LEONARD WOOD

units were represented, and which became for the soldiers the gala event of the year.

Field days were held at each post, in every department, on the second Friday of the month. Each department held an annual meet, the winners being sent to the Philippine Championship Meet at Manila, to which also went the best batteries, wagon trains and supply trains; each regimental commander sent his best company.

Military tournaments were combined with the athletic meets, and the soldiers, in consequence, took an added interest in their profession. There were contests between Batteries of Field Artillery to see which could most quickly take to pieces a mountain gun, pack it on mule-back, advance 50 yards at a gallop, halt, unpack the gun, reassemble it, load, and fire a shot. One year the contest was won by the Seventeenth Battery in the remarkable time of forty-five and one-fifth seconds. Another Battery was only a fraction of a second behind.

There has recently been much agitation for the reform of our system of courts martial, but the injustices involved were many years ago fully appreciated by General Wood, and he did everything in his power to mitigate them. When Commander of the Eastern Department in 1909, he recommended that:

"The present system of handling military convicts should be changed and a procedure inaugu-

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rated looking to reform as well as punishment, in which it will be possible for prisoners by good conduct to obtain a standing which will entitle them to reënlistment in the Army on the approval of the Secretary of War. Many men are dishonorably discharged on five previous convictions, all of them for minor offenses; they are not, in the usual sense of the term, convicts. The designation convict should be limited to those who have been found guilty of serious offenses. Many of the men now held as military convicts would, with opportunity, demonstrate their fitness for another chance. It should be possible for them to earn it. . . ."

He took particular interest in the status of men court-martialed for desertion in time of peace. In 1911, as Chief of Staff, he was able to report as follows:

"Careful consideration is being given to the adoption of a system of handling men charged with the offense of desertion. Punishment, while an essential part of the treatment of deserters, should not be the principal object, but rather correction and reform. \* \* \*

"The really serious question is what to do with the deserter when he has been captured, or, as is often the case, has given himself up.

"Prisoners guilty of purely military offenses should be separated from and dealt with entirely differently than those charged with statutory or common-law crimes and offenses.

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"It is believed that under a better system of handling the deserter, a very large proportion of the men now lost to the service and sent back to civil life branded as convicts could be saved and made valuable members of the community. Under present conditions a man found guilty of desertion has no chance to redeem himself, and to earn by good conduct a chance to serve honorably as a soldier. No matter how much he may desire to clear his name he can not do so.

"Most of the offenders are mere boys. The practical effect of our present military prison system and the legislation governing it, is to crush out of these young men all hope of atoning for an offense the gravity of which most of them failed to appreciate, to brand them as convicts and to deprive them of citizenship and hope for the future.

"I therefore believe the present method of handling these young men to be fundamentally wrong, contrary to modern penology and to the application of just and humane principles, and that it is doing infinite harm to those brought under its influence.

"These young men enter the Army at an age when their characters are largely unformed and leave the service as they would leave any other job they are tired of, little understanding the gravity of this offense. Many of them can be reformed. This should be our purpose in all cases. We must give these young men one chance to

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make good and to earn, by good conduct, an honorable discharge. We do not do it under the present system."

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As a Military Administrator it was always General Wood's effort so to conduct his command that every enlisted man in it gained permanent advantage from his service. To quote General Wood's own words, the ex-soldier should be sent "back to civil life a more valuable industrial factor because of better physique, improved mental and physical discipline, and a greater respect for the flag, for law and order, and for his superiors."

He is always looking for a chance to make them more useful and more successful as citizens. He also endeavors to improve their civilian education, whenever it can be accomplished without jeopardizing military efficiency.

When the armistice was signed on November 11th, 1918, our troops could not at once be returned to civil life, but with the end of the fighting the militant spirit of civilian America in arms fell away.

Nevertheless many of the units abroad were kept marching or standing about in the rain at "maneuvers," for months after the armistice, by officers who could not seem to get it through their heads that the war was over. General Wood, however, without delay converted his division

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into a university, and began to prepare his men for the problems of peace time.

He arranged to have the University of Kansas take 400 of his men into its laboratories. Lecturers came from the Agricultural College to give courses to the farmers among his soldiers. Other professors taught Economics and American History in terms which could be understood by even the most recently Americanized doughboy of foreign birth.

General Wood sensed intuitively and instantly the "next thing," as he has always done. Just as he initiated the epochal Plattsburg movement, while all others in authority were still crying about being too proud to fight, and about a million men springing to arms between sunrise and sunset; so now at the end of the war, while others in military authority were maneuvering and drilling and inspecting, Leonard Wood was teaching Americanism on the basis of the Constitution of the United States. He was urging preparedness for peace just as ardently as he had pushed preparedness for war four years before. He was leading the men under his charge to the inevitable conclusion that the internationalism of Bolshevist Soviets was impractical and vicious.

From Camp Funston, he was assigned to command the Central Department, with Headquarters at Chicago. He arrived there on March [278] ٤

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20th, to find that ex-soldiers and ex-sailors were having difficulty in obtaining employment and in otherwise readjusting themselves to life on a peace basis. Various civilian relief societies were at work, but they frequently conflicted with one another, and the results obtained were not 100% efficient.

General Wood met the situation immediately; within ten days a Central Bureau for reëmployment was in full operation at 120 West Adams Street, coördinating the work of the various welfare societies of the city in their efforts to meet the thousand and one needs of the exservice men.

The Red Cross took charge of transportation, the Jewish Welfare Board of vocational training and apprenticeships, the Salvation Army of clothing, the Y.M.C.A. of lodgings and food supply, the Fort Sheridan Association devoted itself to obtaining positions for professional men, the Chicago Women's Clubs ran a rest room, the Chicago Legal Aid Society gave free legal advice, and the War Camps Community Service ran information booths.

The main bureau itself took charge of the reemployment situation. Its records show that in six months 43,345 ex-service men registered there. Of that number 32,259 asked assistance in obtaining employment, and more than 30,400 found places through the instrumentality of the bureau.

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And finally, two of the most recent achievements of Leonard Wood's career as a military administrator have been the restoration of order after the riots in Omaha, where law-respecting and law-abiding citizens were trampled under foot by a mob; and afterward at the steel strikes at Gary, where, although he maintained public order and although the property of the mills was protected, the strikers said that Leonard Wood was the only man who ever gave them their full rights under the Constitution.

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## CHAPTER XVI

#### THE CONSERVATOR OF AMERICANISM

LEONARD WOOD'S past life divides itself into three periods of activity—his eighteen years of practice as a Surgeon; his brief but brilliant career as a combat soldier; and his successful work as an Administrator which extended from the autumn of 1898 when he became Governor of Santiago, until the spring of 1914 when he ceased to be Chief of Staff of the United States army.

At the present moment it is not any one of these three phases of his life that have been terminated which interests us most. Much more vital to his countrymen is the fourth and most important period in his career, which has not yet reached its zenith—that is his leadership as an unflinching defender of Republicanism against the assaults of Autocracy on one side and Communism on the other; as the principal upholder and prophet of Americanism against the two extremes of Prussianism and Bolshevism, and as the staunch advocate of Patriotism against Internationalism.

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Our people did not begin to appreciate the value of Leonard Wood's leadership in the cause of Americanism until about 1913; nevertheless, it became a vital influence much earlier.

His distrust of Germany and his antagonism to the Prussian system began as far back as 1902, at which time he attended the Imperial German Army maneuvers as special representative of the United States. There his keen mind received its first warning of the trend of events which finally culminated in the World War.

Nearly every one now realizes that the Kaiser and his military clique had for decades been planning and preparing a general war, which taking the family of nations by surprise, should conquer the world, and be the logical sequence to Germany's ruthless conquests of 1866, 1867 and 1870. By such a war the Kaiser hoped to extend Prussian ideals and influence over all nations of political or industrial importance.

In the light of after events, it seems incredible that the countries threatened should have been so blind to the ultimate purpose of Germany's colossal military preparations.

The Kaiser, realizing the futility of any attempt to conceal his country's great military expansion, expended himself in a shrewd effort to camouflage its ultimate purpose. To achieve this end, he exhibited his army at every opportunity, and loudly boasted of its might to the very people against whom it was ultimately to be let loose.

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He successfully applied, on a larger scale, the psychological principle, so cleverly illustrated in one of Edgar Allan Poe's detective stories, where a man skillfully conceals a valuable document from the police, who are searching for it, by hanging it in plain sight on the wall.

The Kaiser proclaimed that all these gigantic preparations were intended merely as a protection for his "peace-loving Vaterland" against possible attacks from France, and we believed him despite the fact that republican France had only one-half the population of Imperial Germany.

Each year Wilhelm II invited the rulers and leaders of Russia and Great Britain to witness the maneuvers of his armies. At such times, he devoted himself to the entertainment and conquest of his distinguished guests, whose suspicions he disarmed by the most flattering personal attentions, and by repeated assertions of international friendship and pacific intentions.

So successful was his stratagem, that he completely blinded the vast majority of the Slavic and Anglo-Saxon peoples and neutralized any considerable attempt at preparedness on the part of the nations threatened; among all their royal personages and military leaders who enjoyed the Kaiser's lavish hospitality and were recipients of his flattering attention, there were only two whose perceptions were not befogged, but who saw clearly through the curtain of sub-'terfuge back to the naked truth behind. Among

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the dignitaries who attended the German maneuvers in 1902 were Field Marshal Earl Roberts, fresh from his military and administrative triumphs in South Africa; and Major-General Leonard Wood, just back from like successes in Cuba. The records of their public services were strikingly similar. Before meeting, each had felt admiration for the work of the other; and after meeting, they found themselves kindred spirits.\*

As they stood together on the plains of Prussia, watching the seemingly endless hosts of German soldiers, they first cautiously sounded one another as to the inference each drew from the pageant, but presently came to a reciprocal confidence and complete mutual understanding.

It developed that one conclusion was common to them both: that this mighty army was never collected, trained and maintained for France alone, but that world conquest was its ultimate aim, in the path of which stood both Great Britain and the United States.

The Prussian Junkers looked upon these two "Engländer" with only half concealed contempt, believing all Americans and Britons to be stupid and thick-headed where *Weltpolitik* was concerned.

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<sup>\*</sup>Captain Halstead Dorey (now Colonel Dorey, D. S. C., D. S. M., Officer of the Legion d'Honneur, Croix de Guerre) was General Wood's aide in 1902 at the German Maneuvers, and gave the author the details of the relationship between Wood and Roberts.

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The Kaiser was not astute enough to realize that these two silent men, with analytical minds and unflatterable temperaments, were penetrating to the very heart of his schemes and discussing the means to circumvent them, as day after day throughout the autumn weeks they watched the "war play" of his numerous army corps.

Their very taciturnity seemed to the voluble Emperor a mark of dullness. Their reserve would have been a warning to a less self-absorbed mortal, but the Kaiser, deceived by his egotism, believed he was producing upon them the impression he desired. Even when General Wood refused the order of the Black Eagle, highest and most prized of Prussian decorations, the Emperor failed to take the warning which would have been plain to any man less blinded by self-conceit; especially when Wood accepted the decoration of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor from Republican France.

Day after day, Roberts and Wood watched the mighty hosts of the German War Lord rehearsing the attack upon the world which was being tested and re-tested until "the day" when it should finally be pronounced invincible and irresistible.

They noted that each German division was as responsive to the control of its commanding general as a well trained horse to the hand of its master. Each button on the tunic of every German private was speckless.

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The two farsighted Anglo-Saxon leaders gradually perceived that a race for supremacy had been started, not merely between the Anglo-Saxons and Teutons, but a more farreaching struggle between the two antagonistical systems of Republicanism and Prussianism.

These first impressions were later further confirmed by visits to subsequent Imperial German annual maneuvers.

Roberts and Wood found themselves in complete accord as to the danger which threatened their nations, and were agreed as to the necessary measures to meet it.

With both of them, to see a duty was to undertake it. Each returned to his own country to begin the long and seemingly hopeless struggle to make his people realize the oncoming menace of Germany's military expansion and growing ambition.

The whole world knows how their warnings were met with public indifference or ridicule, how they also encountered repeated official rebuffs. Nevertheless, steadfastly and unfalteringly, they not only sounded the note of warning, but also used every means in their power to remedy defects in their country's defenses.

In the end they were responsible for the saving of the Republicanism they loved, for although they were not able to achieve any adequate military preparedness in either Great Britain or the United States *before* the conflict be-

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### THE CONSERVATOR OF AMERICANISM

gan, they nevertheless did so prepare the public mind for universal military service, that when the dire emergency finally came, both nations accepted it without fatal delay.

Many people have criticized Leonard Wood for appealing directly to the American people in his campaign for preparedness and Americanism, and maintained that he ought to have confined himself to formal recommendations made exclusively through official channels to the War Department.

It is, however, important to note the fact that for ten years after his first historic interview with Earl Roberts, he did actually adhere strictly to official channels, and made his recommendations only through reports to the War Department, where they were invariably pigeon-holed.

Throughout the decade from 1902 to 1911 his clear vision revealed to him the extreme seriousness of our situation; in proof of which, his recommendations quoted in the previous chapter, although they are only fragmentary selections from his repeated appeals for action, yet give ample evidence of the invariable accuracy of his predictions.

In the light of after events, the absolute certainty with which he anticipated the future requirements of our Army, even to the smallest and least important detail, is little short of miraculous.

For instance, in 1917 the United States Army [287]

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was at last reluctantly forced to admit the vital importance of the bayonet and hand grenade in modern warfare. Up to that time, it had stubbornly refused to consider the development of the bayonet and the adoption of the grenade, yet as early as 1905 Wood had begun to advocate the use of these weapons. At that date, while still in the Philippines, he made the following recommendation to the War Department:

"A suitable type of hand grenade should be developed and made available for use when required. Hand grenades have been frequently much needed in service against Moros, and recent experience shows that they will play an important part in future wars. Thus far it has been impossible to secure from the Ordnance Department a suitable hand grenade. However, efforts are being made to secure samples of those used in the recent Russo-Japanese war. . . .

"The present bayonet training is of little value except as a physical exercise. The men know very little of the possibilities of the weapon, and never will until they are given the material to practice with, and are put through a course of instruction by competent instructors. Each company of infantry should have at least six complete sets of fencing equipment for this instruction."

During the author's service in France, in 1917 and 1918, he learned to appreciate the great value of the 12-gauge repeating shot-gun, loaded

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THE KAISER LEONARD WOOD

EARL ROBERTS

AT THE GERMAN MANEUVRES OF 1902

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


"Not too proud to fight!"

AT PLATTEBURG



Watching the Plattsburgers at drill



General Wood began the training of his mounted troops in spite of the lack of horses.



Typical reserve officers in field uniform AT CAMP FUNSTON





AT GARY



AT THE TIME OF THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE

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with buckshot, for use in close action in raids or in holding outposts. This gun, although simply invaluable, was only issued late in the war, after repeated demands for it had been made upon the Ordnance Department. And even then, we could never obtain them in anything like sufficient quantities. We seldom had more than two guns for an infantry battalion, when at least a score would have been useful.

When we did secure them, they were rendered extremely unreliable because only paper ammunition was furnished, which, under service conditions, in the rain and mud of France, frequently became wet; it then swelled and refused to function smoothly through the mechanism of the gun, which frequently jammed at the most critical moments.

After my return from the A. E. F., I was astonished, while reading General Wood's reports as Commander of the Philippine Division, written in 1906, to come across the following passage:

"It is recommended that each company be furnished with four 12-gauge repeating shotguns, with a reasonable supply of buckshot cartridges with metallic shells. These metallic shells now issued to the constabulary, in this department, are of excellent type, made of cheap composition and cost little more than paper shells. The paper cartridge is unsafe, as, in a damp climate, it is

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liable to swell and stick and throw the gun out of action at a critical moment.

"The repeating shotgun, loaded with buckshot, is most valuable for outpost duty, and for advance guard in a brushy country. Soldiers are constantly rushed, with little or no warning, and the enemy is on them at a very short range, and what is needed is something to stop them instantly. For this purpose there is no weapon in our possession equal to the shotgun loaded with buckshot. . . ."

General Wood's first radical departure from routine methods of gaining a hearing occurred in 1911 when he was Chief of Staff. He then actively opposed certain military legislation, proposed by Congressman Hay of Virginia, and eventually caused its defeat. This proposed law was not only unsound but was clearly contrary to the interests of the country.

In an effort to punish Wood for his activity, a bill was immediately concocted by Hay and introduced in Congress under the guise of general military legislation. This bill was framed with the intention of removing Wood from office. It provided that any officer who had not served ten years as an officer of the line was to be debarred from holding the position of Chief of Staff. At the time the bill was drawn, it could affect no general officers of the army except Generals Wood and Funston, neither of whom were West Point-

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ers, and neither exclusively regular army officers, either in spirit or training.

Senator Root, in opposing the bill, remarked that: "The provision could not better accomplish its purpose if it read that no man whose initials are L. W. shall be Chief of Staff."

Four years later, in 1915, under a Democratic 'Administration, after Wood had been relieved as Chief of Staff and was therefore no longer in a position to checkmate his scheme, Hay succeeded in having his measures passed by a Democratic Congress, and his bill was responsible, more than any other legislative factor, for America's unpreparedness in the great war.

In the light of after events, it is interesting to note that it was a Democratic politician who first dislodged Wood from the groove of orthodox official reports and forced him—realizing his country's danger—to adopt the method of direct appeal to the American public.

From that time he became increasingly prominent as an advocate of adequate preparedness, and a defender of the ideals of Americanism.

"There are many things man cannot buy," he said, "and one of them is Time. It takes time to organize and prepare. Time will be found only in periods of peace. Modern war gives no time for preparation. Its approach is that of the avalanche and not that of the glacier. God has given us eyes to see, ears to hear, and intelligence and memory to gather and to hold

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something of the lessons of the past. If we fail to make use of these means of protection which have been given us, and simply say that because certain things are disagreeable they are to be disregarded, if we make no adequate preparation and neglect the evidence of our senses, we can expect help neither from God nor man and the fault will be our own."

It was characteristic of his energy, as well as of his devotion to his Country, that he was not content to let the matter rest with a single statement,—a sort of verbal alibi. He continued his attack, and his epigrams upon preparedness became famous from coast to coast; he used to say: "The captain of a ship, when he puts out to sea, does not prepare his life boats to overcome the power of any particular storm but makes ready for any emergency which may arise."

Once his fighting blood was up, it was inevitable that before long he should add action to epigram, and his best-known activity took the form of the "Plattsburg Movement." The first two officers' training camps were initiated by him in the summer of 1913, while he was still Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army,—he ceased to be Chief of Staff early in 1914. One of these camps was located at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and the other at Monterey, California. Their student personnel was largely drawn from the universi-

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ties, because Wood realized what splendid officer material they contained. In the first year only 222 attended the two camps, but they represented twenty-seven universities.

General Wood explained their inauguration in the following words:—"The ultimate object is not in any way military aggrandizement, but to provide in some degree a means of meeting a vital need confronting us as a peaceful and unmilitary people, in order to preserve the desired peace and prosperity through the only safe precaution; more thorough preparation and equipment to resist any effort to break such peace."

In 1915, he initiated a corresponding movement among young business and professional men, and the attendance at two camps held at Plattsburg, in July and August of that year, totaled about eighteen hundred, coming from every state in the union. These men made up the famous First Plattsburg Regiment, a band of crusaders which included in its ranks such men as Robert Bacon the Senior and his sons; Richard Harding Davis, George Wharton Pepper, Grenville Clark, William Cooper Procter, John Purroy Mitchel, Frederick Huidekoper, John Mac-Vicar, Percy Haughton, Elihu Root, Jr., Dwight Davis, Henry Hooker, William Marshall Bullitt, Charles Whittlessey, George Edward Buxton, Redmond Stewart, Arthur Woods, Charles E. Hughes, Jr., Tomkins McIlvaine, Benjamen

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Dibblee, George Vincent, Frederick Alger, Dudley Field Malone, and the four sons of Theodore Roosevelt.

History will devote no little attention to the rise and growth of the citizens' military preparedness movement in America from 1913-1917. It is unique. Nothing of the sort has ever before been known in any country. Discouraged and tacitly disapproved by the administration in power, this movement was founded by the farsightedness of one man, and developed by his inspiring genius to redeem his Country.

He was not only the true prophet of Americanism, but in addition to his prophetic foresight he also possessed qualities of administrative genius which enabled him to win the necessary action from a country whose government and the majority of whose people were at first totally blind to the truths so clearly revealed by him. He was in truth not merely "the speaker but the doer of the word."

The men whom Leonard Wood attracted from the universities and from business and professional life were a carefully selected lot, the highest type of loyal American citizens. Hundreds of them were persuaded to attend the camps by Wood's own personal influence, expressed in private conference or in public speech.

He intended them as a leaven which, after their return to their universities and home cities, should stir the great mass of their fellow-citizens

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to action. In order to accomplish this effectively, it was vital that these pioneers should be acknowledged and respected as leaders in their own communities.

Thus, for example, only fourteen men went from the entire Pittsburgh district to the First Training Regiment in 1915, but they included such leaders among the younger generation as David A. Reed, Alexander Laughlin, Jr., Harry Rapelye, Churchill Mehard, Charles McKnight, Jr., Charles du Puy, Grant Curry, John Ricketson, and two sons of Senator William Flynn.

These men were so inspired and impressed by what they saw and learned at Plattsburg during their month under General Wood, that they went back to their home district, apostles of Americanism, and as a result they brought back with them to Plattsburg the next year no less than six hundred and twenty-five converts.

This larger number, between the summer of 1916-and the spring of 1917, so extended their influence and so molded public opinion, that when the war finally came in April, 1917, the Pittsburgh district was spiritually prepared to meet it and heartily to endorse the draft act.

What happened in Pittsburgh is typical, and took place in cities and towns throughout the whole country, and in all the universities, for the ideals and aims of this one patriot were, through

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the agency he created, transferred to a whole nation.

Thus the people of America, led by Wood, engaged voluntarily and, in many individual cases, at great personal sacrifice in a non-political and essentially unofficial movement for a return to national self-respect and courageous Americanism. When the crisis finally arrived, they provided the country with fifty thousand partially trained officers, in addition to her three thousand regulars, and built up a sufficiently strong sentiment for universal service to make **possible** its enaction into law immediately after the declaration of war.

Those of us who attended Plattsburg in 1915 and 1916, heard General Wood speak as follows in addresses to the students:

"If we are drawn into the World War we shall have to raise, at the very minimum, an army of one million men. Such an army will require in the neighborhood of six thousand field officers, and about fifty thousand company officers,—captains and lieutenants. The entire number of regular commissioned officers at present available amounts to only about three thousand, which means that even if every officer down to the youngest lieutenant now in the army were made a field officer, and were competent to fill the position, we should still have only half the necessary supply of field officers, and would have to draw

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upon men like you trained here at Plattsburg, and upon the National Guard for half our field officers, and for all our company officers.

"But not all the regulars will prove successful in high office; this through no fault of their own, but because the present regular army system has warped and dwarfed some of them by its lack of a fair opportunity for growth and development. The average officer, who spends most of his life in small isolated army posts, cannot be expected to have learned the art of leading a regiment or a brigade.

"The test of the regular army in warfare will be whether it will or will not be able to appreciate its own weaknesses. Many of its officers will prove less competent to lead troops, or to serve on the general staff, than many civilian officers who have had only six months' military experience, but who have in civil life had experience in handling large affairs.

"If the regular army early realizes this truth, and makes merit the sole criterion for promotion and responsibility, it will come out of the war with reputation greatly enhanced. If, on the other hand, it develops a class or caste feeling prejudicial to reserve and militia officers and detrimental to efficiency, it will fail in its mission, and will come out of the war without friends."

Unfortunately for itself, the regular army, during the war, did not as a whole sense what

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General Wood had so clearly foreseen. Its spirit was reactionary instead of progressive.

The military censorship, to which our Army in France was subjected, most often served to protect our leaders and the Administration from just criticism, and less often to fulfil its ostensible purpose of depriving the Boche of information. This censorship hid from people at home what was evident to anyone in France; that the strength of our Army in Europe was not in the regular officers of whom we had the right to expect so much; but was in the enlisted men, the pick of our 100,000,000 people, the youth and vigor of our nation.

The greatest weakness of our Army in Europe was the mental rigidity of that type of regular officer who could not realize that a new order of military things was ushered in when America adopted universal service and the draft. One of his most noticeable characteristics was his immediate and autocratic resentment against anything even approaching constructive criticism from civilian sources. This type of regular seemed incapable of perceiving what Wood saw clearly, namely that when the army became the people the autocratic discipline of America's old professional standing army would have to give place to a new and more republican discipline:--a discipline more like that of the democratic army of France, and of our own American Navy.

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In past decades at West Point, the discipline had required that no fault be allowed to go undetected or unpunished, little being said about making certain that no good work should go unrecognized and unpraised.

The cadets of the entering class,—the "beasts" as the upper-classmen called them,—were looked down upon as an inferior caste; and the West Point graduate when he became an officer was only too often inclined to regard his enlisted men as inferiors instead of as subordinates.

If Leonard Wood had had his way this situation would have been modified before the war instead of after its termination. Better late than never, however; and now at last, as a result of the war and after great travail, the end of the old order is in sight. The more progressive regular officers, many of whom have always held sound views on this issue, have taken up the fight against the old reactionary order of things. Such men as Douglas MacArthur, the new superintendent at West Point, and Charles Summerall. Frank Parker, George Moseley, Dennis Nolan, Charles Kilbourne, Halstead Dorey, Gordon Johnston, William Lassiter, William Weigel, Edwin Glenn, and a score of others are earnestly and unselfishly striving for constructive readjustment. All these men had brilliant records abroad and most of them have, at one time or another, served under Wood and become inspired by his splendid Americanism.

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While the building up of democratic spirit and discipline in our army was not begun as soon as Leonard Wood had desired, he did nevertheless bring about an essential re-awakening of American self-respect, and a general understanding of the necessity for conscription.

In the light of after events it needs no argument to prove that without these fifty thousand reserve officers partially trained by Wood, without the system of officer-training worked out experimentally at Plattsburg, and without the immediate enaction of the draft law made possible by his campaign of education, Germany would have been able to crush France and Britain before America could arrive, and then to recoup herself could and would have exacted gigantic tribute from us and extended over the whole world the Prussian philosophy of government and morals.

This frightful calamity would have overtaken us but for the genius of Leonard Wood, who accomplished his purpose in the face of and in spite of steadfast opposition from those in authority.

In 1916 several of our universities expressed the gratitude which America, finally aroused, felt for Leonard Wood by conferring upon him LL.D. degrees. The one from Princeton was presented in the following terms:

"In our defenseless state he has sounded the reveille to waken a slumbering nation from its

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dream of security, bidding us rise and take our place like men to save our freedom and help to save the imperiled freedom of the world."

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# CHAPTER XVII

#### THE WORLD WAR

As soon as he perceived that the United States was drifting on an irresistible current and would sooner or later, willing or unwilling, prepared or unprepared, inevitably be drawn into the World War, he began diligently to investigate the new, methods of warfare.

As the ranking General of the Army, it was only natural that he should take it for granted that he would be called upon to bear an important part in the eventual struggle. With his usual instinct to make himself ready for any duty that lay before him, he asked leave to go to France, almost as soon as the war began, to study at firsthand the new tactical conditions which were there developing, and which differed radically from anything heretofore taught in our own Army.

This permission was refused, but he did the next best thing and devoted himself to an untiring study of all war documents upon which he could lay hands, and to interviews with foreign officers visiting America; when the war forced European soldiers to re-cast their old ideas of

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military operations, while America persisted in ignoring all the new ideas, he made it his professional duty and his personal pride to keep abreast of the times.

After America had finally declared war, it began to be evident that it was the intention to keep Wood permanently in America. His friends were indignant; they felt that they had a just grievance. But Wood wasted no time nursing grievances; he kept his temper and devoted his entire energy and ability to the accomplishment of the relatively unimportant tasks set for him.

"When in 1918 he was sent on a short visit to France," says John Bruce Mitchell, "to make a quick study of the front, to bring back his experiences for the benefit of men training in the United States, he went into an extremely delicate situation. The French and British military authorities realized that he was the foremost military man in America, yet he was not in command of the American Expeditionary Force. They realized that he knew more about European warfare, due to a first-hand study of the French and German armies, than did any man in the American They knew that the British War Minisarmy. try was particularly worried because Leonard Wood had been relegated to the mere rôle of division commander. They realized that his presence in France would be embarrassing to the Commander and Chief of Staff of the American [303]

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army. Leonard Wood had an international reputation. He had been the guest of the French army at maneuvers. He knew the French President, and he was a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor. He knew all the French Generals; Llovd George wanted him to come to England. It was a chance that a man who could not efface self, who was not a diplomat, might have seized, but the whole time Leonard Wood was in France he simply obeyed orders. There was not a word out of him. He sought to see no one, except in the line of duty. The only time his name appeared in the newspapers was when he stood near a field gun which burst, wounding him. When he came out of the hospital, and sailed back to America, correspondents begged him for interviews. Leonard Wood said nothing."

In July, 1918, his Division, the 89th, was ordered to France and reached the port of debarkation. When Wood's baggage was already on ship-board an order came from Washington relieving him of command. This ended the last hope of his serving abroad. The disappointment of his men was tremendous. He himself realized this and also realized that they were certain to consider the order an injustice, not only to him but to themselves, and might let this make them less enthusiastic in action. He, therefore, called together the officers, and said: "I am going back to Camp Funston to-morrow, where I shall give

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the best that is in me to the training of the new recruits who are being ordered there. Do not concern yourselves with my case, but get your minds on winning the war. If you would please me, play your part cheerfully and well. That means, when in action never fail to take your objective, and never be late on your objective."

After the armistice the division, then veteran of many battles, proudly sent him this message: "We have never failed to take our objective; we never arrived late on our objective."

During the war, every time things went wrong with the general organization of our divisions abroad or of our supply services at home,—and more went wrong, at greater sacrifice of life and treasure than has yet been revealed, men who knew Wood's capacity, chafing under the inefficiency which they were powerless to remedy, sighed for his organizing power and regretted that America's army in France was denied the services of her greatest administrator.

"The powers that be" did not underestimate Wood's ability; on the contrary, they realized it all too well. They knew that if he were allowed half a chance to serve his country in a manner commensurate with his ability he would overshadow them all.

But in not daring either to send him to Europe or to elevate him above a subordinate position at

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home, they unconsciously paid him the highest compliment in their power; for their action, and actions always speak louder than words,—is in itself an admission that Wood is greater than any of them.

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# CHAPTER XVIII

#### CONCLUSION

THE two objections which are most often advanced against Leonard Wood are:

That he is too much of a military man; That he is not enough of a military man.

These two accusations are of course not voiced by the same set of people, nor is either of them advanced by any great number, but one or the other is nevertheless always spoken of whenever Leonard Wood is discussed by his ill-wishers.

Whenever he is mentioned as a possibility for high military office his opponents in the regular army always say, "Oh, he is no soldier."

When he is considered as a candidate for the governorship of a province or for some other civil office of importance his political enemies cry out, "But he is a soldier."

It is important to discover who perpetuates these two ideas and from what motives they are kept alive. Since both charges cannot be true, we shall be able to kill at least one of them; or since two equal forces acting in opposition neutralize one another, we may even be able to remove both from serious consideration.

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Is Leonard Wood too much of a military man to be entrusted with further high administrative functions? Yes, in the opinion of the Bolshevists, pacifists, pro-Germans, I.W.W.'s and lawbreakers he is exactly that. He is too military for those who would prefer to have no loyal efficient force to uphold the law and preserve the honor of our country. He was too much of a military man to suit those who preached peace at any price and wished us to shirk our responsibilities in the face of repeated outrages from Germany and Mexico. He was too military not to realize America's dangerous state of unpreparedness at the very beginning of the great war, and to make whatever effort lay in his power to remedy the defective condition of our national defenses.

To him and to Theodore Roosevelt we owe it that we did not enter the war too late to save our ideals from Prussian domination.

The coöperation we finally gave, arrived barely in time to save us and them from German rule, and then only because these two great patriots had been wise enough to realize our danger and powerful enough to re-awaken the conscience of the American people.

The help we gave our allies came in the nick of time to save democracy only because Theodore Roosevelt by voice and pen stirred his countrymen to action and because Leonard Wood demonstrated our acute need for preparedness.

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Wood was also too military to suit the Germans. They knew from their spies in America how in 1915 and 1916 he was rousing and preparing the American people, and when we finally entered the war they naturally hoped that any one but Wood might be sent to France in command. They had of course no great opinion of the purely military skill of any American; knowing, as they knew every detail of our unpreparedness, that none of our officers had ever maneuvered even a division. But they also knew that to execute an attack is only a very small part of the responsibility of a Commander-in-Chief. They knew that in converting millions of raw recruits into an effective army, the chief requisite is organizing ability and that a great executive is much rarer than a skillful tactical commander. They were willing to concede that America might possibly have better troop leaders than Wood, but they were confident that a truly great administrator like Wood could not occur twice in one country in one generation.

Yes, for the Germans, General Wood was decidedly too military, but he was not too military for the statesmen of Great Britain and France, who repeatedly and anxiously wondered why he was not on the Western Front.

The charge that Wood is not military enough comes almost exclusively from certain of his fellow officers in the regular army,—a minority cut [309] and dried in the West Point-Leavenworth mold.

This is because he never views public affairs solely from the standpoint of the soldier.

Moreover, from the very fact that his early education was not military, his mind remains flexible and receptive to any new ideas in the art of war.

Therefore we are led to disagree with that minority which thinks him not military enough.

We rejoice that Wood escaped a West Point training, for the varied education, theoretical and practical, which he did obtain left him as much of a military man in experience, and as little of a military man at heart, as was George Washington. Both men entered the army from civil life, without any special military training, and each resorted to military measures only as a last resort.

Leonard Wood's military governorship both in Cuba and in the Philippines attracted the attention and won the admiration of all civilized countries for the very reason that his methods of reorganization were based on constructive, hygienic, legal and educational reforms, and were not forced upon the people by military pressure, to which all other colonial governors had found it necessary to resort. Never before in the history of the world did any colonial administrator have in his methods so small an element of military compulsion.

After his governorship of Cuba had termi-[310] nated, he was able truthfully to say: "Although our government in Cuba was in form a military occupation, the Cuban civil courts were actually in control from start to finish."

Leonard Wood is not military enough to repress or oppress any people or class struggling toward greater freedom. Although of long lineage and honorable ancestry, he himself rose from humble circumstances, and therefore has deep sympathy with and a clear understanding of the difficulties which beset the masses of our people striving towards improved living conditions.

He is ever firm in maintaining the law, but just as diligent in his efforts to bring about modifications of laws which have proved oppressive to the masses of any country where he has been in power.

He is not too military for times of peace and harmony, but is military enough to use force as a last resort whenever the safety of our Country is at stake and to deal effectively with such an emergency as a Bolshevist revolution. And, above all, he is a competent executive; a business man fitted to deal effectively with economic readjustments which face our country. He is by training, ability and temperament America's greatest Administrator.

# When Wood entered Harvard College in [311]

1880, he was without influential friends, with no important family connections, and without any money except what he could himself earn, while he was studying, yet before he reached middle age, he had, by sheer ability and indomitable courage, attained preëminent success in three widely divergent lines of activity.

As a surgeon, he was so successful that he became the personal physician of two successive Presidents of the United States, one a Democrat, the other a Republican.

As a soldier, his record was, for twenty years, the most brilliant of his generation in the Army.

As a colonial administrator, his reputation is approached only by that of Lord Milner in South Africa, and by that of Lord Cromer in Egypt.

But, after all, the most important element in Leonard Wood's career is not how good a soldier he is, nor how skillful a surgeon, nor how efficient an administrator. What is, at the present moment, most vital is the fact that his successive triumphs in such widely divergent professions, each undertaken under hampering conditions, reveal to his countrymen the superabundant energy, the native ability and the sterling character which enabled him to rise to preëminent success in every position to which he has been called.

We are recording the life of a man whose career is by no means finished, but whose past achievements give us just grounds for complet-

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# CONCLUSION

ing his biography with the reasonable prediction that he will attain an equally great success in the fourth, final and highest stage of his life's work, which is his present championship of the ideals of Americanism, built on the basis of the Constitution of the United States.

A man's judgment in future problems involving his country's welfare can be fairly measured only by the accuracy of his past predictions of events which have since taken place, and not by his cleverness in explaining away his previous misconceptions. A man's future ability to serve his nation can best be estimated by the number and magnitude of the practical results he has actually achieved in the past, not by his expertness in writing excuses for having failed of such attainment.

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Judged by these two standards, Leonard Wood's record is flawless. He has ever been a true prophet in all matters pertaining to the political and military welfare of his native land, its allies and dependencies. He has never had to make excuses, for although the administrative tasks successfully allotted to him have been vast in scope, he has never in any one of them fallen short of exceptional success.

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# APPENDIX A'

#### OPINIONS BY ASSOCIATES OF LEONARD WOOD

General Lawton, April 15th, 1898, speaking of Wood's part in the Geronimo Campaign.

"I SERVED through the war of the rebellion and in many battles, but in no instance do I remember such devotion to duty or such an example of courage and perserverance. It was mainly due to Captain Wood's loyalty and resolution that the expedition was successful."

On September 9th, 1886, during the campoign, Lawton had written:

"I desire to particularly invite the attention of the department commander to Asst. Surg. Leonard Wood, the only officer who has been with me through the whole campaign. His courage, energy, and loyal support during the whole time, his encouraging example to the command when work was the hardest and prospects darkest, his thorough confidence and belief in the final success of the expedition, and his untiring efforts to make it so, have placed me under obligations so great that I can not even express them. . . ."

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Theodore Roosevelt, speaking of the Geronimo Campaign.

"The young doctor, tall, broad-chested, with his lightyellow hair and blue eyes, soon showed the stuff of which he was made. Hardly any of the whites, whether soldiers or frontiersmen, could last with him; and the friendly Indian trailers themselves could not wear him down. . . .

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"On expeditions of this kind, where the work is so exhausting as to call for the last ounce of reserve strength and courage in the man, only a very high type of officer can succeed. Wood, however, never called upon his men to do anything that he himself did not do. They ran no risk that he did not run; they endured no hardship which he did not endure; intolerable fatigue, intolerable thirst, never-satisfied hunger, and the strain of unending watchfulness against the most cruel and dangerous of foes: through all this Wood led his men until the final hour of signal success. When he ended the campaign, he had won the high regard of his superior officers not merely for courage and endurance, but for judgment and entire trustworthiness. A young man who is high of heart, clean of life, incapable of a mean or ungenerous action, and burning with the desire to honorably distinguish himself needs only the opportunity in order to do good work for his country.

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Commended for "gallant and hazardous service, courage, and energy, encouraging the command under the most trying circumstances, and for untiring efforts in the campaign against hostile Apaché Indians in Sonora, Mexico, during the greater part of which he commanded the detachment of infantry." (General Orders, No. 39, Headquarters of the Army, April 9, 1891.)

Leonard Wood received his Congressional Medal of Honor as a result of the following correspondence:

# INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE, Los Angeles, Cal., July 22, 1894.

MAJ. J. G. GILMORE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

"SIR: Referring to . . . recommendations for brevet for Asst. Surg. Leonard Wood for gallant and hazardous service while serving under my command in the Geronimo

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campaign . . . I desire to call attention to some of the conditions which then existed, and which should form an important factor in considering the merit of the service of individuals, and which to a great extent have at this late day been lost sight of.

"The outbreak of Geronimo and his band had occurred more than a year before this campaign was inaugurated. during which time the southern portion of New Mexico and Arizona and northern Sonora had been completely terrorized and the industries paralyzed by this Indian and his band. That portion of the army in New Mexico and Arizona had been operating more or less unsuccessfully all of this time. An expedition of Indians to the stronghold of the hostiles had failed, and the commander been killed. The murders committed by the hostile Indians had reached alarming numbers, and their atrocities were unusual, revolting, and terrorizing. The army were disheartened and discouraged. The confidence of the people was shaken in their efficiency for this work. The press was loud and bitter in its criticisms of their incompetency. General Crook himself was subjected to open insult when traveling on the cars in Arizona. Congress was seriously considering the propriety of organizing a regiment of frontiersmen, and also authorizing a reward of \$25,000 for the capture of this Indian.

"Under these conditions the expedition I had the honor to command was organized and entered upon its work. While there were plenty of good men and officers willing and desirous to undertake the difficult task set them, to that extent had their confidence in their ability to successfully accomplish the object been shaken that none believed any valuable results would be accomplished, and the fatigue and hardships of the work soon overcame the strength of the physically weak ones.

"It is in this connection that I called special attention to First Lieutenant and Assistant-Surgeon Wood. He was not only willing and anxious to undertake the work

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of the campaign, but believed every moment of the time that the issue would justify its inception, and he never lost an opportunity, either by his voice or example, to make it so. As a medical officer he was prompt, attentive, and untiring, but what I now refer to was his work, independent of and in addition to his professional duties, work which he performed voluntarily because of his loyal soldierly feeling, and courage and enthusiasm in his work.

"Assistant Surgeon Wood is entitled to consideration for his energy, courage, and soldierly example exhibited through the whole campaign. Among the special or individual instances I cite the following: On the night of May 20, 1886, while on a trail closely following the hostile Indians. I found it imperative to communicate with General Miles. I endeavored to employ some men at a ranch to carry my message to the railroad, but could not induce them to go because of their fear of the hostiles who were reported to have sent a raiding party between us and the railroad to draw us off the trail. Assistant Surgeon Wood volunteered to undertake the delivery of the message, and rode 35 miles, sent and received a reply to his message from General Miles, and returned to camp by 7:30 o'clock A. M., May 30, having ridden 70 miles, and then marched with the command on foot a distance of 32 miles the same day. . . .

"On the night of June 30, near Sinoquipa, Sonora, Assistant Surgeon Wood, who had voluntarily accompanied the scouts along the San Augustin Mountains to look up the trail of the hostiles, volunteered to go alone, after four of the scouts had refused to accompany him because of the danger, to Sinoquipa to seek important information relative to a party of hostiles supposed to be near the town. Starting late in the afternoon in the direction Sinoquipa was supposed to lie—the country was unknown and without trails. . . Arrived at Sinoquipa about 9 P. M. One Mexican killed by these Indians and one

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wounded were brought in while he was there. Starting the same night he returned alone to camp with the information, arriving about 2 o'clock A. M., having traveled a distance of about 34 miles.

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"July 2 the cavalry, having become exhausted, was left in camp to recuperate, and the expedition was continued with infantry only. Through the severity of the exposure, and from the great exertion required, only those possessing great vitality and endurance could hold out continuously. From this and other causes my officers became reduced, so that none were left with the infantry. Doctor Wood volunteered to command them and on July 2nd was assigned to their command. . . . During this time the most trying work of the campaign occured and the endurance of the command was tried to its utmost. Assistant Surgeon Wood marched at the head of his men. and by his example made their work possible. During this time he was bitten by a tarantula. The wound was painful in the extreme and the swelling very great, but he continued to march at the head of his men, making a forced march of 28 miles through an almost impassable country during intensely hot weather, suffering indescribable physical pain, his thigh being swollen to double its normal size and intensely inflamed.

"His fortitude and courage at this time were something beyond anything I had ever before witnessed. On this day, July 13th, the camp of the hostiles was located by the scouts on the Yaqui River, where it flows through some of the roughest portion of the Sierra Madre. The camp was attacked by the scouts under Lieutenant Brown, Fourth Cavalry, and the infantry commanded by Asst. Surg. Leonard Wood. The hostiles were completely surprised, and abandoned their camp precipitately, fleeing in every direction, their camp and equipage, food, horses, and everything belonging to them falling into our hands. ... Following this, and brought about by his suffering and exposure, Doctor Wood was, about July 15, while

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marching up the Yaqui River, stricken with fever, becoming delirious, and in his weak and exhausted condition I despaired of saving his life, but constructed a travois and determined to drag him to some ranch, if I could find one, and there leave him. Before starting, however, he regained his reason, refused to be sent back, was placed on a mule, and carried along until he was again able to assume his usual duties in command of the infantry. . . .

"August 20th to 31st, Geronimo and his band having conditionally surrendered to me and having moved his people to a point near and under the protection of my camp, pending the receipt of instructions from General Miles, the Mexican troops presented themselves in force much larger than mine and demanded the custody of the hostiles. Declining to comply. I detached Lieutenant Gatewood with his interpreter to escort the prisoners to United States territory, following with my command as soon as I could safely move from the Mexicans. Accompanied - Assistant Surgeon Wood, I left the camp of my troops and proceeded to the camp of the hostiles. My command, having missed the trail, did not reach the camp. and I proceeded to overtake them, leaving Assistant Surgeon Wood and Lieutenants Clay and Gatewood with the hostiles, they remaining two days with them . . . at their mercy if they had been illy disposed toward them. Assistant Surgeon Wood was conspicuous on this occasion by preventing a possible misunderstanding by the exercise of coolness and good judgment.

"In commending Assistant Surgeon Wood so highly I do not wish to be understood as implying that he is the only one connected with that campaign deserving consideration. In my opinion he is more deserving from the fact that he is the only officer who participated in the whole campaign from first to last and never lagged one instant in his duty and devotion. I believe that every officer and soldier who took part in that trying work is entitled and, judged by the merits of others who have

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received consideration for like service, should receive either a brevet or a medal of honor, and in some instances both should be bestowed. . . .

"Very respectfully, "H. W. LAWTON. "Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General."

First Indorsement HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST, Governors Island, N. Y., February 5, 1895.

Respectfully forwarded.

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I now most earnestly renew the recommendation, calling especial attention to the letter of Colonel Lawton, which describes one of the most laborious, persistent, and heroic campaigns in which men were ever engaged, and the fact that Capt. Leonard Wood, assistant surgeon, volunteered to perform the extraordinary hazardous and dangerous service is creditable to him in the highest degree. For his gallantry on the 13th of July in the surprise and capture of Geronimo's camp I recommend that he be brevetted for services on that date.

> Nelson A. Miles, Major-General.

Adjutant-General's Office,

February 15, 1895.

Respectfully submitted to the Lieutenant-General, with brief inclosed.

J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, October 11, 1897. Respectfully submitted to the Major-General Commanding the Army.

> W. P. HALL, Assistant Adjutant-General. [321]

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C., December 28, 1897. Reference to the board which considers medal-of-honor cases desired by the Major-General Commanding. J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, March 29, 1898.

By direction of the President a medal of honor is presented to Dr. Leonard Wood, U. S. Army.

Throughout the campaign against hostile Apaches in the summer of 1886, this officer, then assistant surgeon and serving as medical officer with Captain Lawton's expedition, rendered specially courageous and able services involving extreme peril and display of most conspicuous gallantry under conditions of great danger, ' hardship, and privation. . . .

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

The Secretary of War directs that in this case the medal be engraved as follows:

The Congress

to

Capt. Leonard Wood,

Asst. Surg., U. S. A.,

for

distinguished conduct in campaign against Apache Indians, summer, 1886.

> H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.

'Adjutant-General's Office, April 4, 1898.

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# General Miles, said in the spring of 1898:

"This officer served in the field under my command for several months during the terrible campaign against the Apache Indians under Geronimo. He is one of the most enterprising, intelligent, and fearless officers in the service, and competent to fulfill the duties of a field officer."

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

General Lawton, early in 1898:

"When through exposure and fatigue the infantry battalion lost its last officer (in the pursuit of Geronimo) Captain Wood volunteered to command it in addition to his duties as surgeon. In this duty Captain Wood distinguished himself most. His courage, endurance, and example made success possible. . . ."

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

Gen. Wm. M. Graham, spring of 1898:

"With a high sense of honor in all the obligations of life, he is a most conscientious and zealous officer in the discharge of duty. His physique is superb; his mental qualifications are of the highest order."

\* \* \* \* \*

Gen. George A. Forsythe, early in the year 1898:

"Captain Wood served with me on the frontier in Arizona and New Mexico a number of years ago. I have known him well for the past ten years and I regard him as one of the very best soldiers I know.... He has all the sound judgment, good sense, executive ability, experience, and courage requisite to make him one of the best and safest colonels in the Army."

\* \* \* \* \* \*

"Captain Wood is especially gifted for the command of men. He is a man of great ability and courage, and his experience in the Indian wars, and bringing with that experience the entire confidence of the Army, con-

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firms all his friends, of whom I am glad to be one, claim for him."

R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War, April 16th, 1898.

The following extracts are taken from report of Senate Committee on Military Affairs, printed 1903 on the occasion of the Rathbone trial:

"President McKinley appointed Captain Wood to be colonel of the First United States Volunteer Cavalry on the 8th of May, 1898. He commanded his regiment, which constituted one of the two attacking columns at Las Guasimas on June 24, 1898. His brigade commander, the present Lieutenant-General Young, reported as follows of him in this engagement:

"'I ordered the attack, and it was executed in a manner winning the admiration of the division commander and all present who witnessed it...

"I can not speak too highly of the efficient manner in which Colonel Wood handled his regiment, and of his magnificent behavior on the field. Colonel Wood disdained to take advantage of shelter or cover from the enemy's fire while any of his men remained exposed to it—an error of judgment, but happily on the heroic side.'

"His division commander, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, reported as follows:

"'The magnificent and brave work done by his regiment under the lead of Colonel Wood testifies to his courage and skill. The energy and determination of this officer had been marked from the moment he reported to me at Tampa, Fla., and I have abundant evidence of his brave and good conduct on the field, and I recommend him for consideration of the Government.'

"He was made brigadier-general of volunteers on the 8th of July, 1898, having won his brigadier-generalship by the gallantry and efficiency with which he served as

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colonel in the Santiago campaign, as he had won his colonelcy by the gallantry and efficiency with which he had served while acting as a line officer in command of a detachment of infantry in the campaigns against the Apachés.

"Maj. Gen. W. S. Shafter, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, reported as follows:

"'The following officers were conspicuous for their bravery and handled their troops so well I desire to recommend them for promotion: . . . Colonel Wood, to be a brigadier-general.'

"Shortly after being appointed brigadier-general he was made military governor of Santiago. He received the appointment on the recommendation of his military superior, Major-General Shafter, who cabled to Washington on August 4: 'I think General Wood by far the best man to leave in command of the city of Santiago, and perhaps of the whole district.' So well did he perform his duties that President McKinley, on October 7, gave him the command of the Department of Santiago, making him also civil governor of the province of the same name, and appointing him major-general of volunteers on the 7th of December, 1898.

"On October 1, 1899, Maj. John R. Brooke, commanding the Division of Cuba, reported of him as follows:

"'I desire to express my appreciation of the able assistance rendered me by the several department commanders in the transaction of the military portion of our duties in the Division of Cuba, as follows: ... Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood.'

"So well did he do his work as governor of the province of Santiago that, purely on his merits, on the recommendation of the Secretary of War, President McKinley appointed him military governor of the island of Cuba on December 20, 1899. So great was his success in his new position, a position at that time of as great responsi-

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bility, difficulty, and importance as almost any other in our whole Government, that, by way of recognition and reward, somewhat over a year later, on the 4th of April, 1901, on the nomination of President McKinley, he was made a brigadier-general in the United States Army. He continued to serve with striking efficiency as military governor of the island of Cuba until on May 20, 1902, he turned over the government of the island to the first president of the Republic of Cuba. In the official records General Wood's services during these years are spoken of as follows:

(Extract from General Orders, No. 66, Adjutant-General's Office, July 4, 1902, to the Army of the United States.)

"'The President thanks the officers and enlisted men who have been maintaining order and carrying on the military government of Cuba, because they have faithfully given effect to the human purposes of the American people. They have governed Cuba wisely, recording justice and individual liberty; have honestly collected and expended for the best interests of the Cuban people revenues amounting to over \$60,000,000: have carried out practical and thorough sanitary methods, greatly improving the health and lowering the death rate of the island. They have gradually trained the Cubans in all branches of administration, so that the new Cuban Government, upon assuming power, has begun its work with a force of Cuban employees competent to execute its orders. The have transferred the government of Cuba to the Cuban people amid universal expressions of friendship and good will, and have left a record of order, justice, and liberty, of rapid improvement in material and moral conditions, a progress in the art of government which reflects great credit on the people of the United States."" (General Wood was military governor of Cuba during most of the time covered by this order.)

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## Theodore Roosevelt, Januarv 7th, 1899.

"What I am about to write concerning the great service rendered, not only to Cuba, but to America, by Brigadier-General Leonard Wood, now Military Governor of Santiago, is written very much less as a tribute to him than for the sake of pointing out what an object-lesson he has given the people of the United States in the matter of administering those tropic lands in which we have grown to have so great an interest. . .

"The great importance of the personal element in this work makes it necessary for me to dwell upon General Wood's qualifications as I should not otherwise do. The successful administrator of a tropic colony must ordinarily be a man of boundless energy and endurance: and there were probably very few men in the army at Santiago, whether among the officers or in the ranks, who could match General Wood in either respect. No soldier could outwalk him, could live with more indifference on hard and scanty fare, could endure hardship better, or do better without sleep; no officer ever showed more ceaseless energy in providing for his soldiers, in reconnoitering, in overseeing personally all the countless details of life in camp, in patrolling the trenches at night, in seeing by personal inspection that the outposts were doing their duty, in attending personally to all the thousand and one things to which a commander should attend, and to which only those commanders of marked and exceptional mental and bodily vigor are able to attend. . . .

"Both his medical and military training stood him in good stead. I was frequently in Santiago after the surrender, and I never saw Wood when he was not engaged on some one of his multitudinous duties. He was personally inspecting the hospitals; he was personally superintending the cleaning of the streets; he was personally hearing the most important of the countless complaints

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made by Cubans against the Spaniards, Spaniards against Cubans, and by both against Americans; he was personally engaged in working out a better system of sewerage or in striving to secure the return of the land-tillers to the soil. I do not mean that he ever allowed himself to be swamped by mere detail; he is much too good an executive officer not to delegate to others whatever can safely be delegated; but the extraordinary energy of the man himself is such that he can in person oversee and direct much more than is possible with the ordinary man."

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Extract from the report of the Secretary of War (Elihu Root), dated December 1, 1902.

"I know of no chapter in American history more satisfactory than that which will record the conduct of the military government of Cuba. The credit of it is due, first of all, to Brig.-Gen. Leonard Wood, the commander of the Department of Santiago until December, 1899, and thenceforth the military governor of the island."

The War Department, by direction of the President, thanked General Wood and the officials serving under him for their services in Cuba in General Orders, No. 38, Headquarters of the Army, 1903:

"The administration of General Wood, both as military commander of the Division and Department of Cuba and as military governor, was highly creditable. The civil government was managed with an eye single to the benefit of the Cuban people. Under the supervision and control of the military governor the Cuban people themselves had an opportunity to carry on their own government to a constantly increasing degree, so that when Cuba assumed her independence she started with the best possible chance of success. Out of an utterly prostrate colony a free republic was built up, the work being done with such signal ability, integrity, and success that the new nation

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started under more favorable conditions than has ever before been the case in any single instance among her fellow Spanish-American republics. This record stands alone in history, and the benefit conferred thereby upon the people of Cuba was no greater than the honor conferred upon the people of the United States."

Report of Senate Committee on Military Affairs, printed January, 1903.

"General Wood has received each promotion as a reward of signal gallantry or signal efficiency in the position from which he was promoted."

# Theodore Roosevelt,

July 30, 1910.

"Nearly twelve years ago, when Leonard Wood was acting as Governor of Santiago, I wrote in The Outlook about what he had already achieved, and what he could be trusted to achieve. During the intervening twelve years he has played a very conspicuous part among the men who have rendered signal service to the country.... What has been accomplished in the Philippines, in Cuba, in Porto Rico, in Panama, and in San Domingo during these twelve years represents a sum of achievement of which this Nation has a right to be extremely proud. In each locality the problem has been different, in each locality it has been solved with signal success.... This record is primarily due to the admirable quality of the men put at the head of affairs in the different places. Messrs. Taft, Luke Wright, Smith and Forbes, Messrs. Hunt, Winthrop, Post and Colton, Governor Magoon, Colonel Goethals-to these and their colleagues and subordinates the country owes a heavy debt of obligation.

"Colonel Goethals, under whom the gigantic work of the Panama Canal is being accomplished, with literally astounding rapidity and success, is a representative of

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the Army. The share of the army in the honor roll is very large. . . . As a whole, of all the work of the army officers, the greatest in amount, and the greatest in variety of achievement, must be credited to General Wood. And moreover, he has at times combined with singular success the functions of civil administrator and military commandant. The part played by the United States in Cuba has been one of the most honorable ever played by any nation in dealing with a weaker Power, one of the most satisfactory in all respects; and to General Wood more than to any other one man is due the credit of starting this work and conducting it to a successful conclusion during the earliest and most difficult years. Like almost all of the men mentioned, as well as their colleagues. General Wood of course incurred the violent hatred of many dishonest schemers and unscrupulous adventurers, and of a few more or less well-meaning persons who were misled by these schemers and adventurers: but it is astounding to any one acquainted with the facts to realize, not merely what he accomplished, but how he succeeded in gaining the good will of the enormous majority of the men whose good will could be won only in honorable fashion. Spaniards and Cubans, Christian Filipinos and Moros, Catholic ecclesiastics and Protestant missionaries-in each case the great majority of those whose opinion was best worth having-grew to regard General Wood as their special champion and ablest friend, as the man who more than any other understood and sympathized with their peculiar needs and was anxious and able to render them the help they most needed. . . .

"His administration was as signally successful in the Moro country as in Cuba. In each case alike it brought in its train peace, an increase in material prosperity, and a rigid adherence to honesty as the only policy tolerated among officials.

"In our country there are some kinds of success which

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receive an altogether disproportionate financial reward; but in no other country is the financial reward so small for the kind of service done by Leonard Wood and by the other men whose names I have given above. General Wood is an army officer with nothing but an army officer's pay, and we accept it as a matter of course that he should have received practically no pecuniary reward for those services which he rendered in positions not such as an army officer usually occupies. There is not another big country in the world where he would not have received a substantial reward such as here no one even thinks of his receiving. Yet, after all, the reward for which he most cares is the opportunity to render service, and this opportunity has been given him again and again."

"General Wood is easily the ablest soldier the nation has produced since the Civil War. If we should become involved in war to-morrow I don't know where I should look for a man to take his place. He would be the one man to take command."

# Theodore Roosevelt, 1908.

"General Leonard Wood combines in a very high degree the qualities of entire manliness with entire uprightness and cleanliness of character. He is a man of high ideals who scorns everything mean and base and who possesses those robust and hardy qualities of body and mind for the lack of which no merely negative virtue can atone. . . . He has shown himself one of the most useful and patriotic of American public servants, and has made all good Americans his debtors by what he has done. . . . During these last eighteen years he has rendered to America service of the very highest values and of a kind that could be rendered only by a man of wholly exceptional power and ability, ardent in his big-hearted

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devotion to the honor of the flag and the welfare of the nation."

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, March, 1917. \* \* \* \* \* \*

"The higher the position to which he may be appointed, the greater will be his value."

GENERAL LAWTON, 1898.

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# APPENDIX B.

A LIST OF LEONARD WOOD'S ANCESTORS WHO REN-. DERED PATRIOTIC SERVICE FROM 1620 TO 1865:

SERVICE IN THE CIVIL WAR.

DR. CHARLES JEWETT WOOD, his father, served through the entire War in the Medical Corps.

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HIS ANCESTORS WHO SERVED IN THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION.

ABEL CUTLER, Sudbury, Mass., born March 9, 1759.

Served as Private in Captain Andrew's Company in Colonel Marshall's Regiment, 1776. Enlisted June 13, 1776.

Also in Colonel Thomas Poor's Regiment, 1778. Discharged December 16, 1780.

TIMOTHY FLAGG, Waltham, Mass., born March 10, 1741.

Private in Captain Abraham Peirce's Company, called out by Colonel Thomas Gardner in the alarm of April 19, 1775, to march to Concord and Lexington. His Company served until Saturday the Fourth, the day after the fight at Concord.

He enlisted again April 25, 1775 in Colonel William Bond's 37th Regiment at Camp Prospect Hill. The Company marched at the taking of Dorchester Heights by order of General Washington.

Served also in Colonel Dike's Regiment, 1777.

JOHN NIXON, born at Framingham, Mass., March 4, 1725.

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Was a member of the Expedition against Cape Breton in 1745, under Sir William Pepperhill, and was at the capture of Louisburg.

After serving in the Army and Navy for seven years, he returned to Framingham, but soon entered the Army again and as Captain fought at Ticonderoga and in the battle of Lake George.

In the Revolution he led a company of Minute Men at Lexington, and commanded a regiment at Bunker Hill, where he received a wound from which he never entirely recovered.

He was appointed Brigadier-General by the Continental Congress on August 9, 1776, and entrusted with the command of Governors Island in the Harbor of New York, being the first American officer to hold that post.

In 1777 he served under Major-General Horatio Gates. At the battle of Stillwater he commanded the First Massachusetts Regiment. Here a cannon ball passed so near his head as to impair permanently the sight of one eye and the hearing of one ear. Owing to failing health he resigned his commission Sept. 12, 1780.

MICAH REED, born in Abington, Mass., February 1, 1743.

Served as Sergeant in Captain William Reed's Company, in Colonel John Bailey's Regiment of Minute Men, which marched to Concord and Lexington on the alarm of April 19, 1775.

Also in Captain Edward Cobb's Company in Colonel Edward Mitchel's Regiment.

His Company marched from Abington to the "Farms" in Braintree, March 4, 1776.

JOHN WHITE, SR., of Marshfield and Blanford, Mass., born 1738.

Enlisted in the Continental Army May 20, 1781, for

a term of three years. Age. 43. Occupation, Doctor of Medicine.

JOHN WHITE, JR., of Marshfield and Blanford, Mass., born 1763.

Son of Doctor John White, Sr. Served under command of Captain Park.

Discharged July 25, 1781. Age 17.

ELI WOOD, of Brookfield, Mass., born February 16, 1753.

Private in Colonel Ebenezer Leonard's Regiment, 1775. Also in Colonel Wigglesworth's Regiment, having enlisted for a term of three years from February 1, 1777. At Valley Forge 1778.

Corporal in Colonel John Rand's Regiment July 5, 1780.

Discharged October 10, 1780.

He named his seventh child, Leonard, after his old Colonel. This son was the grandfather of the present Leonard Wood.

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HIS ANCESTORS WHO SERVED IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1620-1775.

JOSEPH ANDREWS, 1597-1635.

Deputy from Hingham to the General Court of Massachusetts, 1636, 1637, 1638.

Appointed in Arbitration Commission to settle the boundaries between the several Colonies.

SAMUEL APPLETON, 1586-1670.

Deputy from Ipswich to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, 1637.

Associate Justice of the Quarter Court, 1637.

ELLIS BARRON, 1600-1676. Watertown, Mass. Soldier in King Philip's War.

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THOMAS BARTLETT, 1594-1654.

Ensign, 1639.

Lieutenant in the Company of Watertown, Massachusetts, 1639-1645.

Served during Pequot War.

JOHN BENT, 1603-1672. Sudbury, Mass.

In Major Simon Willard's expedition against the Indian Chief Ninigret in 1654.

JOHN BIGELOW, 1617-1703. Watertown, Mass. Served in Pequot War and in King Philip's War.

SAMUEL BIGELOW, 1653-1732.

Representative from Watertown to the General Court of Massachusetts, 1708-1710.

THOMAS BIGELOW, 1683-1756.

Representative from Watertown to the Massachusetts General Court, 1738.

Lieutenant of Infantry, 1741.

JOSEPH BOYNTON, 1645-1730. Rowley, Mass.

Deputy from Rowley to the Massachusetts General Court, 1697-1714.

Soldier in the provincial military forces of Massachusetts Bay.

NICHOLAS BROWNE, 1673. Lynn, Mass.

Deputy to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay from Lynn, 1641; from Reading, 1671, 1672.

SAMUEL CHAPIN, 1595-1675.

Magistrate of County Court at Springfield, Massachusetts, 1652.

Appointed by the General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony to govern Springfield; when it was burned by the Indians in King Philip's War he was a participant in repelling the attack on fortified houses.

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RICHARD CHURCH, 1608-1668, Plymouth, Member of Plymouth Military Company, 1643. Served in Pequot War. FRANCIS COOKE, 1574-1663. Passenger on the Mayflower. One of the Recognized Historic Founders of Plymouth Colony. Signer of the Mavflower Compact. Member of Myles Standish's Company in expedition against Indians in "First Encounter." Member of Plymouth Military Company. GRIFFIN CRAFT, 1630-1689. Deputy from Roxbury to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, 1638, 1663-1667. Lieutenant of a Roxbury Military Company. 1653-1676. JAMES CUTLER, 1606-1604. Lexington, Mass. Member of Lexington Military Company. Served in King Philip's War. THOMAS CUTLER, 1648-1722. Lexington, Mass. Lieutenant of the Lexington Militia under Captain Reed. ANTHONY EAMES. Deputy from Hingham to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, 1637, 1638, 1643. Deputy from Marshfield to the General Court of Plymouth, 1653-1658, 1661. Member of a Council of War, 1657. Lieutenant. 1645. JOHN FAY, 1648-1690. Marlboro, Mass. A member of the Marlboro Garrison during King Philip's War.

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JOHN FISKE, 1619-1684. Wenham, Mass.

Deputy from Wenham to the Massachusetts General Court, 1669, 1679.

Ensign of Wenham Military Company.

MICHAEL FLAGG, 1651-1711. Watertown, Mass. Soldier in the Massachusetts provincial military forces.

THOMAS FLAGG, 1616-1698. Watertown, Mass. Served as a private in the Train Band until 1681, when he was 65 years of age.

CHARLES GOTT, died 1667. Salem & Wenham, Mass. Deputy to the Massachusetts General Court, 1635.

CHARLES GOTT, JR., 1639-1708. Wenham, Mass. Soldier in the Company of Foot at Wenham, 1683.

HENRY GILBERT, 1661-1740. Brookfield, Mass.

Built the Gilbert's Fort at Brookfield, 1688, as defense against Indians.

JOHN GILMAN, 1624-1708.

Councillor, Province of New Hampshire, 1679-1682. Representative from Exeter to the General Assembly,

1693.

Speaker of the Assembly, 1693-1697.

Lieutenant of the Exeter Military Company, 1669. Judge of Norfolk County Court, 1678-1670.

WILLIAM HAGAR, 1659-1731. Watertown, Mass. Served under Captain Nathaniel Davenport in King Philip's War.

STEPHEN HOPKINS, died 1644. Passenger on the Mayflower.

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One of the Recognized Historic Founders of the Plymouth Colony. Served under Captain Myles Standish, 1621. Member of the Governor's Council, 1633-1636. Member of Council of War for Plymouth, 1642. Volunteer in Pequot War. IOHN How, died 1687. Marlboro, Mass. Commanded Garrison House at Marlboro in King Philip's War, 1675-1676. JOSEPH JEWETT, 1600-1661. Rowley, Mass. Deputy from Rowley to Massachusetts General Court. 1651, 1652, 1653, 1654, 1660. JOSEPH JEWETT, 1656-1694. Rowley, Mass. In King Philip's War, under Captain Samuel Brocklebank. Later Captain of a Company. JOHN LIVERMORE, 1606-1684. Watertown, Mass. Corporal in New Haven Military Company, 1647. JOHN LIVERMORE, JR., 1638-1718. Watertown, Mass. Soldier in King Philip's War. Lieutenant. George Morton, 1599-1624. One of the Recognized Historic Founders of Plymouth Colony.

JOHN MORTON, 1616-1673. Middleboro.

Deputy from Bridgewater to the General Court of Plymouth Colony, 1672-73.

JACOB NASH, died 1717.

Lieutenant in Captain Ephraim Hunt's Company in French and Indian War, 1689.

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JAMES NASH.

Deputy from Weymouth to the General Court of Massachusetts Colony, 1655, 1662, 1667.

George Phillips, 1593-1644.

One of the Recognized Historic Founders of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay.

Minister at Watertown, 1630-1644. Active in Founding and Forwarding the Interests of the Colony prior to 1675.

SAMUEL PHILLIPS, 1625-1696. Rowley, Mass.

Preacher of the Election Sermon to the Massachusetts General Court, 1678.

WILLIAM READE, 1605-1663. Weymouth, Mass.

Ensign of Foot Company, 1640.

Deputy from Weymouth to the General Court, 1635, 1636, 1638.

WILLIAM READE, JR., 1639-1706. Weymouth, Mass. Served in King Philip's War.

EDMUND RICE, 1594-1663. Sudbury, Mass.

Deputy to the General Court of Massachusetts Colony, 1640, 1643, 1652, 1653, 1654.

Edward Rice, 1619-1712. Marlboro, Mass.

Member of the West Middlesex Regiment, which was quartered in his garrison house, 1691.

ROBERT SEAVER, 1608-1683. Roxbury, Mass. Served in King Philip's War.

SAMUEL SHERMAN.

Governor's Astistant under Governor John Winthrop. Ensign and Lieutenant, 1667.

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SAMUEL SPRAGUE, 1640-1710. Marshneld.

Deputy from Marshfield to the Plymouth General Court, 1682, 1683, 1684, 1686.

Secretary of the Colony, 1686, 1689, 1690, 1691.

GREGORY STONE, 1590-1672. Cambridge, Mass.

Deputy to General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1638.

JOHN STONE, 1618-1683. Cambridge, Mass.

Deputy to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, 1682-1683.

RICHARD SWAN, died 1678.

Deputy from Rowley to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, 1660, 1667-1673, 1675, 1677.

In King Philip's War, and expedition to Canada.

SAMUEL SYMONDS, 1595-1678.

Deputy from Ipswich to the General Court of the Colony, 1638-1642.

Governor's Assistant, 1643-1673.

Deputy Governor of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1673-1678.

JOHN THOMPSON, 1616-1696.

Deputy from Barnstable to the General Court of Plymouth Colony, 1671, 1672; from Middleburgh, 1674, 1675, 1680, 1681-1686.

Lieutenant in King Philip's War, 1675.

CHRISTOPHER WADSWORTH, died 1688. Duxbury.

Deputy from Duxbury to the General Court of Plymouth Colony, 1639.

In Captain Myles Standish's Company, 1643.

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JOHN WADSWORTH, 1638-1700. Duxbury.

Deputy from Duxbury to General Court of Plymouth Colony, 1690, 1691.

Deputy from Duxbury to the Massachusetts General Court, 1694.

DANIEL WARREN, 1628-1715. Watertown, Mass. Served in King Philip's War.

RICHARD WARREN.

Passenger on the Mayflower, 1620.

One of the Recognized Historic Founders of the Plymouth Colony.

Signer of the Mayflower compact.

Fought in the "First Encounter" with the Indians, at Wellfleet Harbor, Dec. 8, 1620.

JOHN WHIPPLE, 1605-1669.

Deputy from Ipswich to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, 1640, 1641, 1642, 1646, 1650-1653.

JOHN WHIPPLE, 1626-1683.

Deputy from Ipswich to the General Court of Massachusetts, 1674, 1679, 1682, 1683.

In Captain John Appleton's Troop, 1668.

Lieutenant in Captain Nicholas Paige's Company in Mount Hope Campaign.

King Philip's War, Captain of troop, 1676.

JOHN WHIPPLE, 1657-1722. Ipswich, Mass.

Representative from Ipswich to the General Court of Massachusetts, 1695.

Lieutenant, 1700.

Captain, 1708.

Judge of Sessions Court.

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JOHN WHITE, 1664-1727. Haverhill, Mass. Ensign, 1602. Lieutenant, 1697. Captain, 1715. Commanded Garrison House at Haverhill, 1604. Representative, 1700, 1702, 1703, 1713, 1715, 1716, 1710. Clerk of the House of Representatives, 1702. PEREGRINE WHITE, 1620-1704. Born on the Mayflower the day before landing. Captain of Colonial Troops. Member of Council of War for Plymouth Colony. 1675. SAMUEL WHITE, 1718-1801. Haverhill, Mass. Iustice of the Peace. Representative to the General Court of Massachusetts. Delegate to the first Provincial Congress at Salem, October 7th, 1774. THOMAS WHITE, 1500-1679. Weymouth, Mass. Member of the Weymouth Militia. Deputy, 1637-1671, to Massachusetts General Court. WILLIAM WHITE. Passenger on the Mavflower, 1620. Signer of the Compact. One of the Recognized Historic Founders of the Plymouth Colony. WILLIAM WHITE, 1610-1600. Haverhill, Mass. Founder of Haverhill. Captain of first Military Company, 1648. WILLIAM WHITE, 1694-1737. Haverhill, Mass. Representative from Haverhill to the Massachusetts General Court, 1733, 1734. Captain of Haverhill Military Company. [343]

SAMUEL WOOD (or WOODS), 1636-1718, of Watertown and Groton.

He was a member of the Train Band of Watertown. In 1662 he moved to Groton where he was one of the original proprietors, and resided in the town until its destruction by the Indians in King Philip's War in 1676, when he participated in its defense. When the town was abandoned, he returned to Watertown. But in 1677 he signed the agreement made at Concord, to resettle Groton, and the following year went back to Groton.

In King William's War in 1691-1692 his home was made a garrison house for defense against Indian attacks.

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